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ABSTRACT
Growth of multinational enterprises (MNEs) has resulted in rapid increases in the number of 
cross-border, inter-related transactions. Manipulation of the 'international transfer prices' 
(ITP) of these transactions enables MNEs to shift profits between jurisdictions and minimise 
global taxation.
In 1935, the US presented the arm's length principle (ALP), believing transactions between 
related companies should earn equally to identical transactions between independent 
companies.
Attempts, predominantly by the US and OECD, to control transfer pricing methods (TPMs) 
based on the now universally acknowledged, although increasingly inappropriate and out- 
dated, ALP have resulted in the adoption of overwhelmingly prescriptive, increasingly 
demanding and punitive measures.
Advance pricing agreements (APAs) were introduced to resolve ITP disputes involving tax 
authorities and MNEs, offering opportunities to openly negotiate acceptable TPMs in 
advance. APAs in their current form, however, are complex, time-consuming and demand 
sensitive information disclosure. APAs appeal to MNEs suffering only the most costly ITP 
disputes.
A major concern for MNEs with operations in different tax jurisdictions is double taxation. 
This is alleviated firstly, through the harmonisation of world-wide adopted US regulations
and OECD guidelines; secondly, the maintenance and expansion of treaty networks, 
facilitating inter-governmental communication on MNEs; and finally, the introduction of'last 
resort1 arbitration services.
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INTRODUCTION TO
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PRICING
INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER PRICING
Growing Importance of Transfer Pricing
This study begins by asking the most basic and most easily answered question of all: Why 
have companies spread their operations from a domestic to a multinational level. This change 
has led to a large number of problems with transfer pricing and a lot of attention from 
governments and companies.
Arpan (1988) listed a number of reasons, most of which are obvious, to explain multinational 
growth. Firstly, raw materials not available or in short supply for one multinational enterprise 
(MNE) unit in one country can be imported for sale or further processing by another unit 
located in a different country. Secondly, some stages of an MNE's production process can be 
orchestrated more efficiently away from the headquarters, for example assembly plants for 
automobiles are established in lower labour-cost countries. Thirdly, the option of MNEs to 
operate sales and distribution offices in countries and importing goods from manufacturing 
affiliates located in other countries. Fourthly, many services for MNE units are rendered by 
the head office or an affiliate which benefit all, such as an advertising campaign. Finally, 
there are many international financial flows between units of an MNE. Some are payments 
related to goods and services provided by other units; loans or loan repayments; dividends; 
and some are designed to lessen taxes of financial risks.
MNEs are now major players in the global economy. The phenomenal growth of a number of 
businesses is demonstrated by the findings of Benson and Lloyd (1983), who noted that of the 
100 largest economic units in the world, only half are nation states, the rest being 
transnational corporations. Additionally, the 1997 Ernst and Young Report (1997a) points 
out that many multinational companies currently generate as much, or more, taxable income 
outside (as within) their home jurisdiction.
Through the global growth of business, transfer pricing has evolved significantly from its 
origins as a local tax matter (Ernst and Young, 1997a). Elliott (1995b) noted the findings of 
the Ruding Committee which estimated the value of transfer pricing transactions, in 1992, 
involving EC countries as based on 1989 data (Appendix 1). This value although very 
sizeable is much greater today, as Kim, Swinnerton and Ulferts (1997) noted: "It is hard to 
grasp how the global economy has changed since 1990."
Transfer pricing effects nearly every aspect of multinational operations - research and design, 
development, manufacturing, marketing, distribution, after-sales services and most critically, 
an organisation's world-wide tax burden (Ernst and Young, 1997a). It is the last aspect that is 
of particular interest to government fiscal authorities. In 1992, President Clinton cited that 
the US federal government was losing at least $10-12 billion in tax revenues annually (Bucks 
and Mazerov, 1993). The heightening awareness of the potential scale of losses is a reflection 
of the keen requirement of governments to ensure they are receiving their fair share of tax 
dollars (Humphreys, 1994).
The increase in attention from governments, in the form of (more) prescriptive legislation and 
increased auditing, has effected MNE's such that 81% of the firms that Ernst and Young 
(1997a) approached said that transfer pricing had become the most important tax issue. This 
can be compared to the 1995 report (Ernst and Young, 1996) which recorded that 82% of 
firms thought transfer pricing a 'key issue1 as opposed to being 'the most important concern'.
Firms Multiple Motivations in Transfer Pricing
Elliott (1995) explained that a firm may use cost-orientated transfer prices (internal costs) or 
a system based on market prices (external prices). Which method is preferred depends on the 
objectives of an MNE. Elliott (1995) noted, for example, that some jurisdictions thought 
transfer pricing a gambit employed by MNEs to minimise global taxes. The belief that this is 
really the case may be a main reasons that governments prefer that transfer prices be set 
according to market prices, the prices of independent competitors. However, Thomas (1971) 
pointed out, this may not be the optimum pricing method since transfer prices based on 
market prices reflect true value only when they are determined in a freely competitive market 
(Arpan, 1988). Markets are unlikely to be freely competitive by the very nature of the 
multinationals operating in them (the characteristics are more likely to be monopolistic).
Market-Based Versus Non-Market Based Methods
According to Arpan (1988) companies prefer cost-based prices because of the greater
flexibility which they offer compared to market-based prices. Any cost element that enters
into the computation of the base transfer price can be changed as well as the percentage 
mark-up, it is more difficult to change a transfer price based on market prices.
- Objectives of MNEs Setting Transfer Prices?
There are a number of restraints affecting an MNE achieving their objectives. Plasschaert
(1979) suggested the following inducements for transfer pricing manoeuvres:
Restrictions on ownership: actual nationalisation or threats of expropriation, with 
or without 'adequate' compensation, or the obligation to enter into joint ventures with 
local private or public sector interests. 
Taxes on corporate profits. 
Import duties
Exchange controls, such as restrictions on profit remittance or dual exchange rates. 
In addition, it is also useful for directors to be able to take out their fees in low tax 
areas (Kirsch and Johnson, 1991).
Ernst and Young's 1997 Transfer Pricing Report (1997a) looks at the factors considered in 
shaping the transfer pricing policies of MNEs. The study found that maximising operating 
performance came as a top priority for firms. Optimising tax arrangements, documentation in 
preparation for audit and financial efficiencies, which were all, considered important but not 
a main priority followed this. Finally, performance incentives were established as of low 
importance. Were companies saying that tax minimisation was not their main priority simply 
to reassure authorities or because it genuinely was not? If this were the case, would their 
shareholders be as unconcerned with their loss of income.
Leitch and Barrett (1992) made a valuable comment on tax minimisation as an important 
objective and noted that: "It is only one of the many components that follow from ownership, 
location, and internationalisation advantages that arise from market imperfections. These 
other components, such as low labour rates, may indeed be much more important to profit 
maximisation."
It is very difficult to prove that tax avoidance is the top transfer pricing objective. According 
to Outram (1996): "Hard figures about the cost of corporate tax avoidance are hard to come 
by (although it is widely accepted that international tax planning denies the British Treasury 
billions of pounds every year)."
Tang (1992) received information from 98 companies and carried out a similar study by 
"judging the importance of twenty environmental variables that multinational firms usually 
consider when formulating their international transfer pricing (IT?) policies". The results 
were as follows:
Table 1.1
Ranking of 
Average 
Importance
1990
1
2
3
4
5
6,7,8
6,7,8
6,7,8
9
10
11
12
13,14
13,14
15
16
17
18
19
1977
1
4
2
3
6
8
11
9
7
5
16
12
15
20
17
10
14
13
19
Variables
Overall profit to the company.
Differences in income tax rates and income tax legislation among 
countries.
Restrictions imposed by foreign countries on repatriation of profits or 
dividends.
The competitive position of subsidiaries in foreign countries.
Rate of customs duties and customs legislation where the company has 
operations.
Restrictions imposed by foreign countries on the amount of royalty or 
management fees that can be charged against foreign subsidiaries.
Maintaining good relationships with host governments.
The need to maintain adequate cash flows in foreign subsidiaries.
Import restrictions imposed by foreign companies.
Performance evaluation of foreign subsidiaries.
The need of subsidiaries in foreign countries to seek local funds.
Devaluation and revaluation in countries where the company has 
operations.
Anti dumping legislation of foreign countries.
Anti-trust legislation of foreign countries.
The interests of local partners in foreign subsidiaries.
Rules and requirements of financial reporting for subsidiaries.
Volume of inter-divisional transfers.
Rates of inflation in foreign countries.
Risk of expropriation in foreign countries where the company has 
operations.
820 18 US government requirements on direct foreign investments.
Environmental Variables of International Transfer Pricing
'Overall net profit to the company' appeared the most important factor in both years. This was 
followed shortly by 'differentials in income tax rates and income tax legislation among 
countries,' 'restrictions of repatriation of profits or dividends,' 'the competitive position of 
foreign subsidiaries,' and 'rate of customs duties and customs legislation where the company 
has operations'.
In comparison, in 1979, two years after the initial ranking year, Wu and Sharp (1979) found 
that the main criteria affecting the method choice were compliance with tax and tariff 
regulations and MNE profit maximisation (Borkowski, 1990).
Do Objectives Change Over Time?
The following three variables progressed up the above table markedly during the period: the 
maintenance of a good relationship with host governments'; 'the need for subsidiaries in 
foreign countries to seek local funds'; and finally, the effect of anti-trust legislation of foreign 
countries'.
The table also recorded a drop of three criteria over the period. They are 'the performance 
evaluation of foreign subsidiaries', 'rules and requirements of financial reporting of foreign 
subsidiaries' and finally 'the rate of inflation in foreign countries'.
Comparing this table to Arpan's (1972) findings (Appendix 2) it can be seen that there is some 
alteration in the importance of variables over time. Arpan recorded that the American, 
Canadian, French and Italian companies considered income taxes to be the most important 
variable and the British considered the improvement of financial appearance of US 
subsidiaries most important.
Contradicting Objectives
Plasschaert (1979) warned that these transfer pricing motivations can conflict, possibly 
causing more harm than good; for example, under-pricing of exports by a parent company 
may lead to a fall in corporate taxes paid in one country, however, this advantage may be 
offset by higher import duties. Another reason for the under-pricing of exports by the parent 
company is in order to extract profits and capital out of a country, with a weak currency or 
with an unfavourable investment climate which is likely to entail higher import duties in the 
host country.
Leitch and Barren (1992) noted contradicting internal and global profit-maximising 
objectives. They found that since an MNE might aim to maximise the profits of their division 
so it would affect the MNE group's profit-maximising potential. For example, an MNE group 
would want an MNE in a high tax country to transfer as much profit out of the country and 
hence as low a profit level as possible.
In addition, Plasschaert (1979), offered a number of other limiting factors preventing the 
maintenance of an optimal transfer pricing system. The first was the administrative cost of 
handling a successful programme, particularly with a diverse assortment of goods and
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services with production facilities spread worldwide. Governments would be suspicious if a 
company with such operations were constantly changing export prices, but on the other hand 
a transfer pricing system would require frequent updating to keep au courrant with world- 
wide modifications to corporate tax rates, import duties and a number of other factors. Such 
manoeuvring would inevitably affect the profits of subsidiaries, possibly negatively, and this 
could lead to resentment and protests that could invite legislative interest and investigation.
Plasschaert (1979) noted that transfer pricing policies need "central monitoring", planning and 
decision making, yet this often conflicts with the 'profit-centre1 philosophy which calls for 
decentralised decision making authority and, where product mix allows, for freedom to 
procure inputs from unrelated suppliers. Finally, firms usually plan long-run target rates of 
return and fix prices or alternatively follow the 'price-leader1 in the field, and hence there may 
be little "room for deliberate tax- or regulation-minimising fiddling with transfer pricing" 
(Plasschaert, 1979).
How Can MNEs Achieve Their Objectives?
Shulman (1969) noted that companies could achieve lower taxes by circumventing profit 
repatriation restrictions by charging a higher price for imports between related companies. 
Similarly, lower prices could be charged to avoid high import duties in host countries (Al- 
Eryanietal, 1990).
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- The Transfer Pricing Method (TPM) Preference of American and Japanese MNEs
In 1997, Borkowski (1997) attempted to determine whether organisational, environmental or 
financial factors most affected transfer pricing choices of US MNEs with subsidiaries in 
Japan and Japanese MNEs with subsidiaries in the US. The findings were as follows:
1. 82% of Japanese MNEs favoured non-cost methods, a reflection of the cultural 
emphasis on long-run performance and collectivism to achieve best results. 42% 
of US MNEs preferred cost and 53% preferred non-cost methods.
2. Performance evaluation was found to be more important to the Japanese in 
deciding transfer pricing. Segmental profit is more significant to non-cost MNEs 
(which are mostly Japanese-owned). Size was also important since non-cost 
MNEs were generally much larger organisations.
3. US firms were more likely to be audited and this is partly reflected in their 
preference for cost-based transfer pricing methods.
4. US firms reported better financial results, possibly due to their optimistic 
approach, a difference in accounting and reporting principles or because they 
genuinely are more successful.
5. If free from constraints, both US and Japanese MNEs would switch from cost- 
based methods to the comparable profit method and the resale price method.
12
Borkowski (1997) suggested that methods were chosen in response to legislation 
rather than just to maximise operations.
Japanese-owned companies were also used for a study by Cravens and Shearon (1997) to 
illustrate how political-based factors effect the use of transfer prices. They noted that 
Japanese MNEs trust their own government's actions (over foreign governments) and prefer to 
shift profits to Japan regardless of whether the tax rates are lower because of the greater 
certainty and predictability. Additionally, Cravens and Shearon (1997) posited that firms are 
encouraged to set transfer pricing to increase their global competition, which is aided by the 
ability to carry out global sourcing.
Legal and Size Factors Affecting the Choice of TPM
Borkowski (1990) and Al-Eryani et al (1990) investigated the effects of environmental 
variables on the determination of ITP strategies by US MNEs. The latter study concentrated 
on US-based firms and the former looked more specifically at US-based manufacturing firms. 
"The significance of the legal and size priorities rather than other factors in determining the 
choice of a market-based transfer pricing strategy suggests that legal rather that economic or 
social constraints play an important role in selection of transfer pricing strategies" (Al-Eryani 
etal, 1990).
In 1992, Borkowski carried out two further studies. One study investigated the differences 
between domestic and international transfers and the other study involved organisational and 
international determinants affecting the TPM (Cravens and Shearon, 1997). The second study 
found that "tax and tariff concerns, the stability of the parent MNE's economy, the ease and
13
cost of implementation, the use of subsidiary profits for performance evaluation, and the 
degree of the MNE's decentralisation all contribute to the choice of method" (Borkowski,
1992).
Yunker (1982) identified overall market conditions and demand for the product, government 
regulations and restrictions, and economic conditions as motivating criteria affecting the TPM 
chosen.
Benvignati (1985) carried out a study comparing TPMs and company characteristics and 
commented on the preference of large firms, and those with a large number of subsidiaries. 
He found that the MNEs mostly used market-based methods on the grounds that their size 
encouraged attention from local authorities so they felt constrained to follow the most 
acceptable methods.
Avoiding expensive conflicts with local regulatory authorities, Arpan (1979) has the same 
view as Benvignati (1985) that larger firms choose to use the more acceptable methods. 
Arpan (1979) noted that non-US MNEs mostly used market pricing to price inter-company 
transfers. Tang (1979) added to these findings that the cost-plus method was most popular 
amongst both US-owned and Japanese-owned companies. Al-Eryani et al (1990) wrote that 
most of the firms they investigated used a combination of market and non-market based 
transfer prices as a basis and found that those methods ultimately chosen closely abided by 
the US tax regulations. This is an opinion also expressed by Borkowski (1997). Arpan 
(1979) concluded that there is no universally optimal system of international intra-corporate 
pricing (Al-Eryani et al, 1990).
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The reluctance to use non-market based methods is explained by Lecraw (1985) who noted 
that MNEs methodically used these procedures to reduce custom duties and taxes, and to 
circumvent government prices and capital-profit remittance controls. Furthermore, 
Plasschaert (1985) found this more widely spread in Less Developed Countries because of 
their inability to interpret or oversee the convolution of IIP.
Cravens and Shearon (1997) criticised the above reports saying that only legal and size 
variables have any real significance in predicting the method. They noted that: "The objective 
of transfer pricing relates to an outcome rather than the means by which the objective is 
achieved, the transfer pricing method."
Cravens and Shearon (1997) agreed with Plasschaert (1979) and found that, with the 
multifarious inducements to 'practice transfer pricing gambits', MNE's are actually indifferent 
to the actual method, so long as it provides the easiest way of flowing funds in and out of the 
desired countries.
Transfer Pricing in the Decision-Making Framework
The Ernst and Young 1997 Report looked away from the methods, to examine the positioning 
in the organisation of transfer pricing decision making. They explained that since transfer 
pricing affects so many different aspects of an MNE's business (research and design, 
performance evaluation and so on), decisions made in these areas have an impact on the 
ability of the MNE to withstand attack from fiscal authorities around the world. The chart 
below demonstrates a conflict over the residence of transfer pricing in the organisation.
15
HOnce strategic decisions 
have been made and cross- 
border issues are apparent
  Not considered as part of 
strategic planning but viewed 
as a compliance exercise
QAs part of corporate strategic 
planning
None of the above
28%
11%
31%
30%
Table 1.2
Transfer Pricing in the Decision Making Framework
"The Tax function is too often left to cope with decisions to which it has provided little or no 
input. This reflects a commonly held view that taxes are merely a cost of doing business." 
Ernst and Young (1997)
Nationality Affects the Importance of Transfer Pricing in Strategic Decision Making
There is a country-by-country determinant not illustrated in the above diagram. For example, 
48% of German and Swiss owned MNEs brought transfer pricing policy making in at the 
strategic planning level compared to only 16% of Dutch and 22% of UK owned MNEs. 
Why do German firms and Japanese firms (38% at strategic planning level), who experience 
relatively less stern penalty regimes, place so much important on transfer pricing in the 
decision making process? Perhaps the answer to this question relates to the cultural factors, 
for example as suggested by Borkowski (1990) above.
16
Transfer Pricing for Management Purposes
Jacob (1995) carried out a study investigating the use of transfer pricing for tax management 
purposes by measuring the volume of transfers of US-based MNEs. He attempted to 
distinguish between the use of operational methods to decide the location of income and the 
accounting manipulation of transfer prices. The study involved investigating two different 
periods: the pre-US 1986 Tax Reform Act years 1982-1984 and post period, 1988-1990. The 
conclusions indicate that companies with substantial intra-firm sales pay lower global taxes 
than otherwise similar enterprises in both periods. The former types of firms, however, 
appear to have paid less taxes in the later period. This result is consistent with global tax 
minimisation through transfer pricing in both periods (Jacob, 1995). In addition, the 
profitability differences between US and foreign operations are consistent with the 
management of transfer pricing for tax reasons in both periods (Jacob, 1995).
Hoshower and Mandel's (1979) study, however, presents different findings to those of Jacob 
in the examination of transfer pricing policies of diversified US-based multinationals. The 
conclusion they reached was that: "A significantly greater number of diversified, 
multinational, US-based firms locate their transfer pricing decisions at the divisional rather 
than the central corporate level. This is consistent with the policy of decentralised 
management."
Financial Outcomes of Setting Transfer Prices
Cravens and Shearon (1997) looked away from the actual transfer pricing method, instead
17
and the number of countries in which MNEs operate in the 'tax management model 1 provides 
compelling support for transfer pricing policy affecting financial outcomes." Transfer pricing 
methods appeared insignificant and attempts at modelling the results of earlier research failed 
to find a comprehensive set of environmental or internal methods which could explain 
transfer pricing methods. The main conclusion was that the dollar value of transfers 
remained a significant variable of financial outcomes. Cravens and Shearon (1997) finished 
by saying: "The significance of the foreign sales in the return on assets model rather than in 
the total tax model may indicate that it is a variable relating more to competitive position than 
managing the total tax burden."
Overview of the Empirical Literature
The selection of factors which affect TPM choice adopted by the empirical studies in this 
chapter varied. In light of this variation and with recognition of the different research 
methods used, for example questionnaires and interviews, the results of each study must be 
interpreted according to the depth and scale of research undertaken.
By carrying out a meta-analysis of multinational transfer pricing research, Borkowski (1996) 
attempted to interpret which factors most significantly affected TPM choice. Borkowski 
(1996) examined empirical research, carried out over the previous 20 years, relating to MNEs 
based in the US. Due to the inconsistent way in which those studies had been carried out, 
Borkowski (1996) found that meta-analysis was limited. Inconsistencies noted included
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The conclusion: "Only two factors (size and industry) were reported with enough statistical 
data for meta-analyses supported the large corporation/market-based method relationship, and 
were inconclusive regarding industry (type)" (Borkowski, 1996).
Ability of Tax Authorities to Collect Their "Fair" Share of Tax
This section is concerned with a quick overview of the behaviour of governments to MNEs 
with regard to ITP. According to Plasschaert (1994): "Governments aim at maximising the 
country's share of the benefits which derive from international transactions." This is true to a 
lesser extent when one considers the lesser developed nations who are not as equipped to 
understand and control transfer pricing exploitation (Plasschaert, 1994). In Eastern Europe, 
however, as Atkinson and Tyrrall (1997) pointed out, as the economic climate is improving, 
transfer pricing legislation is being introduced. They noted the Ukraine and Russia as 
examples of where this is the case.
Whether the expertise exists to apply transfer pricing rules is disputable, but aggressive 
application may be used to offset this inexperience. MacDonald (1997) used Mexico as an 
example of where this has been the case, with a new law having been introduced which 
assumes all transactions between related parties are not at arm's length. MacDonald (1997) 
noted: "The recent crackdown has translated into tough new fiscal laws making it virtually 
impossible for companies to take advantage of low tax jurisdictions anywhere in the world."
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The governments who are better furnished to understand international trading, are expending 
enormous resources addressing the issue of IIP. This appears to have reached a high pitch in 
some countries, for example in the US. Zach (1993) commented on the US's apparent 
obsession with detail: "There is a trend among the current generation of lawmakers to strive 
for a preciseness that is impossible. In the pursuit of perfection, this often ignores the 
commercial realities faced by corporations, including problems of administration and 
compliance."
Legal Restraints
Although there is a huge commitment to resolving the transfer pricing dilemma, unfortunately 
the courts are still facing problems resolving disputes arising in complex cases. "They (the 
IRS) also found that the length of time it took the Revenue authorities to build up a case 
showing that there were transfer pricing irregularities was such that they were often too late to 
take any action" (Bennett, 1996). The desire may be strong to collect taxes but this 'legal' 
weakness is having a profound effect on the confidence of authorities to administer sound 
rulings. In some cases they overreact; "thus the eradication of abuses may occur at the cost of 
additional regulations, which excessively constrain those enterprises, whose ways of 
conducting business are beyond reproach" (Plasschaert, 1994).
The Power of Stricter Jurisdictions
Humphreys (1994) concentrated on the problem of transfer pricing in Canada where taxes are 
among the highest in the world. He also made reference to the US as the country most 
advanced in transfer pricing and how this has fuelled the major trading partners to introduce 
some level of regulation or definition on the subject. Countries he highlighted as being
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effected include: Australia (Elliott, 1997), Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, 
the Netherlands (Groenen and Spierondonk, 1994), Spain and the UK. In addition, Korea, 
Poland and New Zealand (On the tax borderline, 1995) are countries that have increasingly 
demanded verification of arm's length prices.
Out of the countries mentioned above, those countries introducing more rigid and severer 
regulations, for example Canada, France and the UK, have led the MNEs based there to 
increase the importance of transfer pricing in their decision making (Ernst and Young, 
1997a). Alternatively, the stricter jurisdictions could be identified by a greater percentage of 
firms located there who find it necessary to prepare documentation: 78% of firms in the US, 
61% in Australia, 57% in Canada 51% in Japan and 50% in UK (Ernst and Young, 1997a). 
The actual number of investigations appear to be highest for companies based in Australia, 
Canada, the UK and the US. According to Ernst and Young (1997a): "The fewest 
examinations are conducted in jurisdictions where well-defined regulations do not exist, for 
example Sweden."
Jim Marshall (in On the tax borderline, 1995), Head of International Tax at KPMG said: 
"International groups must expect to have their pricing policies reviewed by the tax 
authorities of the countries in which they trade, and must be prepared to document and defend 
those policies.
Requirements on MNEs are expanding. Comprehensive audits are being carried out by better 
trained tax inspectors, and harsh penalty regimes are being introduced (Atkinson and Tyrrall, 
1997). Although Arpan (1988) made the following comments in 1988 it still remains true
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today: "The heyday of transfer pricing manipulation is probably over, but transfer pricing will 
remain highly significant for multinationals and their financial and accounting staff."
Following Chapters
This thesis is concerned with looking at what attempts have been made to control ITP. From 
the above it can be seen that regulations and increased audit attention have been a part of this 
control and the following chapters will go into much more detail. Chapter two discusses the 
internationally accepted arm's length principle (ALP), the foundation on which a majority of 
countries have built their regulations. The essay looks at the faults of ALP, its inapplicability 
in a wide number of cases, particularly those involving intangible goods, but also the lack of 
realistic alternatives (the theory of global formulary apportionment) available.
Chapter 5 looks at the harmonisation of opinions on the treatment of ITP of the two core 
bodies, the OECD and the US, and the two following chapters examine their influence world- 
wide, with a case-study on the UK modernisation of transfer pricing legislation.
The remaining chapters are concerned with the use of advance pricing agreements (APAs), 
agreement in advance of acceptable transfer prices, and double taxation treaties, governments 
agreeing their share of the MNE groups global profits, as ways to solve ITP disputes.
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Research Methods
The research carried out in this thesis has largely been desk-based. The key statutes used in 
research were as follows:
Year Country/ 
Organisation
Statute Contents
1979 OECD OECD Model Taxation Convention on
Income and Capital
Article 9
principle
enshrines ALP
1984 OECD Transfer Pricing and Multinational 
Enterprises: Three Related Issues
Transfer pricing guidelines
1988 US A Study of Intercompany Pricing The White Paper - transfer pricing 
regulations.
1988 UK Income and Corporation Tax Act S770-773 - transfer pricing rules
1991 US Revenue Procedure 91-22 Advance Pricing Agreements.
1992 US Proposed Regulations Transfer pricing of intangible
property
1993 US Temporary Regulations Transfer pricing of intangible
property.
1994 OECD Transfer Pricing for Multinational 
Enterprises Discussion Draft Part One
Guidelines on transfer pricing
methods.
1994 US Final Regulations Final transfer pricing regulations.
1995 OECD Transfer Pricing for Multinational 
Enterprises Discussion Draft Part Two
Guidelines for intangibles and 
administrative issues.
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1995 OECD Transfer Pricing for Multinational 
Enterprises and Tax Administrations.
Final version of transfer pricing 
guidelines
1996 US Revenue Procedure 96-53 Advance Pricing Agreement
Procedures.
1997 UK Modernisation of Transfer Pricing 
Legislation
Incorporating OECD guidelines 
into legislation.
In addition, there were interviews with a small number of transfer pricing specialists:
Name Title Company/Authority Date of 
Interview
I.F. Dykes Tax Manager Deloitte and Touche, Birmingham April 1998
A.J. Hickman International Specialist, 
Competent Authority 
Specialist
International Division, Inland 
Revenue, London
May 1998
S. Jonsson Principal Consultant KPMG Tax Advisers, KPMG, 
Birmingham
May 1998
C.D. Rolfe International Tax
Partner, Chairman 
Transfer Pricing Group
Coopers and Lybrand, London April 1998
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ARM'S LENGTH PRINCIPLE (ALP)
The arm's length principle (ALP) has become the most popular standard world-wide for 
setting transfer prices. The US first introduced ALP in 1935 with the issue of Section 482 
regulations (which were formally introduced in the Internal Revenue Code in 1954) and the 
most recited interpretation of the ALP is contained in Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax 
Convention:
"[When] conditions are made or imposed between ... two [associated] enterprises in 
their commercial or financial relations which differ from those which would be made 
between independent enterprises, then any profits which would, but for those 
conditions, have accrued to one of the enterprises, but by reason of those conditions, 
have not so accrued, may be included in the profits of that enterprise and taxed 
accordingly."
Since introducing the ALP, the US has continued to play a dominant role in the 
standardisation of transfer pricing legislation, along with the OECD. Both have issued 
material regularly on international transfer pricing (ITP) among related parties and both 
believe in the basic theory of ALP and support the predominant adoption of the traditional 
transaction methods described later in this chapter.
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Arguments for the adoption of such an approach includes the treatment of related enterprises 
as if they were independent of one another. This ensures that focus is solely on the properties 
of the trade, as would be the case with independent enterprises and, as such, allows greater 
comparison of transactions between different parties and a more equal approach to the taxing 
of independent and related enterprises.
On the other hand, to remove any acknowledgement of advantages existing by being a 
multinational enterprise, for example economies of scale, distorts the true arm's length price 
of a transaction. Lester (1999) noted that, "the arm's length principle fails for controlled 
transactions because the special advantages created by these transactions are unique or 
immeasurable". According to Arnold and Mclntyre (1994): "Academics have claimed that 
ALP necessarily produces improper results in some cases, because it cannot account for the 
profits that a group of related corporations typically enjoys from conducting an integrated 
business." Instead, related companies are forced to pretend they have only the same 
advantages as an independent company carrying out a comparable independent transaction. 
OECD (1995) admits that this is considered one of the criticisms of ALP.
Another criticism, a practical difficulty, is that there are circumstances when transactions 
amongst related parties will not exist in a situation involving independent enterprises. The 
OECD (1995) uses the example of the sale of an intangible as a prime example of such. 
Lester (1999) said that the unique nature of these transactions creates a wide price range 
which makes the market price uncertain.
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As far as the US introducing the ALP to prevent the manipulation of transfer prices, Lester 
(1999) noted that the ALP has actually resulted in the avoidance of US taxes. Lester (1999) 
found that the US loses at least $2 billion a year through tax evasion under the ALP.
A number of criticisms of the ALP have been touched upon here and other problems are 
apparent in later chapters, particularly with the narrow applicability of the different ALP 
transfer pricing methods (TPMs). In addition, chapter 5 highlights the overwhelming 
documentation burden on taxpayers and tax authorities and the adoption of transfer pricing 
penalties.
Guidance Applying ALP
The ALP methods adopted by the OECD, the US and most of the world are fundamentally 
associated with comparing the related transactions of MNEs with the independent transactions 
of autonomous enterprises. The OECD guidelines and the US regulations both offer guidance 
on carrying out comparability analysis and this will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 5 
(Transfer Pricing Harmonisation).
To have an idea of the guidance offered by the US and OECD, however, it is helpful to look at 
one example. This is the utilisation an arm's length range, a range containing a number of 
acceptable profit outcomes, demonstrating that there are a number of occasions when the 
application of a method will create a selection of acceptable results. As OECD (1995) noted, 
transfer pricing is not an exact science and so the actual determination of the transfer price to 
be used in any one case requires the taxpayer to exercise good judgement.
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Traditional Transactional Methods
In applying the ALP there are two different approaches that can be used to determine 
acceptable transfer prices, transaction-based methods and profit-based methods. This chapter 
will look at the former, viewed as the most direct technique and customarily preferred. The 
next chapter analyses the theory behind and use of profit-based methods.
The US promoted three traditional methods in its Section 482 regulations adopted in 1968. 
The regulations allow the differences between controlled and uncontrolled transactions to be 
traced directly to the activities between the inter-related companies. In the (frequent) absence 
of directly comparable companies, another criticism regularly sited of the ALP, the emphasis 
falls on finding other significant procedures to indicate activities are at arm's length. These 
approaches, direct and indirect, are reflected in the traditional transaction methods below.
Comparable Uncontrolled Price (CUP) Method
CUP is the most direct determination of ALP, preferred by both the IRS and OECD who are 
in agreement that every effort should be made to employ it.
The method compares the sales price for goods and services in an uncontrolled transaction 
with those in a controlled one. Any difference in prices may indicate that conditions are not 
arm's length, and that it may be necessary to substitute the controlled transaction price for the 
uncontrolled one.
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The OECD guidelines note that transactions are comparable if one of two conditions are met: 
a) none of the differences between the transactions being compared or between the enterprises 
undertaking those transactions could materially affect the price in the open market; and b) 
reasonably accurate adjustments can be made to eliminate the material effects of such 
differences.
According to Section 482-3 of the US Internal Revenue Code (IRC): "Comparability under 
this method depends on close similarity with respect to these factors, or adjustments to 
account for any differences. Factors which may be particularly relevant include 
a) Quality of the product;
b) Contractual terms, (e.g. scope and terms of warranties provided, sales or purchase 
volume, credit terms, transport terms);
c) Level of the market (i.e. wholesale, retail, etc.);
d) Geographical market in which the transaction takes place;
e) Date of the transaction
f) Intangible property associated with the sale;
g) Foreign currency risks; and
h) Alternatives realistically available to the buyer and seller."
This may sound a relatively simple method to apply, however, according to Schwartz et al 
(1995), CUP is extremely factual requiring numerous invoices to be reviewed to determine 
comparability. In reality, it is very unlikely that a direct substitution can take place because 
transactions are rarely perfectly comparable.
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CUP was more suited to the relatively less complex transactions on the 1980's. Atkinson and 
Tyrrall (1997) used the changing structure of the car industry as an example of how the 
method has become less appropriate. They noted that in the 1980's it was possible to use 
independent distributors as a comparator for other dependent car distributorships in the UK. 
Now that all the major car manufacturers have developed their own dependent distributor 
networks, finding such an arm's length comparability becomes increasingly challengeable.
Schwartz et al (1995) noted: "Computing the number and amount of the adjustments that need 
to be made is extremely complex in most cases. The required level of detail makes a study of 
the CUP method the most expensive to complete, but the evidence is the most compelling if it 
exists."
Arnold and Mclntyre (1994) found CUP to be most widely used for goods sold on public 
commodity markets, such as wheat, and in pricing oil and iron-ore. They found it was useful 
for pricing manufactured goods that do not depend substantially for their value on special 
know-how or brand names.
Resale Price Method (RPM)
After CUP, the resale price method (RPM) is sited equal second with the cost-plus method in 
the US hierarchy of preferences. OECD (1994) describes RPM as: "A transfer pricing 
method based on the price at which a product has been purchased from an associated 
enterprise and is then resold to an independent enterprise. The resale price is reduced by the
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resale price margin. What is left, after subtracting the resale price margin, can be regarded, 
after adjustment for other costs associated with purchase of a product, as an arm's length price 
of the original transfer of property between associated enterprises.
According to Section 482-3 of the US transfer pricing regulations: "Comparability under this 
method is less dependent on close physical similarity between the products transferred than 
under the CUP method. Comparability is particularly dependent on similarity of functions 
performed, risks borne, and contractual terms, or adjustments to account for the effects of any 
such differences. 
Factors which may be particularly relevant include 
a) Inventory levels and turnover rates, and corresponding risks, including any price 
protection programmes offered by the manufacturer;
b) Contractual terms (e.g. scope and terms of warranties provided, sales or purchase 
volume, credit terms, transport terms);
c) Sales, marketing, advertising programmes and services, (including promotional 
programmes, rebates, and co-op advertising);
d) The level of the market (e.g. wholesale, retail etc.); and
e) Foreign currency risks."
The OECD view RPM as most useful when applied to marketing operations, possibly because 
the emphasis is not on a product being sold, giving preference to other attributes of 
comparability. Minor product differences are less likely to have as material an effect on the 
profit margins as they do on price. Hence, fewer adjustments than with CUP are normally
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needed to account for product differences when making comparisons between associated and 
independent enterprises.
Cost Plus Method
The cost plus method, last of the traditional transaction methods, as identified by OECD 
(1994): "Takes the cost of production and adds the appropriate gross profit margin. This 
mark-up should be determined by reference to the mark-up earned by the manufacturer's sales 
to unrelated parties for the same or similar transactions."
According to Section 482-3 of the US IRC: "Factors that may be particularly relevant to this 
method include 
a) The complexity of manufacturing or assembly;
b) Manufacturing, production, and process engineering;
c) Procurement, purchasing, and inventory control activities;
d) Testing functions;
e) Selling, general, and administrative expenses;
f) Foreign currency risks; and
g) Contractual terms (e.g. scope and terms of warranties provided, sales or purchase 
volume, credit terms, transport terms).
As with RPM, the cost plus method relies little on the actual product in question and more on 
other factors of comparability. OECD (1994) suggested that the cost plus method is probably 
most useful where semi-finished goods are sold between related parties, "who have concluded
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joint facility agreements or long term buy-and-supply arrangements, or where the controlled 
transaction is the provision of services".
Complying with the Methods
Though these methods may appear very straight forward, to prove the adoption of any one 
TPM means producing a lot of documentation that takes up a lot of time and can be very 
expensive. In addition there is no certainty that the tax administrations will accept the TPM 
chosen and therefore no certainty against being penalised.
Bucks and Mazerov (1993) and Mazerov (1994) criticise the US use of ALP harshly, listing 
these following four shortcomings: 
"The arm's length pricing system:
  costs the federal and state treasuries billions of dollars annually in unjustified and 
unnecessary revenue losses: a public policy failure that borders on the scandalous;
  diverts too many scarce resources, both public and private, to tax planning, complex 
accounting and auditing practices, and lengthy litigation;
  creates inequities in tax payments and thereby tilts the competitive playing field by 
allowing global corporations to play transfer pricing games that entirely domestic firms are 
not even eligible to enter; and
  fails to guarantee any substantial degree of international uniformity in the division of 
income for tax purposes."
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As shown above, the ALP has a number of faults and this is not helped by the fact that the 
traditional transaction methods will not be appropriate in a number cases, not least that there 
may not even be any comparable transactions available. The next section departs from the 
ALP to look at an alternative method, global formulary apportionment, to help answer the 
question why ALP is still so widely acknowledged in the face of so much criticism.
Global Formulary Apportionment (GFA)
The US were the earliest pioneers of formula apportionment, primarily recognising the 
fundamental issues in dividing income of related corporations involved in interstate 
commerce (Bucks and Mazerov, 1993). The approach was then considered with a view to 
applying it on a global scale as international business transactions became more significant. 
Support in the US for GFA, according to Sayer (1995) who quoted Senator Byron Dorgan, is 
based on the idea that it is a convenient way of raising revenue without taxing voters.
The IRS has not been successful with ALP transfer pricing cases taken to court. In 
comparison, they have won a majority of their internal cases and the US Supreme Court has 
upheld the validity and fairness of the formulary apportionment method (Bucks and Mazerov, 
1993). Two revolutionary states, North Dakota and Montana, have so far been successful in 
administering the international apportionment system (Bucks and Mazerov, 1993). With a 
worldwide adoption of GFA it could be possible for jurisdictions to experience a similar level 
of success with court cases involving GFA as North Dakota and Montana.
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The OECD (1995) have identified global formulary apportionment (GFA) as: 
"A method which would allocate global profits of a multinational enterprise group on a 
consolidated basis among the associated enterprises in different countries on the basis of a 
predetermined and mechanistic formula. The formula would most likely be based on some 
combination of costs, assets, payroll and sales."
The US recommended GFA as a mandatory taxpayer reporting system, saying it was the 
method of accounting that best fitted the reality of world trade conducted within a global 
enterprise. It was argued that an MNE group must be considered on a consolidated basis to 
reflect the business realities of the relationships among the associated enterprises of that group 
(OECD, 1995).
The OECD (1995) argued in return that, "predetermined formulae are arbitrary and disregard 
market conditions, particular circumstances of individual enterprises and management's own 
allocation of resources". In addition, they also noted that the ALP is better equipped to deal 
with changing exchange rates, differing accounting standards and multiple currencies and 
hence that GFA was not a more 'realistic1 transfer pricing system.
The main advantage of GFA, however, is that considerably less 'staff hours are necessary to 
complete a GFA audit that covers all international issues of an MNE than to complete an 
international arm's length audit, which might be limited to only a portion of a company's 
related-party transactions (Bucks and Mazerov, 1993). OECD (1995) suggested that this cost
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saving, and much more, would be needed to fund the: "Intolerable compliance costs and data 
requirements because information would have to be gathered about the entire MNE group and 
presented in each jurisdiction on the basis of the currency and book-keeping and tax 
accounting rules of that particular jurisdiction."
It would take an enormous effort worldwide to launch GFA as an alternative to ALP to 
prevent the huge scale double taxation which could arise over the use of conflicting methods 
(GFA versus ALP) and alternative interpretations of the GFA. The OECD (1995) noted that 
to implement such a system, "would require substantial international co-ordination and 
consensus on the predetermined formulae to be used and on the composition of the group in 
question". Deciding on these things "would be time-consuming and extremely difficult and if 
all the major countries failed to agree to move to GFA, MNEs would be faced with the burden 
of complying with two totally different systems." Sayer (1995) quoted Michael Schwartz on 
the idea of the US using GFA: "If the US adopts formulary apportionment, it would be a 
nightmare dealing with other governments." GFA, therefore, appears to be advantageous to 
neither tax administrators nor taxpayers alike.
ALP as the "Best Option"
Because of the disadvantages of GFA (even more are listed in Chapter III of the 1995 OECD 
guidelines), clearly outweighing the advantages, countries are unwilling to make change away 
from ALP. It has taken a long time for the ALP to become so widely accepted among
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countries and it is very unlikely that this opinion will be swayed in the absence of any real 
alternative.
The OECD (1995) admitted that the ALP will not always be straightforward to apply in 
practice, but, in defence of ALP, said that it generally does produce appropriate levels of 
income between associated enterprises acceptable to tax administrations.
OECD (1995) also noted the following: "A move away from the ALP would abandon the 
sound theoretical basis described above and threaten the international consensus, thereby 
substantially increasing the risk of double taxation." Experience under the ALP has become 
sufficiently broad and sophisticated to establish a substantial body of common understanding 
among the business community and tax administrations. This experience should be drawn on 
to elaborate the ALP further, to refine its operation, and to improve its administration by 
providing clearer guidance to taxpayers and more timely examinations.
CHAPTER 3.
PROFIT-BASED TRANSFER
PRICING METHODS
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PROFIT-BASED TRANSFER PRICING METHODS
"Traditional transaction methods are the most direct means of establishing 
whether conditions in the commercial and financial relations between associated 
enterprises are arm's length. However, the complexities of real life business 
situations may put practical differences in the way of the application of the 
traditional transactional methods." (OECD, 1995)
When the products being sold incorporate valuable intangible property, where there is no 
analogous data available or adequate information, it may become essential to "address 
whether, and under what conditions, other methods may be used" (OECD, 1995). This 
suggests investigation of profit-based methods.
These methods "examine the profits that arise from controlled transactions of one or more of 
the associated enterprises participating in those transactions". They must be consistent with 
OECD guidelines and compatible with Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention. The 
methods identified are the profit split method, the comparable profits method (CPM) and the 
transactional net margin method (TNMM).
Profit Split Method
The profit split is probably the most accepted of the profit-based methods and hence attracted 
the least controversy. The OECD July 1994 draft guidelines first introduced the method. As
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noted by Arnold and Mclntyre (1994), the method is typically employed when none of the 
three traditional transactional methods can be applied.
- Division of Profits
The process concerns the allocation of consolidated profits attributable to intercompany 
transactions on the basis of an objective measure of their economic contributions had their 
transactions been between arm's length parties. Each party's share of the combined profit or 
loss depends significantly on the functions performed, risks assumed and resources employed 
(Mawani, 1997). An example of an 'objective measure', or arbitrary ratio, could be one which 
relates to the proportion to capital employed. Atkinson and Tyrrall (1997) pointed out that 
this profit split procedure will inevitably encompass a measure of subjectivity, but can be 
acceptable. This can be explained, perhaps, by the fact that since similar firms are evaluated 
in deciding the arbitrary ratio, then neither is likely to be left with "an extreme or improbable 
profit result". According to OECD (1995): "This aspect can be particularly important when 
analysing the contributions by the parties in respect of the intangible property employed in the 
controlled transactions (see Chapter 6). This two-sided approach may also be used to achieve 
a division of the profits from economies of scale or other joint efficiencies that satisfies both 
the taxpayer and tax administration."
- Functional Analysis
To work out, in more detail, how much each of the parties involved have contributed to the 
transactions it is necessary to carry out some functional analysis. The different types are 
described in detail in Chapter I of the OECD 1995 guidelines and firms are expected to carry 
this analysis out to support the use of any of the transfer pricing methodologies. Mawani 
(1997) highlighted the use of residual analysis and contribution analysis.
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Firstly, a residual analysis divides the combined profit of the related parties in two stages. 
Initially, each party is allocated a level of profit to provide an income appropriate for the type 
of transaction in which it is employed. Market data could assist in the division of this income. 
According to OECD (1995): "In the second stage, any residual profit (or loss) remaining after 
the first stage division would be allocated among the parties based on an analysis of the facts 
and circumstances that might indicate how this residual would have been divided between 
independent enterprises."
Secondly, contribution analysis divides the overall profit or loss based on the relative value 
added functions performed by each party. This process of division is aided as much as 
possible by external market data of comparable transactions between unrelated parties. 
Generally, according to OECD (1995) the profit to be divided is the operating profit. In 
exceptional cases it may be necessary to divide the gross profit and deduct any expenses 
incurred which are consistent with the activities carried out or risks born. The OECD (1995) 
gives the following example when this may be necessary: "In the case of an MNE that engages 
in highly integrated worldwide trading operations, involving various types of property, it may 
be possible to determine the enterprises in which expenses are incurred (or attributes), but not 
to accurately determine the particular trading activities to which those expenses relate. In 
such a case, it may be appropriate to split the gross profits the expenses incurred in or 
attributable to each enterprise."
- Use of profit split method
According to Stitt (1995): "While an interesting concept in theory, it will only be valid where 
all the relevant revenue authorities agree on the underlying basis for allocating the profits. It 
may, therefore, be a useful approach in mutual agreement proceedings (see Chapter 9) or for
42
companies seeking multilateral advance pricing agreements where TPMs are discussed in 
advance (see Chapter 8)." In addition, the method is often used, on an informal basis, by tax 
authorities in negotiating disputes with taxpayers through an internal appeal procedure 
(Arnold and Mclntyre, 1994).
It should be noted that the profit split method is more appropriate than other transfer pricing 
methodologies when the activities of the affiliates of a MNE are very unsegregated and hence 
transactions difficult to measure individually. The benefit of this method is that it does not 
rely directly on closely comparable transactions, and can obviate the need to establish 
transactions between independent enterprises. If a group of affiliated companies has more 
than one product line, the profit-split method could be applied separately to each product line 
(Arnold and Mclntyre, 1994).
OECD 1995 guidelines stated that not needing closely comparable transactions shows that the 
profit split method offers flexibility, in particular the method is acceptable because it takes 
into account: "specific, possibly unique, facts and circumstances of the associated enterprises 
that are not present in independent enterprises, while constituting an arm's length approach to 
the extent that it reflects what independent enterprises reasonably would have done if faced 
with the same circumstances." On the other hand, however, it would be difficult to collect and 
maintain information on the combined revenues and costs for the transactions involving two 
or more related companies situated in different countries. The OECD (1995) noted that this 
would require stating books and records on a common basis and making adjustments in 
accounting practices and currencies. Similarly, it would be difficult to highlight the 
contributions of the different parties or identify the operating expenses and allocate between 
the transactions and relevant parties.
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- Japanese Profit Split Method
In Japan the authority to use the profit split method is found in the 1986 Special Taxation 
Measures Law Enforcement Order, Article 39-12, Special Provisions for Taxation of 
Transactions with Foreign Affiliated Persons. According to Clark and Dodge (1997), 
however: "To the IRS the Japanese profit split is essentially formulary apportionment, even in 
the guise of a profit split method, is not a specified method under US transfer pricing rules." 
This illustrates inter-country conflict even on the basic definition of a universally accepted 
method. One of the problems listed by Clark and Dodge (1997) is that the Japanese National 
Tax Authority (NTA) accepts the use of internal data as opposed to the US regulations which 
point out that such data is far less reliable than external comparable data. OECD (1995), 
however, noted one weakness with regards to external data, used in deciding the contributions 
of each related firm involved, is that any information collected "will be less closely connected 
to those transactions than is the case with other available methods". In addition, companies 
are often very limited by the actual amount of internal and external data available to them and 
furthermore, independent enterprises are generally, not going to use the profit split method.
- US Versus OECD Profit Split Methods
In the US, the authority was initially written in the 1993 temporary regulations and the S482 
regulations contained a list of three conditions which must be met before being allowed to use 
one of the three profit split methods available (see Appendix 3). These conditions are that: 
both controlled taxpayers own "valuable" non-routine intangible property; there are significant 
transactions between controlled taxpayers; and certain administrative requirements are 
followed.
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Unlike this restriction on the use of the profit split method in the US regulations, the OECD 
guidelines show a more favourable approach and express a strong preference for the use of the 
profit split method over the transactional net margin method (TNMM) (the other profit-based 
method allowed). Greenhill and Bee (1996) recorded that the profit split method will produce 
a very different result than that obtained under any of the other methods specified in either the 
Section 482 regulations or the guidelines. An example, from Greenhill and Bee (1996) to 
illustrate this point is that the guidelines would allow a taxpayer to base its profit split analysis 
on projected profits, seemingly without regard to actual profits realised; such an approach 
would not be permitted under the Section 482 regulations.
Another failing is in the required disclosure of the use of the profit split method, included in 
the US penalty provisions, which makes this method one to be used only if no other method is 
appropriate (Schwartz, Zimmerman, Peterson and Seickel, 1994).
With regards to dealing with intangible property (Chapter 4), Boatman (1997) found that the 
profit split method appeared: "The most promising candidate for an arm's length analysis 
where both parties to the transaction own valuable intangible property, since it allows for 
excess returns on both sides of the transaction."
Comparable Profit Method (CPM)
The comparable profit method (CPM) was the most controversial of the main transfer pricing 
methodologies. The US first introduced CPM in the 1988 White Paper and since that time it 
has received a lot of criticism, not least that it represents a departure from the arm's length
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pricing standard. This section will look at what is the CPM, the advantages and disadvantages 
of such a method, how it has been greeted by everyone outside the US and how those feelings 
have (or have not) changed over time.
OECD (1994) defined CPM as looking at: "The profit levels earned by uncontrolled parties 
which are considered comparable based on acceptable criteria, such as size and line of 
business." Alternatively CPM could be describes as comparing the period percentage 
operating profit in controlled subsidiaries with the percentage in similar uncontrolled entities 
on a whole company basis. If comparing CPM to the OECD's comparatively recent 
transactional net margin method (TNMM) (see next section), it can be seen that TNMM 
compares the operating profit on transactions rather than on a whole company basis (Atkinson 
and Tyrrall, 1997).
- Acceptable Range
Furthermore Coopers and Lybrand (1993) state that the transfer price must "...result in an 
operating profit within a range of operating profits of comparable companies". This range 
must be established initially by the taxpayer, for itself or a related party and if results fall 
within that range, then its transfer prices will be accepted by the tax authorities (Arnold and 
Mclntyre, 1994). KPMG has found that for most companies the range of results under CPM is 
broad enough that most companies can satisfy this method (Schwartz, Zimmerman, Peterson 
and Seickel, 1994). If results do fall outside the acceptable range then the IRS are likely to 
adjust the transfer prices so that the profits end up fall within the range, probably in the 
middle.
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Ogum and Kim (1995) suggest an number of steps in order to construct acceptable transfer 
prices using the CPM (see Appendix 3).
Advantages and Disadvantages
The main advantages are that it involves the easiest and cheapest type of analysis to perform. 
Partly this is because operating profit data is often readily available from published accounts. 
However, it is regarded by the OECD as providing a less satisfactory standard of comparison 
since extensive adjustments to the profit and loss and balance sheets may be required 
(Atkinson and Tyrrall, 1997). lan Dykes, Tax Manager at KPMG, Birmingham, (1998 
interview) said of CPM:
"Quite easy to get the information and put it together. That is the point, it is the ease of 
getting the information. It is quite possible that there are transaction comparables out there 
which would be better, more you could hang your hat on, more easily is a third party 
comparable, but finding them is a nightmare, businesses are not prepared to give that sort of 
information. Which means that where there is a lack of that sort of information you are 
almost invariably going to fall back on CPM."
Clark and Dodge (1997) noted, however, that the Japanese NTA were concerned with the 
comparable independent enterprises being used in a CPM analysis because they believed that 
these comparisons would not reflect the "mutual dependency that exists between a Japanese 
parent and its US subsidiaries".
It is more complicated to set transfer prices with this method, but easier to check the results 
(Schwartz, Zimmerman, Peterson and Seickel, 1995).
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- Not An Arm's Length Method
This chapter has already mentioned that the CPM is accused by some as not an arm's length 
pricing method, the basis of this argument is on the fact that profits do not necessarily directly 
reflect the price of transactions with associates. France and Germany have been two of the 
"loudest" countries to make this opinion known (Rehder, 1996). The US Treasury Department 
tried to ease some of the concern of France and Germany by drawing attention to the areas of 
the IRS regulations which restrict the IRS' allowed usage of CPM, for example the 
introduction of an arm's length range (Hembrey, 1995a).
Arnold and Mclntyre (1994) criticised the arm's length standard for being very vague and, 
arguably at least, accommodating pricing methods, such as the profit split method as well as 
CPM, that seem closer to formulary apportionment than to the arm's length method. The 
Business and Advisory Committee (BIAC) also held the view that CPM does not represent an 
arm's length method. Elliott (1995) said that their objective was to make sure that the arm's 
length standard would continue to be recognised as the preferred method. This begs the 
question was there ever any doubt that the traditional transaction methods would not be 
favoured. There is no data to suggest this would have been the case. However, lan Dykes 
(interview 1998) did say that, "as a method in practice we use CPM almost invariably" 
(although it is not officially an acceptable method in the UK). Perhaps the question is to what 
extent firms go to initially to try and use the traditional methods as opposed to settling straight 
away for CPM, perhaps the "easier" option.
Looking at the concerns of the Japanese, Tadaki (1993) quoted Masaki Miura, deputy 
commissioner of the international affairs department at the NTA Agency, who said, "although 
the CPM is just one of the (four) methods, we are afraid of frequent reliance on, and frequent
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usage of, the CPM". Ernst and Young 1997s Transfer Pricing Report recorded the usage of 
different methods used for all types of intercompany transactions. The result demonstrates 
that the traditional methods remain the most commonly applied.
Table 3.1 
Country
Australia
Canada
France
Germany
Italy
Japan
Korea
Netherland
Sweden
Switzerland
UK
US
Percentage of Methods Used For All Types of Transactions
Country is the country in which companies have their headquarters 
PS = Profit Split HP = Historical Practice NS = Not Stated 
The first Cost = Cost Plus The second Cost = Transactions at Cost 
Ernst and Young, 1997 Transfer Pricing Report
CUP CUT RPM Cost CPM TNMM PS
72
48
20
28
20
23
39
16
12
56
49
56
8
4
8
8
-
8
2
12
4
4
16
27
20
32
28
20
12
-
5
16
16
16
19
26
68
80
56
88
48
31
36
76
52
84
62
65
16
16
12
12
-
-
5
8
12
12
14
21
4
_
4
8
-
15
9
4
8
-
3
4
12
8
20
8
8
15
7
8
20
12
16
14
Cost
4
8
24
8
16
-
-
24
20
12
8
22
HP
16
8
20
-
-
46
30
8
12
12
19
15
Other NS
52
40
24
52
56
-
-
44
48
36
27
37
32
24
24
28
28
-
-
28
40
40
16
35
According to the above table CPM is the second favoured profit based method after profit 
split. CPM is the fifth preferred method, in you ignore the "other" less conventional methods, 
proving that CPM is used by a large number of companies, but not in place of the traditional, 
more widely accepted, transaction methods.
Ernst and Young (1997) recorded that CPM is, generally, not used in preference to any of the 
other methods depending on the types of transactions. This is illustrated in the table below. 
The "other methods" have not been included.
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Table 3.2
CUP CUT RPM Cost CPM TNMM PS
Sale of finished goods 31 4 24 36 11 4 8 
Sale of raw materials 28 1 11 45 9 3 5 
Administrative/managerial 9 3 3 49 3 1 2 
Technical Services 12 5 2 49 2 2 3 
Commission for sale of goods 22 3 9 23 6 2 8 
Intangibles 23 12 5 15 9 2 6 
Financing 25 6 2 17 4 2 2 
Percentage of Methods Used by Type of Transaction 
Ernst and Young, 1997 Transfer Pricing Report
CPM is only more popular than CUT and TNMM, and then not in all cases, out of the 
methods listed above. Do the authorities opposing the use of CPM really have anything to 
worry about?
Hembrey (1995a) stated that MNEs were fearful that the use of CPM would require 
subsidiaries to calculate "comparables" for a large number of individual products, depending 
on how the method was employed by the different national tax authorities. This problem is 
more obvious when it is pointed out that some companies buy tens of thousands of products 
each year from related companies in varied locations abroad. Hembrey (1995a) said that 
MNEs predict that any requirement to calculate many of their purchase prices using 
profit-based methods would be time-consuming and costly. On the other hand, Andrew 
Hickman, International Specialist and Competent Authority Specialist at the Inland Revenue, 
said that companies in the US had greater access to market information than companies in 
other countries, for example data on tax returns, and, therefore, it will be easier for the CPM 
method to be applied than the traditional transactional methods. In the absence of 
comparables, Andrew Hickman showed a concern that companies might be encouraged to use 
methods considered even more opposed to the ALP, such as formula apportionment.
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- US Introduction of CPM
Elliott (1995) explained the adoption of CPM in the 1988 White Paper as an "unfortunate 
manifestation from the popular belief that foreign subsidiaries (of Japanese parents in 
particular) were not paying their fair share." The House Ways and Means Committee (in the 
US) held a number of meetings to research into the claim that foreign subsidiaries were not 
paying enough in taxes and hence the need to introduce CPM to counter this. The conclusion , 
according to Elliott (1995), was that: "Some of the companies investigated have been 
operating in the US for years and have never sent a check to Uncle Sam for 'one thin dime' in 
corporate income taxes." Hufbauer (1992), however, defended some of these firms, he said 
that: "Less sinister explanations for the apparent poor performance can be offered: for 
example, foreign firms may acquire sick US companies at premium prices in the hope of 
effecting a turn-around, they may incur heavy startup costs in building greenfield plants and 
distribution systems with large amounts of debt."
Elliott (1995) said that CPM was the manifestation of the US issuing increasingly divergent 
transfer pricing rules on how the arm's length principle was to be applied. We have seen, from 
earlier in the chapter, the problems that the Japanese NTA and other tax authorities worldwide 
have had trying to digest the introduction of this method. MNEs also have had a hard time 
understanding CPM, particularly because it is a method not considered to adhere to the arm's 
length standard and hence, foreign to what they have been regulated to abide by.
Elliott (1995) noted : "There has been a chasm between transfer pricing regulations in the US 
and the OECD which was at its widest and most controversial in 1992 with the publication of 
US (1992). The US 1992 regulations followed the recommendations of the White Paper and 
established the use of CPM. The 1993 regulations continued to allow the use of CPM with the
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addition to the regulations of the "best method" rules which meant that to use CPM, the 
favoured traditional transaction methods had to be rejected for whatever reasons before a 
taxpayer could choose this option.
- Change in Emphasis on US Side
CPM has been used for many years by the IRS in settling transfer pricing disputes (Arnold, 
1994). Revisions to S482 regulations published in 1994 allow taxpayers to use CPM under 
certain conditions in determining transfer prices for sales of tangible and intangible property 
(Arnold and Mclntyre, 1994). France and Germany, in particular, were looking for tighter 
controls on the use of CPM (Rehder, 1996).
Elliott (1995) pointed out that the most interesting developments, with regards to the US 1994 
final regulations and the OECD guidelines, had been the softening in approach by both the US 
and the OECD towards CPM (although in opposite directions), the added flexibility inherent 
in both documents, and the USs' support for the transaction-based form of ALP. The US's 
lessening of enthusiasm for the use of CPM after the 1992 controversy put the use of the 
method into a more realistic perspective. This is demonstrated by Hembrey (1995a) who 
quoted a high level IRS official as having said that he expected CPM to be considered the 
"best method" in relatively few cases. According to Tadaki (1993), however, Japan and the 
rest of the international community would still fear that its arbitrary use would be both 
"illogical and unfair".
- Change in Emphasis on OECD/European Side
According to Hembrey (1995b): "Frances Horner, the principal administrator for the OECD's 
Fiscal Affairs Division, recently said that the OECD draft (Part I of 1995 guidelines) accepts
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CPM as a valid arm's length method, but also urges national governments to use CPM as a last 
resort due to "certain difficulties" in its application." France and Germany were opposed to 
this allowance unless the report spelt out clear and agreeable restrictions on the use of CPM 
(Hembrey 1995b). This restriction must have brought some comfort to them. In addition, it 
has been made clear that the OECD only accepts CPM so far as its use is consistent with the 
guidelines (Stitt, 1995).
- CPM Conclusion
The Japanese NTA still have significant concerns over the use of CPM by US-based 
companies since they believe using the method typically results in profits in a US subsidiary 
even when the transactions are not profitable overall (Clark and Dodge, 1997). One example 
of the apparent double standard is, according to Clark and Dodge (1997): "In a typical 
Japanese manufacturer-US distributor situation, the CPM generally requires the distributor to 
earn a profit and pay US income taxes, even if the transactions are unprofitable on a 
consolidated basis. In contrast, if the same unprofitable, consolidated business was operated 
by a US company, with its manufacturing operations located in the US, the company would 
"be permitted to lose money" and pay no US income taxes."
A section from Elliott (1995) describes the current (now more harmonised) opinions of the 
OECD and US and a fitting conclusion to CPM:
"The overall approach of both OECD (1994) and US (1994) is that the method appropriate 
in each individual case should be determined on its own merits. The OECD expresses a 
preference for the transaction-based methods over profit-based methods and indicated that the 
latter should only be used in the last resort. However, this approach allows the use of CPM in 
the appropriate circumstances."
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- TNMM Similar to CPM?
The OECD (1994) noted that CPM had strengths and weaknesses in terms of the ability to 
establish whether conditions in the financial and commercial relations of associated 
enterprises are arm's length. The OECDs' public acceptance of CPM has boosted its use 
worldwide. The main disadvantage in the past was the lack of acceptance outside the US, the 
OECDs change in view towards CPM and the introduction of the TNMM method from the 
OECD, which is quite similar to CPM, will change the general opinion. According to Stitt 
(1995): "Some commentators have suggested that TNMM is nothing more that CPM with a 
new name, except that more emphasis is placed on information about the company under 
review, rather than industry averages or other data not linked directly to particular 
transactions." To understand this contention it is necessary to know more about TNMM. The 
following section, therefore, will explain TNMM and discuss its comparability to CPM as 
well as discuss its use generally and acceptability worldwide.
Transactional Net Margin Method (TNMM)
Transactional net margin method (TNMM) is the second profit-based method, after the profit 
split method, which the OECD endorses in the 1995 guidelines. The OECD (1995) describes 
TNMM as examining "the net profit margin relative to an appropriate base (e.g. costs, sales, 
assets) that a taxpayer realises from a controlled transaction". The net margin is equal to the 
particular products' return on assets or operating income to sales. The benefit of using net 
margins is that they are less affected by changes to transactions that the price (as needed for 
CUP).
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As well as TNMM being considered alike to CPM, Mawani (1997) said that "this method is 
similar in its application to the resale price and cost plus methods, except that it focuses on net 
margins instead of gross margins." According to OECD (1995), the use of net margins is 
beneficial since they are "more tolerant to some functional differences between controlled and 
uncontrolled transactions than gross margins". The OECD (1995) shows this by explaining 
that differences in functions are likely to effect the level of operating expenses and, therefore, 
enterprises might end up with an extensive range of gross profit margins , but still much 
similar levels of net profits. On the other hand, there will be factors which will have a greater 
effect on a taxpayer relying on net margins and not those concentrating on prices or gross 
margins. The OECD (1995) provides guidance on establishing comparability for TNMM, 
which they believe is very important to minimise this problem.
The similarity between the resale price and cost plus methods and TNMM means that TNMM 
must be applied in a manner consistent with them. If these traditional transactional methods 
are inapplicable then a taxpayer could try and use TNMM. However, Stitt (1995) noted that 
TNMM depends heavily on the availability of reliable data and, "thus, on the face of it, it is 
arguable that there would have to be truly exceptional circumstances for a TNMM to be more 
appropriate than one of the traditional methods.
As with the previous methods, a taxpayer would need to carry out functional analysis of 
associated enterprises and independent enterprises to establish the comparability of 
transactions and any adjustments which might have to be made to make the transactions more 
suitably comparable.
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A taxpayer, however, would not be required to determine the functions carried out by more 
than one of the related parties. Unlike the profit split method, for example, a taxpayer would 
not have to state the books and record of all participants or allocate costs for all participants 
(OECD, 1995). This is particularly beneficial for transactions involving complex factors or 
transactions which are highly specialised.
- Arm's Length Range
From Mawani (1997): "Averaging net margins over several years may control for minor 
deviations on profits over product life cycles and business cycles. This requires computing a 
similar longer-run measure for comparable firms undertaking arm's length transactions. 
Furthermore, the notion of arm's length range is more applicable for TNMM than most other 
transfer pricing methods, since the range implicitly recognises the reality that the ceteris 
paribus assumption in comparing net margins of two entities is unlikely to be satisfied. The 
use of a range implies that no adjustments to the transfer price may be required if the 
appropriate net margin of a tested party falls within the arm's length range."
- CPM and TNMM Compared
CPM and TNMM have clear definitions to discriminate between the two methods, they do, 
however, drive towards similar conclusions. Simon Jonsson, Principal Consultant at KPMG, 
Birmingham, noted that the OECD looked at the profit split method more as a method closer 
linked to CPM than TNMM.
Greenhill and Bee (1996) ascertained that TNMM is very similar to CPM under the Section 
482 regulations. They wrote: "Some OECD countries perceive the CPM as only the 
imposition of industry-wide average returns to a taxpayer's entire business activity, without
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any regard to comparability and to factors other than transfer pricing that might ignore profit 
margins. However, the S482 regulations have explicit comparability standards that apply to 
all pricing methods. Thus, when properly applied, the CPM and the TNMM should produce 
substantially the same result." This view is supported by lan Dykes, manager at Deloitte and 
Touche, Birmingham, who said that he "didn't believe, in practice, that there is any difference 
(between CPM and TNMM)".
Conclusion
We have seen, from the previous chapter in particular, the overriding preference for the use of 
traditional transactional methods over profit based methods. The introduction and allowed 
application of the latter methods provides proof of the inability of the former traditional 
transactional methods to capture all types, if even half, of related transactions. The US and 
OECD support the idea of using the "best", most suitable method depending on the facts and 
circumstances of the transactions. Profit-based methods are acceptable above CUP, RPM and 
the cost plus method so long as they prove to be the optimum recourse.
According to OECD (1995), however, most countries have limited their use of profit-based 
methods to the profit split method. The guidelines continue by saying that: "Very few 
countries have much experience in the application of the rransactional net margin method and 
most consider it experimental and therefore prefer to use the profit split method in cases of 
last resort." This opinion is slowly changing as more countries introduce some form of 
legislation for the use of TNMM and/or CPM.
CHAPTER 4.
GROWTH OF INTANGIBLE
PROPERTY
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GROWTH OF INTANGIBLE PROPERTY
Transfer pricing in multinational companies involving intangible property has provided and 
continues to provide a huge conundrum for tax authorities and taxpayers alike. The seemingly 
sudden emergence of intangibles has caused a lot of problems for tax authorities trying to 
police transfer pricing. The table below, taken from Hufbauer (1992), illustrates the rapid 
growth of international receipts and payments of royalties and license fees for US firms.
Table 4.1
Receipts Payments
Year Related Firms Unrelated Firms Related Firms Unrelated Firms
1960 590 248 35 40
1965 1199 336 68 68
1970 1620 583 111 114
1975 3526 759 241 192
1980 5695 1170 515 254
1985 4123 1700 467 380
1990 1846 3446 1621 1023
US Firms' International Receipts and Payments of Royalties and License Fees, 1960-90
(millions of dollars)
Hufbauer (1992): Source - Survey of Current Business, various issues.
The table shows that international receipts of royalties and license fees for related firms, from 
the period 1960 to 1990, has increased by more than 20 times as much. Likewise, payments 
among related firms has increased by over 46 times as much.
This chapter will give examples of some of the types of intangibles and the problems they 
introduce, the failed court cases showing how hard it is to prove transfer prices are being 
manipulated and both the legislation in US and the guidelines of the OECD which have been 
introduced in an attempt to harness the pricing of intangible property.
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Intangibles defined
King (1994) considered the different types of intangibles and divided them into four broad 
categories:
1. Rights - receiving contracts on favourable terms, and providing contracts, such as mortgage 
servicing rights;
2. Relationship - assembled work force, customer relationships, distributor relationships;
3. Grouped Intangibles - goodwill, going concern; and
4. Intellectual Property - patents, trademarks, copyrights, and trade secrets or know-how.
The last category of intangibles and setting transfer prices for them, has attracted the most 
attention from tax authorities. This is largely due to the growth of pharmaceutical companies 
and their use of patents. According to Nurton (1997), without patent protection, 
pharmaceutical companies would have no guarantee of a return on the millions of dollars 
invested in developing a new product. Typically, a small number of products account for a 
majority of a company's revenues. The importance of patents can be seen when one considers 
how often drugs often become more widely acknowledged by their brand name than by their 
"international non-proprietary" name. Nurton (1997) names aspirin, as the best example, a 
product which made Bayer. This example represents a case involving highly valuable 
intangibles and this is normally equated with a complete lack of existing comparables. 
Knowing that medicines are involved, however, one could already have reasonably concluded 
that there would not be anything similar in existence anyway.
- OECD and Intangibles
In addition, as Price Waterhouse (1997b) highlighted, the OECD list important characteristics 
for intangible property apart from the actual type. These are: firstly, the form of the
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transaction, for example whether there is a license of a sale; secondly the duration and degree 
of protections; and finally, the anticipated benefits from the use of the intangible property. 
These need careful consideration when contemplating buying, loaning or selling a (valuable) 
intangible.
The OECD guidelines had not, up until 1996, considered arm's length pricing for intangible 
property or the provision of intercompany services (Greenhill and Bee, 1996). The OECD 
then published an update on April 11,1996 which brought about considerations for both of the 
above (OECD, 1996). This extension included an expansion to their existing discussion of 
intangibles in the 1995 OECD guidelines to distinguish between marketing and trade 
intangibles:
Marketing intangibles - include trademarks, trade names, customer lists and distribution channels; and 
Trade intangibles - are commercial intangibles other than marketing intangibles, for example, those 
created through research and design.
Boatman (1997) noted that making the definitions more refined had two important 
implications. Firstly, the question was raised as to whether a distribution subsidiary is entitled 
to excess returns on its marketing activities or should it be compensated as a service provider. 
Boatman (1997) concluded that if a distributor were not to enjoy long-term exclusive 
distribution rights then surely they would not be willing to absorb significant marketing 
expenditures as arm's length. The second connotation was a recognition that if a firm can 
create marketing intangibles other that tradenames and trademarks then this surely suggests 
that intangible ownership cannot be determined by identifying the owner of the enterprise's 
patents, know-how, and trademarks. This insinuates that ownership can be shared across a 
MNE. The example used was a distribution subsidiary's expenditure on the development of
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superior distribution channels led to the creation of marketing intangible and resulting 
supranormal profits to the subsidiary despite the parent owning all patents and trademarks.
- Problem of Measuring Intangible Property
King (1994) noted that, "comparable uncontrolled transactions in intangible property are 
exceedingly difficult to come by, in part because intangible property is unique to some degree 
virtually by definition and in part because controlled and uncontrolled intangible licenses tend 
to differ systematically". King (1994) illustrates this point by comparing related and unrelated 
party license agreements, finding that a situation involving related parties will more likely 
entail a parent company licensing 'state-of-the-art1 technology to its subsidiary. In an 
unrelated situation license agreements will tend to involve the lending of more dated 
technology.
Atkinson and Tyrrall (1997) considered how hard it is to set fair transfer prices for intangible 
property even when comparable property can be identified. The OECD guidelines suggest 
that comparability on intangible property should take into account the following factors and 
their relevance when comparing controlled and uncontrolled transactions:
a) any limitations on the geographic area in which rights may be exercised;
b) export restrictions on goods produced;
c) the exclusive or non-exclusive character of any rights transferred;
d) the capital investment (to construct new plants or to buy special machines);
e) the start-up expenses and the development work required in the market;
f) the possibility of sub-licensing;
g) the licensee's distribution network; and
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h) whether the licensee has the right to participate in further developments of the property by 
the licensor.
In addition, Atkinson and Tyrall (1997) said that there may be further difficulty in 
establishing the level of transfer price charged since there is no necessary link between the 
value of an intangible and the cost of maintaining it. The OECD recommend companies carry 
out a functional analysis to aid in the breakdown of uncontrolled transactions into component 
elements (Atkinson and Tyrrall, 1997).
- The US and Intangible Property
The introduction of US regulations relating to the transfer of intangible items was, to some 
extent, a result of the growing number of cases that the IRS were finding of companies 
transferring high profit margin activities from the US to low tax jurisdictions and charging no 
royalty for the use of the intangibles developed in the US. According to Halperin and Srinidhi 
(1996), the results of such activity were returns on assets for the foreign affiliates far in excess 
of that of the US parent company. Two famous court cases in which the IRS failed to prove 
companies were undertaking such enterprises were: Bausch and Lomb Inc. v. Commissioner 
of Internal Revenue (92 TC 33 (93)) and Eli Lilly v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (84 
TC 996 (85)).
In the case of Bausch and Lomb, the US Tax Court had to decide on the appropriateness of a 
royalty being paid to an affiliate in Ireland, a low tax country, for a license to use valuable 
intangible property from the US-based parent company. The business involved the 
manufacture and sale of soft contact lenses and there would have been one or two if any 
comparable companies, who would not have been using the same processes. Patton (1989)
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recorded the conclusion of the case as follows: "The court identified 19 licensing 
arrangements that could have been used as comparables, yet failed to decide the case based on 
any of them. Patton (1989) concluded by saying: "If the role of inexact comparables is to be 
preserved at all for the future...the IRS should provide sufficient guidelines so that taxpayers 
and courts may make appropriate adjustments when a sufficient number of potentially 
comparable arrangements exist."
- 1968 Cost-Sharing Provisions
According to King (1994): "The 1968 US regulations sanctioned cost-sharing agreements 
among members of a controlled a group. These agreements involve the related parties sharing 
the cost of research and design from the development of the intangibles. The 1968 US 
regulations required that each parties contribution towards the cost of intangible be in 
proportion to their expected benefit from the use of the intangible. Each party is then 
considered a joint owner in the property and does not have to pay any royalties. Similarly, 
Mawani (1997) pointed out that the OECD guidelines require that any agreements explicitly 
mention that the expected benefits to each party will be in proportion to the risk sharing and 
cost contribution.
The 1992 proposed regulations made cost-sharing arrangements more regimented, requiring 
such dealings to be set out in writing, with appropriate records to back them up and an 
additional requirement that such intangibles be ultimately developed in the conduct of the 
trade or business. As well as retaining the 1968 idea that costs and benefits be in proportion to 
one another, the 1992 regulations insisted that they must be adjusted to depict changes in 
economic conditions or operations of the business. According to King (1994), cost-sharing
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agreements among members of a controlled group are commonplace in a number of 
research-intensive, high technology industries.
- "Commensurate With Income" Standard
The above cases were partly responsible for Congress passing the US Tax Reform Act of 1986
which, as we have made reference to in previous chapters, added the following to S482
regulations:
"In the case of any transfer (or license) of intangible property ... the income with
respect to such transfer (or license) shall be commensurate with the income attributable to
the intangible."
In other words, the addition to the S482 regulations requires an affiliate, who uses an 
intangible developed by an affiliate in another country to pay for the service depending on the 
amount of benefit they expect to earn from the use of the intangible. This payment is referred 
to in the regulations as a "superroyalty". Finding generally acceptable measures of such have 
proved and continue to prove difficult. Governments and taxpayers to a certain extent, do not 
have access to enough eligible information in order to determine arm's length royalties. In 
addition, the commensurate with income standard requires periodic adjustments in royalty 
rates to reflect the actual experience of the parties in utilising the intangible property (Arnold 
andMcIntyre, 1994).
The 1986 US Tax Reform Act, before specifying different acceptable methods, first applied a 
new perception to the transfer pricing affair called the "arm's length return". According to 
Halperin and Srinidhi (1996), the underlying principle is that an affiliate may earn the same 
level of profit per unit as a competitor who does not have the intangible. Durst and Fiamma
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(1993) voiced an opinion held by many that this "commensurate with income" standard, with 
its possibility of IRS (as well as other authorities) second guessing, represents an inappropriate 
departure from the internationally acceptably arm's length standard. Furthermore, this process 
departed from traditional beliefs because it was based on returns as opposed to the traditional 
idea which depended totally on arm's length prices.
The White Paper recognised four methods for pricing inter-company intangibles:
1) exact comparables method - finding a transfer price by comparison with the same intangible being 
transferred between unrelated parties in an analogous environment;
2) inexact comparables method - found from comparing a similar intangible transferred, but not in 
identical circumstances;
3) arm's length return method - according to Hufbauer (1992), this method attributes income based 
on a rate-of-return ratio or on an operating margin such as the so-called Berry ratio; and finally 
3) profit split method - according to Hufbauer (1992), this involves first attributing a portion of 
income, based on benchmark rates of return, to the manufacturing and marketing activities of affiliated 
firms, and then assigns the residual income according to the relative value of the intangibles owned by 
the affiliates.
Halperin and Srinidhi (1996) examined and analysed the difficulties that there may be in the 
different resource allocations that these methods, compared to the actual arm's length royalty, 
might cause.
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- 1992 US Proposed Regulations
The 1992 US proposed regulations reflected very much what was said in the White Paper
although with respect to the transfer pricing of intangibles, the regulations identified and
ranked three methodologies:
i) matching transaction method - looks at the uncontrolled transfer of same intangible under at
least very similar circumstances;
ii) comparable adjustable transaction (CAT) method - looks at an uncontrolled transfer of at
least a very similar intangible under different circumstances;
iii) CPM - compares stated profits of controlled transactions with profits that the controlled
transaction would have earned if its profit level indicators had been equivalent to those of
uncontrolled parties that perform similar functions (Hufbauer, 1992).
Chapter 3 made reference to the use of CPM acceptable profit ranges. This also applies to 
CAT and the operating income of the property in question should fall within certain ranges set 
by the comparable profit interval. Income falling outside an established range could be 
subject to an IRS adjustment, normally to a position well inside the boundaries.
- 1993 Temporary Regulations
The 1993 temporary regulations introduced a change in preference towards both CPM and 
CUT. According to Schwartz et al. (1994), CUT is in essence, the CUP method with the 
important addition that transactions, for the purpose of comparability, must have substantially 
the same profit potential. They listed the following four points in which CUT, must 
substantially be the same:
contract terms, including the exploitation rights granted;
- state of development of the intangible;
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  periodic adjustments; and
  uniqueness of the property and the period for which it remains unique.
Unfortunately, the likelihood of finding any useful information regarding comparable
uncontrolled transactions will be slight for most taxpayers.
According to Halperin and Srinidhi (1996), "in the case of CUT, regulations implicitly assume 
that the royalty charged to the independent licensee is not influenced by the requirement that 
the same royalty must by charges to the affiliate. However, we argue that the royalty charged 
the independent licensee will be viewed as endogenous by the MNE. When the tax rate in the 
MNE affiliate's foreign country is less than the tax rate in the US, we have demonstrated that 
CUT causes the inter-company royalty rate to be lower than the royalty rate under full 
information. This lower royalty rate results in increased production abroad".
Boatman (1997) pointed out that the application of TNMM is inappropriate since the approach 
assumes that the company does not own any valuable intangible property. In addition, 
however, the application of traditional transaction methods such as CUP and resale price 
method are also difficult, as comparability between controlled and uncontrolled transactions 
became more difficult to ascertain.
Further to the 1993 temporary regulations recommending the use of either CUT or CPM a 
third allowable option was introduced, that of an "other" method. According to Schwartz et 
al. (1994), the three specified methods in this category were as follows: 
Residual Allocation Method - profit allocated to balance sheet assets based on the functions 
performed. Residual intangible profit then allocated based on the relative value of the 
non-routing intangibles, or on the expenditures related to the development of the intangible.
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Capital Employed Allocation Method - available in situations where the level of risk is equal 
to all parties. The intangible profit is allocated based on the ratio of each entity's capital 
invested in the relevant activity to the total capital in that activity.
Comparable Profit Split Method - involves identifying comparable companies with similar 
transactions, functions, product markets, risks and intangibles. It is necessary that all the 
comparable companies are functionally comparable and that there be reliable financial data.
- Developments since 1993
A new act has been introduced in the US in 1997 effecting the transfer of intangible property 
to foreign corporations or to partnerships. Ryder, Yoder and McGill (1997) reported that now, 
in general, "if a US shareholder transfers intangible property to a foreign corporation in 
exchange for stock, the US shareholder is treated as having sold the property to the 
corporation in exchange for a deemed stream of royalty payments over the useful life of the 
property". This means that the Act has effectively changed the source of the royalty income 
from home (US) to foreign. A US taxpayer may now offset any tax on such income against 
foreign credits.
- Japan, Germany and the Netherlands
Throughout this chapter so far we have only really concentrated on the actions of the US and 
the OECD. In this section we will consider the approaches of the Japanese, Germans and 
Dutch in attempting to control the pricing of intra-group intangibles. Information has been 
taken from Price Waterhouse's Worldwide transfer pricing group (1997b) survey which 
examined these three countries.
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- Japan
Under Japanese law intangibles are treated similarly to tangible items. However, Two aspects 
of royalty quantification' are being looked at by the tax authority. These are as follows:
ROYALTY BASE - the basis on which the royalty depends, for example on the sales of 
intangible property bearing a particular brand name. Price Woodhouse noted, "the potential 
for relatively objective measurement encouraged Japanese tax authorities to begin their 
investigation of royalties with a review of the reasonableness of royalty bases."
ROYALTY RATE - the value of the royalty, for example the rate may change according to the 
turnover of the licence. Price Waterhouse (1997b) noted, "until the highly publicised 1993 
Coca Cola audit, Japanese tax authorities had not seriously challenged royalties. However, it 
is now common practice when conducting an audit for tax authorities to focus on the royalty 
base, as well as on royalty rates."
Price Waterhouse (1997b) said that the authorities are gathering information to establish a 
database of royalty rates charged by US and European MNEs to their Japanese subsidiaries.
- Germany
According to Price Waterhouse (1997b): "The Administrative Principle states that if a royalty 
cannot be evaluated in terms of uncontrolled comparables, it is assumed that a conscientious 
business manager of the licensee would not agree to accept a royalty higher than that which 
would allow achievement of an appropriate profit from the licensed product(s). 11
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In addition, the German tax authorities do not accept royalties in return for using a brand 
name. The only exception where a royalty may be paid is where the trade name is a part of the 
firm name, but predominantly identified as the trade name.
- The Netherlands
There are no specific requirements with respect to intangible items, taxpayers are left to set 
transfer prices within the framework of the OECD guidelines. Like reviewing the pricing of 
tangible property the Netherlands Revenue will examine the expenses incurred by the seller 
compared to the economic benefits acquired.
- Country Conflicts
As well as looking at individual countries and the way the authorities police the transfer 
pricing of intangible items, it is also interesting to note the conflicts between tax authorities 
arising over contradictory opinions on the value of royalties to be paid to related companies 
across borders. Each country has an opinion on what level of an MNE's global income they 
feel they have a right to tax. If countries demand for example, that higher royalties should be 
paid from a company based in another country to the company based within their dominion 
then this is a form of profit shifting.
Khalaf (1990) made reference to a number of cases of such conflict with companies caught in 
the middle of revenue maximising authorities. One such example was that of Procter and 
Gamble and the Spanish and US tax authorities, and in this case a Spanish tax court ordered a 
royalty be paid on some of the company's products to the US parent, but where the IRS 
demanded a much higher payment be transferred.
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- Hindsight Adjustments
The OECD 1996 update concedes that: "changed facts and circumstances could lead to the 
revision of conditions of remuneration although the specific reference to periodic adjustments 
has been removed, and that the transacting parties may reserve the right to make future 
adjustments."
Boatman (1997) made note of two important implications of this change in view: Firstly, the 
change in position allowing adjustments contradicts the current position of many European tax 
authorities; and secondly, this discussion by the OECD may be viewed as a narrowing of 
conflict between the OECD (allowing hindsight adjustments) and the US Section 482 
regulations (allowing periodic adjustments). The point is made, however, that there is no 
intention to introduce into the OECD guidelines a "commensurate with income" requirement. 
In any event, the discussion opens the door to hindsight adjustments of intangible property 
prices, potentially providing tax authorities with a powerful income adjustment weapon 
(Boatman, 1997).
- Special Considerations for Intragroup Services
Chapter VII of the OECD guidelines considers the transfer of services between associated 
members of an enterprise. As in line with the already existing guidelines, the update stresses 
that a service has been rendered only when the activity provides the group member with a 
benefit that enhances its commercial position and for which it otherwise would have been 
willing to pay a third party (Boatman, 1997). In addition, however, the report looks at the 
different potential methodologies that could be used in determining arm's length prices for 
intangible property. These include cost allocation and apportionment methods.
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One of the special considerations is the potential for service transfers at cost. There are some 
services for which this is acceptable, for example, a supplier whose costs exceed market price, 
might agree to provide the service to increase its profitability, perhaps by complementing its 
range of activities. Boatman (1997) pointed out that implicit in this illustration is the idea that 
the service supplier also engaged in other profitable activities which would bring about a 
consistency with the final US S482 regulations.
- Need More Research
Halperin and Srinidhi (1996) remarked on the need for more analytical research to understand 
how the incentives in intangible generation are changed by the regulations.
Halperin and Srinidhi (1996) commented on the need for governments to collect more 
information on the value of intangibles to decrease the distortion being created in the attempt 
to set transfer prices. The cost of such data gathering would be costly and obtrusive on the 
taxpayers involved.
- Conclusion
This chapter has looked at the pace of growth in the area of intangible property and seen the 
difficulty tax bodies have faced in trying to regulate and recommend structures for transfer 
pricing. The OECD had expanded and refined its definition of intangible property to help deal 
with the problem in hand. Difficulties for the authorities appeared most frequently where 
transactions involved highly valuable intangibles, patents and licenses and a high specialised 
level of technology.
CHAPTER 5.
TRANSFER PRICING
HARMONISATION
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TRANSFER PRICING HARMONISATION
As we have seen in the earlier chapters, the US and OECD have been the main bodies leading 
the field, specifying the application of ALP in dealing with transfer pricing and developing 
different methods to cope with the increasing complexities of inter-related transactions. The 
greatest problem they (and tax authorities worldwide) faced was related to the growth of 
intangible property (see chapter 4). The US reacted to this growth by introducing the 
"commensurate with income" standard and the comparable profit method (CPM) in the 1988 
White Paper, two ideas which went against the more traditional views held by the rest of the 
world at that time.
This chapter is concerned with how the OECD and the US have developed their transfer 
pricing frameworks since the controversial White Paper was presented, to a situation today 
where the parties have similar opinions on transfer pricing methodologies (TPMs) and their 
application. The similarities can be seen by comparing the IRS's 1994 final transfer pricing 
regulations and the OECD's 1995 Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 
and Tax Administrations.
CPM and the "Commensurate With Income" Standard
It is generally agreed that some MNEs manipulate their transfer prices to shift their profits to 
minimise taxes, but the debate is by how much are MNEs are avoiding these taxes and what 
proportion of companies are guilty. The growing accusations by the US tax authorities, that
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foreign-owned MNEs in the US, were not paying the same amount of tax that the US-owned 
MNEs were paying, was the main factor which instigated the introduction of the 
commensurate with income standard. According to Wartzman (1993), this standard: 
"Essentially forced companies to check the profits (they) earned from such (inter-related) 
transactions against an industry average. If their earnings weren't in line, companies were 
deemed to be establishing their transfer prices incorrectly and could be penalised."
In the US Japanese-owned firms seemed to be at the forefront of the 'accused'. Tadaki (1993) 
used the following quote from Dianne Kanakis, senior manager at Price Waterhouse in 
Washington, to illustrate this point: "The IRS will tell you that they're not targeting 
specifically Japanese companies, but they are targeting sectors. And the industries that they're 
targeting are dominated by Japanese companies."
Tadaki (1993) said that it would be unlikely that Japanese firms would opt to transfer their 
profits home since the tax rate there was higher. Furthermore, they might have reasonable 
explanations for reporting comparably lower reported profits in the US. Yoshio Nakamura, 
deputy director of the international affairs department at the Federation of Economic 
Organisations, said: "If the subsidiaries' profit levels are low it may be because Japanese 
investment in the US is a fairly recent phenomenon that followed the 1985 Plaza Accord, 
which resulted in the yen's appreciation against the dollar" (Tadaki, 1993).
US-based MNEs appeared afraid of their tax authorities' blatant attack on foreign-owned 
MNEs. Wartzman (1992) used the following words of Robert Green, vice president of tax 
policy at the National Foreign Trade Council in Washington, to demonstrate this anxiety, they:
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"don't like the US tax collection agency's proposed rules and fear that congressional action 
could lead America's trading partners to 'scream and shout bloody murder and retaliate1 ".
Reciprocity is not surprising, according to Otsuka, when you consider, for example, that when 
the IRS imposes additional taxes on a US subsidiary in relation to the transfer prices between 
the US subsidiary and its Japanese parent company, the parent is entitled to receive from the 
Japanese tax authorities a refund of taxes already paid. In the case of Nissan and Toyota, a 
total of $769 million was refunded by the Japanese National Tax Administration Agency.
In addition, Khalaf (1990) suggested that attacking foreign firms, in particular 
Japanese-owned MNEs, was just one step in the broadening of policing on transfer pricing in 
general and favourable in the American peoples' eyes. As well as foreign tax authorities 
"getting even" by attacking US-owned firms, the IRS would also gain from concentrating on 
US owned companies. According to Marrianne Burge, international tax director at Price 
Waterhouse in the US: "American companies are an easier target, if only because their books 
are here and written in English. Last year the IRS proposed $4 billion in income adjustments 
for American firms to correct improper transfer prices, and only $500 million for foreign 
companies" (Khalaf, 1990).
Reed, Holyoke and Harbrecht (1994) reported that PepsiCo Incorporated was one such 
targeted firm, fighting over an $880 million bill levied for the period 1985 to 1989 after an 
extensive audit of their subsidiaries.
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1992 OECD Task Force
"Both the OECD and the US endorse ALP, but there has been a need for greater cooperation 
between countries for some time and in 1992 steps were taken which started a harmonisation 
process." (Peterson, 1994)
In 1992 the OECD established a task force to review transfer pricing developments in the US. 
In addition, the realisation of the extent of the differences between the US regulations and the 
OECD guidelines led to the setting up of another task force in 1993 to revise their own 1979 
and 1984 reports. Arnold and Mclntyre (1994) said that the OECD had a major 
'comprehensive and fundamental 1 alteration in mind. Elliott (1995) said that the task forces' 
objectives were: "To develop clearer guidelines for the application of the arm's length 
principle ... acceptable to taxpayers and tax authorities and thereby minimise conflict ... 
should provide a clearer indication of what methods are acceptable and which are not and 
under what circumstances a particular method could be appropriately applied."
Both the OECD and US had looked to external sources for help with their transfer pricing 
programmes. As a result, for example, the US tried to incorporate the observations of many of 
its treaty partners and the OECD had consulted the Business and Industry Advisory Committee 
(BIAC).
Draft Part I of the new OECD guidelines was issued in July 1994 for public comment at the 
same time as US Treasury published its final Section 482 regulations. John Fairley (in 
"Transfer Pricing Will Have Major Effect", 1994b), Head of Ernst and Young's London-based 
International Tax Group in 1994, said that "It is perhaps not surprising that the OECD report
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was published one week after the US Internal Revenue Service released its final regulations. 
There is some similarity between the approaches being adopted." The new regulations and 
guidelines exhibited a lot of progress towards the global treatment of transfer pricing, taking 
similar positions on key issues. Immediate similarities between the two documents 
demonstrates some measure of liaison between the two sets of legislators and an attempt to 
reach a satisfactory and workable consensus (Elliott, 1995).
Best Method Rule
Wartzman (1993) said that, "the thrust of the regulations is to give companies more flexibility 
in choosing which pricing method to use". This can be seen with the adoption of the "best 
method" rule. The rule requires that the arm's length result of a controlled transaction must be 
determined under the method that, under the facts and circumstances, provides the most 
reliable measure of an arm's length result. Thus, according to Section 482, there is no strict 
priority of methods, and no method will invariably be considered to be more reliable than 
others.
The US 1993 temporary regulations list several factors to aid in the best method selection
process. They include:
i) the completeness and accuracy of the data used to determine the method;
ii) the degree of comparability between controlled and uncontrolled transactions; and
iii) (if adjustments are made to increase the degree of comparability) the number, magnitude,
and accuracy of the adjustments required to select the method.
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The US 1994 final regulations noted that the reliability of the assumptions on which the 
methods are founded and the sensitivity of results to these assumptions are also important 
considerations.
Ogum and Kim (1995) noted that: "the best method rule should not be controversial if the 
following conditions apply: the selection of a method is made in good faith; it is properly 
documented; and the result produced by the method is reasonable." The IRS, however, can 
question a taxpayers choice and select a different method if it is subsequently shown to 
produce a more reliable measure. Ogum and Kim (1995) found that, "rather than limiting 
transfer pricing disputes, the (best method) role of the temporary regulations can create a new 
controversy". Reviewing all the transfer pricing methods would require more time and effort 
for MNEs than otherwise. Ogum and Kim (1995) said that this review could involve hiring a 
number of tax and economic professionals, thereby increasing the cost of compliance. In 
addition, there would be no guarantee that tax officials, other than those in the US, would 
accept the eventual method chosen.
The OECD demonstrates a greater preference than the US for taxpayers to use traditional 
transactional TPMs when possible. However, similarly to the US, the OECD does not have a 
strict hierarchy of TPMs. The OECD fosters a similar principle to the best method rule, 
identifying that: "No one method is suitable in every possible situation", and additionally, that 
"the applicability need not be disproved." The last part of the above sentence is different to 
the US final regulations because the OECD recommends that tax authorities should not 
dispute a taxpayers choice of method if it is proved, through documentation, that the use 
adheres to the ALP. The IRS are much more likely to question the use of a particular TPM in 
preference to the other available methods. The OECD guidelines say that: "While in some
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cases the choice of a method may not be straightforward and more than one method may 
initially considered, generally it will be possible to select one method that is apt to provide the 
best estimation of an arm's length price."
The idea of using a method which gives the "best" estimate and the introduction of the "best" 
method rule represent progress towards the harmonisation of opinions. This is particularly 
obvious when comparing this rule with earlier reports which were more concerned that the 
taxpayer use one of the traditional methods above all else if at all possible rather than for the 
reason that it produced the most acceptable results.
Change in the View of CPM
A compromise has almost been reached in the approaches of the US and OECD towards CPM 
(Elliott, 1995). The US has decreased the importance of CPM as a transfer pricing method, 
and in turn, the OECD has admitted that CPM may have some use in exceptional 
circumstances and can be employed as a last result. Although the change in opinions is 
beneficial to international transfer pricing harmonisation, the US rules still appear to give 
CPM higher priority.
The introduction of the transactional net margin method (TNMM) by the OECD demonstrated 
a greater acceptance of the profit-based methods. This is good for both tax authorities and 
taxpayers alike since it demonstrates an understanding that profit-based methods appear the 
most suitable options in an increasing number of cases. The OECD's support for profit-based 
methods should and appears to have helped persuade tax authorities to see the positive aspects
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of using of them (in the absence of more suitable alternatives) in the face of arguments over 
whether they are arm's length methods or not.
TNMM, as noted in Chapter 3, is accused of being the OECD's version of CPM and that 
conceptually, they are the same method. The differences between the two lies in the nuances 
of their application, particularly the IRS emphasis on the inter quartile range and adjustment 
to the midpoint (Wright et al, 1995). One difference worth drawing attention to is that CPM 
was introduced to deal with the problems of transfer pricing of intangibles whereas TNMM is 
not primarily for this purpose since the approach assumes that the tested entity does not own 
valuable intangible assets (Boatman, 1997). OECD did not embrace CPM directly because of 
the alien format it was written in (not in a generally accepted OECD format), which, 
according to Jonsson (1998), was not liked by fiscal governments when CPM first appeared in 
Europe. In addition, the OECD changed the form of CPM because of complaints from the 
BIAC, that CPM did not represent an arm's length method. There is substantial resistance to 
CPM by the rest of the world community, for example, it is not UK policy to accept CPM 
(Hickman, 1998). The OECD and US, however, have made a significant step towards 
international consensus by restricting the use of CPM and by introducing and restricting the 
use of the OECD equivalent, TNMM.
As far as the ftiture of these two profit-based methods are concerned, over time it could be that 
they adapt so much they become the same method. Whether it is TNMM or CPM which is 
compromised the most depends on a number of factors. For example, how well countries and 
taxpayers lead by the OECD guidelines take to TNMM, particularly those most adverse to this 
almost 'American-influenced' method, and the readiness to accept an adaption of this method. 
It may be the case that as more and more tax authorities experience troubles with the
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application of traditional transactional methods on complex transactions they will recognise 
the need for profit-based methods in transfer pricing methods. Everyone realises the 
limitations of the arm's length pricing methods and a change in TNMM and/or CPM to apply 
to an increasing number of'difficult' transactions can only help tax authorities, as long as these 
changes are reasonable and understood.
Non-Arm's Length Methods
The initial introduction of CPM, a method viewed by many as not based on the arm's length 
principle, worried many observers outside the US that the IRS would instigate additional 
methods straying further away from the internationally accepted arm's length standard. For 
example, tax authorities and taxpayers were afraid that the US would allow any global 
formulary apportionment (GFA) methods in the future (because it does not adhere to ALP). 
The decrease in preference over the use of CPM has helped, however, to quench some of those 
fears.
The OECD continues to support use of the ALP uniquely (although some question that the 
TNMM and the profit split method is an arm's length method). The 1995 guidelines 
specifically repudiated the use of a GFA method. Described by OECD (1995), GFA: 
"Allocates the global profits of an MNE group on a consolidated basis among the associated 
enterprises in different countries on the basis of a predetermined formula."
Stitt (1995) criticises GFA methods as not being able to provide answers to transfer pricing 
problems in theory or in practice. His concern is based on a recognition that: "Politicians in
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certain countries still see formulary apportionments as a relatively easy way to increase their 
country's tax take, the practical difficulties either of establishing universally acceptable 
formulae or of accepting that double taxation will arise are conveniently forgotten!"
No matter how bad the arm's length pricing system is with all its faults, it is the only system 
which stands a chance of working. A majority of governments worldwide have incorporated 
the ALP into their transfer pricing legislation (see Chapter 6) and of the remaining 
governments, a high percentage will probably over the next five to ten years, introduce a 
system based on this principle. The ALP is an idea accepted worldwide as a way to control 
transfer pricing and there is an absence of suitable alternatives which would not stand a 
chance of receiving the same level of support. The ALP was first introduced in 1935 in the 
US and it is still being introduced by countries today. An alternative approach risks not being 
accepted and then if it is accepted, a long time over which different governments would 
replace ALP with it (especially if it compares to the time frame for introduction of ALP as 
seen above). If countries tried to change from ALP to an alternative method they could expect 
to face an onslaught of double taxation problems for firms with cross-border transactions 
involving their country. How would that problem be solved if one country adheres to the ALP 
and the other to the new method? Who would admit to being wrong?
European tax harmonisation might help reduce some of the problems of international transfer 
pricing manipulation faced by governments. Business between Europe and other continents 
would then be the major concern of tax authorities and attract all the attention. This would 
mean increased attention on transactions from European countries to those with lower tax 
rates or transactions from high tax countries to European countries. The policing of transfer 
pricing would become an easier task on the whole.
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Comparability
Both the guidelines and Section 482 regulations provide similar standards for comparability 
analysis of independent transactions and both emphasise the need for functional analysis, an 
acceptable range of results and the use of multiple year data:
- Functional Analysis
The guidelines appear to pay particular attention to functional analysis. OECD (1995) points 
out that: "The functions carried out (taking into account the assets used and the risks assumed) 
will determine to some extent the allocation of risks between the parties, and therefore the 
conditions each party would expect in arm's length dealings."
Section 482 lists the following relevant risks:
(i) market risks, including fluctuations in cost, demand, pricing, and inventory levels;
(ii) risks associated with the success or failure of research and development activities;
(iii) financial risks, including fluctuations in foreign currency rates of exchange and interest
rates;
(iv) credit and collection risks;
(v) product liability risks; and
(vi) general business risks related to the ownership of property, plant, and equipment.
- Contractual Terms
The terms of contracts, according to OECD (1995), "generally define explicitly or implicitly 
how the responsibilities, risks and benefits are to be divided between the parties. OECD
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(1995) says that the analysis of contractual terms should be included as part of the functional 
analysis above.
Section 482 noted that the terms of contracts which should be considered include:
(1) the form of consideration charged or paid;
(2) sales or purchase volume;
(3) the scope and terms of warranties provided;
(4) rights to updates, revisions or modifications;
(5) the duration of the agreement and termination and renegotiating rights;
(6) collateral transactions or ongoing business relationships between the buyer and seller; and
(7) extension of credit and payment terms.
- Economic Circumstances
Factors outside a company's control may effect the prices of identical goods and services 
across boundaries. These 'economic1 circumstances need consideration to achieve better 
comparability amongst firms. Considering the market of a good or service is one step which a 
MNE should take and the factors listed by OECD (1995) effecting the market include the 
geographical location; size of the markets; extent of the competition and the relative 
competitive positions of the buyers and sellers; the availability of substitute goods and 
services; the levels of supply and demand in the market to name a few.
- Business Strategies
According to OECD (1995), "business strategies would take into account many aspects of an 
enterprise, such as innovation and new product development, degree of diversification, risk 
aversion, assessment of political changes, input of existing and planned labour laws" and so
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on. These business strategies are considered as a valid reason for having results that would 
otherwise not be considered arm's length (Schwartz et al, 1995).
According to Stitt (1995), who recognised the importance of comparability analysis, the 
guidelines say that it is crucial: "For tax authorities to recognise actual transactions and the 
way they are structured: they should not attempt to substitute other transactions for them." 
Stitt (1995) listed the only two exceptions to that rule which exist: 
F if economic substance differs from the form; or
F if the arrangements made in relation to the transaction, viewed in their totality, differ from 
those that would have been adopted by independent enterprises behaving in a commercially 
rational manner, and the actual structure practically impedes the tax administration from 
determining an appropriate transfer price.
Section 482 notes the following functions that may need to be accounted for in determining 
the comparability of two transactions:
(a) research and development;
(b) product design and engineering;
(c) manufacturing, production and process engineering;
(d) product fabrication, extraction, and assembly;
(e) purchasing and materials management;
(f) marketing and distribution functions, including inventory management, warranty 
administration, and advertising activities;
(g) transportation and warehousing; and
(h) managerial, legal, accounting and finance, credit and collection, training, and personnel
management services.
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The OECD (1995) and the US (1994) permit the use of inexact comparables similar to the 
controlled transaction under revision. According to Schwartz et al (1995), "they differ only in 
their evaluation of the probability that comparable uncontrolled transactions can be identified 
and that adequate and reliable data can be obtained".
In addition to carrying out analysis for single transactions the OECD (1995) noted that this 
may not be possible in some situations and that where transactions are closely associated then 
it should be acceptable for those transactions to be looked at together. Stitt (1995) noted that 
this is already common practice in a number of countries.
Comparability exercises are problematic and limited when the products involved are unique 
(for example new and/or patented) and when the products are intangible or involve intangible 
aspects. A taxpayer needs to find the closest possible independent comparable and make any 
adjustments necessary to account for any differences between the two. Unfortunately, it can 
be argued what a realistic adjustment might be? This is a decision which will be based largely 
on judgement and, therefore, open to criticism and contradicting opinions. Here is where the 
problem lies and where a huge database of all the comparable goods and services would go 
some way to aid the taxpayer in supporting the choice of transfer price. Whether this is 
actually feasible is another question. The act of comparing products to one another is a good, 
solid way to prove transfer prices are at arm's length. The larger and more complete the 
databases of comparables are the greater the possibility of finding the most comparable 
product, and the smaller the resultant adjustments required. This is the case even with 
intangibles and unique products, the only thing which will help taxpayers support their 
transfer prices is to end up with a comparable product which is as similar as possible. A 
number of institutions, including top accountancy firms such as KPMG, are working on, or
have already compiled, a database of comparables, or the addresses of the databases relevant 
to different types of products. Deloitte louche Tohmatsu International (1998c), for example, 
said: "Our proprietary software searches a number of computerised databases for all 
companies appearing in chosen Standard Industrial Classification Codes. Since classifications 
vary by database, the multi-database search ensures the most complete list of companies 
worldwide engaging in transactions comparable to those being tested." The area of 
comparability analysis is an area of big business for accountancy firms and an expensive 
process for MNEs for whom this information is necessary to support the use of any transfer 
price.
Arm's Length Range
Both the OECD (1995) and US (1994) accept that in a majority of cases there will not be one 
correct transfer price for an individual transaction and that there will probably be a range of 
acceptable prices. The range of results, conforming with the US regulations and OECD 
guidelines, is determined either from applying the same TPM to multiple comparable data or 
from applying different TPMs to a transaction. Section 482 notes the following: "The arm's 
length range will be derived only from those uncontrolled comparables that have, or through 
adjustments can be brought to, a similar level of comparability and reliability, and 
uncontrolled comparables that have a significantly lower level of comparability and reliability 
will not be used in establishing the arm's length range."
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The OECD (1995) noted that, "because transfer pricing is not an exact science, there will be 
many occasions when the application of the most appropriate method or methods produces a 
range of figures all of which are relatively equally reliable".
On occasions when a taxpayer ends up with results outside the range in the case of the US, it 
is likely that the profit reported would be moved forcibly to within the acceptable range, 
typically to the midpoint. In the case of the OECD, the guidelines recommend that the 
taxpayer be allowed the opportunity to prove that a transaction was carried out at arm's length, 
regardless that the profit recorded was outside the predetermined boundaries. In the case 
where the taxpayer is unable to justify their results the guidelines say that, "the tax 
administration must determine how to adjust the conditions of the controlled transaction 
taking into account the arm's length range". The OECD advocates that a movement should be 
done depending on the facts and circumstances of the case. In some cases the most acceptable 
answer will be to move the profit to the middle, as the IRS would.
On the whole the use of arm's length ranges could be taken a step further, to help reduce the 
work necessary for taxpayer's to prove the transfer price they choose is at arm's length. By 
creating an acceptable range of profits which could be reported, the taxpayer would not have 
to specify a transfer price and go to all the lengths to justify it if the results were (well) within 
that predetermined range. It would be necessary for the boundaries (of the range) to be 
checked on a regular basis against comparable transactions to make sure they still represented 
an arm's length "area".
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Multiple Year Data
"In order to obtain a complete understanding of the facts and circumstances surrounding the 
controlled transaction, it might be useful to examine data from both the year under 
examination and prior years" (OECD, 1995). Section 482 said that the circumstances in 
which it may be preferable to look at multiple year data include looking to discover the extent 
to which complete and accurate data is available for the taxable year under review, the effect 
of the business cycles in the controlled taxpayer's industry, or the effects of life cycles of the 
product being examined. OECD (1995) suggests that this data might be worthwhile where a 
taxpayer has resorted to using a transactional profit method.
Section 482 noted the following use of multiple year data: "It may be considered to determine 
whether the same economic conditions that caused the controlled taxpayer's results had a 
comparable effect over a comparable period of time on the uncontrolled comparables that 
establish the arm's length range."
Periodic Adjustments
From Arnold and Mclntyre (1994): "Several parts of the 1995 OECD report offer a cautious 
endorsement of the principles contained in the 1994 US section 482 regulations. In limited 
circumstances, for example, the US regulations provide for periodic adjustments to the royalty 
rates paid with respect to transfers of valuable intangible property. The report accepts some 
periodic adjustments as being consistent with the arm's length standard, but it suggests that tax 
administrations should make such adjustments only in certain exceptional cases."
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Penalties and Documentation
Perfect information would be the answer to transfer pricing. Firms could look at all the data 
on comparable firms and comparable transactions and be able to set arm's length transfer 
prices without any of the current troubles experienced and tax authorities could easily see that 
they were adhering to the ALP. Companies and tax authorities alike, however, would totally 
condone the idea, it would kill market competitiveness dead. What then is the next best 
alternative? Countries are doing what they can to obtain as much information as possible on 
firms. This is aided and led by the actions of the OECD and US.
The OECD and US agree that it is necessary to have "appropriate" documentation from firms, 
on their transfer pricing policies, and to have some system of retribution for deviating away 
from the acceptable. The final US regulations have not relieved the taxpayer of 
'contemporaneous' documentation required under Section 6662(e) to avoid the risk of US 
transfer pricing penalties (Farrell, 1991). The guidelines, however, offer a more cautious 
endorsement of this dual strategy, advising that member countries penalise in a way which is 
fair, and not unduly onerous for taxpayers. This may be true, comparatively, but on the part of 
taxpayers, it appears that fears about the ever-increasing costs of tax compliance have been 
insufficiently recognised (Stitt, 1995).
- Documentation
Sherwood (1997) said that: "For companies with an extensive number of related-party 
transactions in many categories (eg. tangibles, intangibles, services etc.) the issue has been 
whether to document all transactions or only those most likely to undergo the most scrutiny." 
In addition, as companies have been increasing the level of documentation they prepare, so tax
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authorities worldwide have increased the number of examinations they carry out. Only by 
looking at the US, the OECD and other tax authorities' regulations and what they expect the 
amount and level of detail to be, and hence the cost, can an individual taxpayer decide the 
amount of documentation they are prepared to create and maintain.
In the US, the increased burden of documentation is the downfall of the newer more flexible 
regulations. Murray Schlussel (Zach, 1993), a senior tax advisor with Ford Motors, in 
response to the question what do tax authorities think of as the purpose for existing businesses 
said: "To make money or to do tax returns?"
The OECD (1995) guidelines devoted a whole chapter to the issue of documentation and an 
example of the organisation's denial about the real cost to taxpayers. This is demonstrated in 
the following passage taken from Chapter V, paragraph 5.6:
"In considering whether transfer pricing is appropriate for tax purposes, it may be 
necessary in applying principles of prudent business management for the taxpayer 
to prepare or refer to written materials that would not otherwise be prepared or 
referred to in the absence of tax considerations, including documents from foreign 
associated enterprises."
In response to this, Self (1994) said: "Surely, if a document would not be necessary in a third 
party transaction there should be no need to create it in an intra-group situation."
On the other hand Chapter V of the OECD guidelines did state that:
"The taxpayer should not be expected to incur disproportionately high costs and 
burdens to obtain documents from foreign associated enterprises or to engage in an 
exhaustive search for comparable data from uncontrolled transactions if the
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taxpayer reasonably believes, having regard to the principles of this Report, either 
that no comparable data exists or that the cost of locating the comparable date 
would be disproportionately high relative to the amounts at issue."
The fact that OECD (1995) said tax administrations must make rulings on related transactions, 
whether they are furnished with complete information or not, means that it might be beneficial 
to a taxpayer to supply as thorough documentation as possible to, "improve the persuasiveness 
of its approach to transfer pricing".
OECD (1995a), however, recognised a number of problems for taxpayers collecting
information on foreign associated parties:
"When the taxpayer is a subsidiary of a foreign associated enterprise or is only a 
minority shareholder, information may be difficult to obtain because the taxpayer 
does not have control of the associated enterprise. In any case, accounting 
standards and legal documentation requirements (and the language they are written 
in) differ from country to country."
Chapter V in the guidelines ended by stating that the Committee on Fiscal Affairs (OECD, 
1995) intends to study the issue of documentation further to develop additional guidance that 
might be given to assist taxpayers and tax administrations in this area.
- Transfer Pricing Penalties
The issue of penalties was mentioned at the beginning of this section as something which the 
US uses as a tool with which to control their taxpayers and something which the OECD 
recommends only in the cases of blatant exploitation of transfer prices. Penalties were 
introduced to encourage taxpayers to maintain acceptable levels of documentation on the
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transfer prices of interrelated transactions. According to Sherwood (1997): "To avoid 
penalties, a company must maintain sufficient documentation to establish that the taxpayer 
reasonably concluded that given the available data and the applicable pricing methods, the 
(chosen) method provides the most reliable measure of an arm's length result under the 
principle of the best method rule in Reg. 1 482- l(c) (Section 482 regulations)."
The OECD does not offer a framework recommending how penalties should (or should not) 
be administered. A framework might be beneficial, however, because a report published by 
Ernst and Young showed that 400 MNEs "urged OECD countries to adopt a more consistent 
approach to enforcement measures and policing arrangements" (Adams, 1997).
As there is no structure for penalties in the guidelines, the end of this section will, therefore, 
be concerned for the large part with the development of a penalty regime in the US and the 
steps which the regulations state must be taken to avoid them.
The first accuracy-related penalties were introduced in the 1990 US Revenue Reconciliation 
Act. The result was that Section 6662(e) of the Internal Revenue Code provided for the 
administration of penalties on tax years ending after November 5, 1990 (Durst and Fiamma, 
1993). Smith (1998) noted that for taxable years after 1993, most taxpayers with Section 482 
controlled transactions will potentially be subject to the penalties.
The two standard penalties dispensed were 20% and 40% of the resulting tax deficiency 
depending on the severity of the situation:
A penalty of 20% is applied in cases of substantial valuation misstatements. According to 
Farrell( 1991) this is when
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- the price of any intercompany item claimed on the tax return (i.e., the amount of purchase 
price, fees for services, royalties, interest or rents) is 200% or more (or 50% or less) of the 
amount determined under Section 482 to be the correct amount for such item (transactional 
penalty); or
- the net Section 482 transfer price adjustments for the tax year exceed $10 million (net 
adjustment penalty).
The penalty is 40% of the tax deficiency, in cases of gross valuation misstatements, when the 
additional income attributable to transfer price adjustments exceeds $20 million (or the price 
on the tax return is 400% or more or 25% or less of the amount determined as correct).
An example of a country which has followed the US's lead and introduced penalties is Japan. 
Here a taxpayer will automatically be penalised by 10% for any underpayment of tax. Yoost 
and Miyajima (1997) noted this penalty will increase to 15% in cases of large assessments and 
to 35% in cases of fraud or concealment. In addition, Canada has introduced 10% penalties 
when a taxpayer can be shown not to have made reasonable efforts to determine and use arm's 
length transfer prices (Will, 1998 and Price Waterhouse, 1997). This would be the case, 
according to Mawani (1997), when the total adjustments of a taxpayer exceeds the lesser of: 
10% of their gross revenues; and $5,000,000.
It might be the case in the future, with the willingness of tax authorities to adopt a similar 
system of penalties as the US, that the OECD guidelines would have to accept and incorporate 
the opinions of these tax authorities as opposed to the usual pattern of the tax authorities 
following the recommendations of the OECD. The OECD might have change its views on
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penalties and instead of tentatively approving the use of them, creating a framework for fining 
taxpayers (they could follow the US, for example, and have 20% and 40% penalties).
- Avoidance of Transfer Pricing Penalties
Smith (1998) noted, with regards to the application of penalties to relatively small taxpayers in 
the US, the attitude of Carol Carter, manager of the group of international and financial 
products examiners recently established in Seattle: "A good faith internal attempt to show how 
transfer prices were set will go a long way with her and her international examiners. The size 
and sophistication of the taxpayer will be taken into account in evaluating compliance with 
Section 6662(e).
According to Smith (1998) a taxpayer can avoid transactional and net adjustment penalties by
doing two things: (1) selecting and applying (in a "reasonable" manner) a transfer pricing
methodology; and (2) contemporaneously documenting the selection and application process.
A penalty can only be avoided on a non-arm's length transfer price if the taxpayer can
demonstrate "reasonable cause" and "good faith" exceptions in setting transfer prices. Smith
(1998) listed some of the relevant factors listed in the regulations which would indicate
methods selected in a "reasonable manner":
" The experience and knowledge of the taxpayer, including all members of the taxpayer's
controlled group.
" The extent to which reliable data was available and the data was analysed in a reasonable
manner.
" The extent to which the taxpayer followed the relevant requirements set forth in regulations
under section 482 with respect to the application of the method.
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" The extent to which the taxpayer reasonably relied on a study or other analysis performed by 
a professional qualified to conduct such a study or analysis, including an attorney, accountant, 
or economist.
" If the taxpayer attempted to determine an arm's length result by using more than one 
uncontrolled comparable, whether the taxpayer arbitrarily selected a result that corresponds to 
an extreme point in the range of results derived from the uncontrolled comparables. 
"The extent to which the taxpayer relied on a transfer pricing methodology developed and 
applied pursuant to an Advance Pricing Agreement for a prior taxable year, or specifically 
approved by the Internal Revenue Service pursuant to a transfer pricing audit of the 
transactions at issue for a prior taxable year, provided that the taxpayer applied the approved 
method reasonably and consistently with its prior application, and the facts and circumstances 
surrounding the use of the method have not materially changed since the time of the IRS's 
action, or if the facts and circumstances have changed in a way that materially affects the 
reliability of the results, the taxpayer makes appropriate adjustments to reflect such changes.
The size of a net transfer pricing adjustment in relation to the size of the controlled 
transaction out of which the adjustment arose.
Farrell (1991) said that, "various precedents under the "reasonable cause" exception have 
excused those taxpayers who have demonstrated that they took "ordinary business care" in 
dealing with their tax affairs from penalties. This, however, necessitates an appropriate level 
of documentation. The following is a list, from section 6662, of the primary documents which 
should be produced in order to avoid penalties:
  An overview of the taxpayer's business;
  A description of the taxpayer's organisational structure;
  Any documentation explicitly required by the regulations under section 482;
98
  A description of the method selected and an explanation of why that method was selected;
  A description of the alternative methods and an explanation of why they were not selected;
  A description of the controlled transaction and any internal data used to analyse those 
transactions;
  A description of the comparables that were used, how comparability was evaluated, and 
what adjustments were made;
An explanation of the economic analysis and projections relied upon in developing the 
method;
  A description or summary of any relevant data that the taxpayer obtains after the end of 
the tax year and before filing a tax return, which would help determine if a taxpayer 
selected and applied a specified method in a reasonable manner; and 
A general index of the principal and background documents and a description of the 
recordkeeping system used for cataloguing and accessing those documents. (Skantz, 1998)
Smith (1998) ended his article by noting that not every document listed would be necessary in 
determining the transfer pricing methodologies (TPMs), depending on the taxpayer's 
individual facts and circumstances. In addition, a number of specific documents not 
mentioned in the regulations might be essential to a taxpayer to demonstrate correct selection 
and use of a particular TPM.
The use of penalties has brought an onslaught of criticism from MNEs, Pierre Solal, corporate 
tax director at Alcatel said: "As a time when multinationals must improve productivity to 
survive, reduce fixed costs and overheads and constantly adopt to a fast changing 
environment, tax authorities around the world should punish those responsible for obvious
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abuses. They should not use the tax code to penalise struggling economic actors" (Sayer, 
1995).
Further Harmonisation?
There appears to have been some degree of communication between the US and OECD from 
looking at the regulations and guidelines. According to Elliott (1995): "The immediate 
similarities between the two documents demonstrate some measure of liaison between the two 
sets of legislators and an attempt to reach a satisfactory and workable consensus." Schwartz et 
al (1995) concluded the following about the OECD and US: "Both endorsed ALP and rejected 
the unitary approach...both recognise the difficulty in finding CUPs and provide for 
appropriate adjustments. Both emphasise the need for functional analysis to determine 
comparability and allow for a range of results and the use of multiple year data."
With the new, generally consistent OECD (1995) and US (1995) reports, differences exist in 
only a few cases. US taxpayers who comply with Section 482 regulations should not be 
exposed to a significant risk of double taxation in OECD member countries (Greenhill and 
Bee, 1996).
Progress Since OECD 1995 Guidelines
Since there is more information on the advancements of the guidelines since 1995, this section 
will concentrate on the work of the OECD. The OECD has issued updates to the 1995
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guidelines in the form of more chapters. In April 1996 Chapter VI broached the transfer of 
intangible property and Chapter VII discussed the transfer of services. In addition, Chapter 
VIII, the last chapter to be added, was released in October 1997 and is concerned with cost 
contribution arrangements (CCA). According to OECD (1997), a common example is a CCA 
for the joint development of intangible property where each participant obtains a share of 
rights in the developed property. In summary, the chapter says that to apply the arm's length 
principle a participant must give a value equal to that which an independent company would 
have assigned in comparable circumstances. The participant's proportionate share of total 
contributions will be consistent with the share of prospective benefits.
OECD (1997) noted that they were going to concentrate on four particular areas: 
" More detailed worked examples of the five approved methods of applying the guidelines will 
be issued to assist taxpayers.
" The general principles of the guidelines may be difficult to use in complex situations, such as 
permanent establishments and thin capitalisation.
" The implementation of the guidelines and the design of administrative procedures are being 
re-examined to look for improvements. For example, should the OECD establish a procedure 
for advance transfer pricing arrangements? Is there a need for OECD-wide arbitration? Can 
greater consistency between the valuation of transactions for income tax and customs duties 
be achieved? 
Compiling the core chapters for paperback release.
In 1998 the OECD issued a further update in the form of two new annexes and a revised 
glossary to the 1995 guidelines. The first addition was a set of guidelines for monitoring 
procedures on the guidelines and the involvement of the business community. OECD (1998)
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says that the objective of the monitoring process: "Is to examine how far Member countries' 
legislation, regulations and administrative practices are consistent with the guidelines and to 
identify areas where the guidelines may require further explanation, amendments or 
additions." OECD (1998) highlights the four main parts to the monitoring process:
a) Peer Reviews: Aims to gain detailed information on legislation, practices and experiences 
of transfer pricing in Member countries. The first level would be an "issue review", which 
would look at the approach taken by all Member countries to a particular issue of widespread 
significance. The second level would be a "limited review" which would only look at the 
approach of a particular country or countries in relation to a specific issue. The third level 
would be a "full review" of a particular country which would address directly the 
interpretation and application of the Guidelines in the particular Member country.
b) Identification and Analysis of Difficult Case Paradigms: Identify and analyse difficult fact 
patterns and problem areas which present obstacles to an internationally consistent application 
of the TPMs set out in the Guidelines. This will also include areas where the Guidelines 
currently appear to offer no or insufficient guidance.
c) Updates of Legislation and Practice: The Secretariat will solicit from Member countries 
reports on developments in their domestic transfer pricing legislation, regulations, and 
administrative practices, consistent with the invitation of the Council.
d) Developments of Examples: The examples are not intended to develop new principles or to 
cover new issues but rather to assist in interpreting principles and in addressing difficult issues 
already discussed in the Guidelines.
The second annex of the update provided examples to illustrate the transfer pricing guidelines 
and the glossary had been updated to include terms introduced in chapters VI to VIII.
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Conclusion
There has been a definite harmonisation of views towards transfer pricing of the OECD and 
the US. This is evidenced, for example, through the introduction of the similar "best" estimate 
and "best" method rule, acceptance of CPM and introduction of TNMM, the similar standards 
for comparability, and the use of arm's length ranges and multiple year data. There is some 
difference in the documentation requirements, the US demanding more contemporaneous 
data, and there is more enthusiasm for penalties on the part of the US. Further harmonisation 
could take place and this would probably result in almost identical approaches to transfer 
pricing control.
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INFLUENCE OF THE OECD AND US
PART A 
A TIMELINE OF TRANSFER PRICING LEGISLATION
The previous chapter looked at the developments and gradual harmonisation of the US and 
OECD in international transfer pricing. Their approaches have affected and continue to affect 
the approaches of other countries worldwide. This chapter is presented as a timeline of events 
from pre-sixties to late 1990's. In general, it illustrates that the US has pioneered approaches 
for controlling international transfer pricing, the OECD has reacted to those approaches by 
producing guidelines and the rest of the world has followed whatever the OECD has 
suggested. (The most important years for the US and OECD are in bold below)
Pre-Sixties
Very little international trade, transfer pricing almost wholly concerned with transfer pricing 
on a local scale. Companies transferring goods internally across states, with their different tax 
rates, in the US is the closest to cross-border transactions.
- 1921
US took first legislative action against tax avoidance through use of tax havens.
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- 1928
The above was followed shortly with the passing of the Revenue Act, which increased the 
power of the IRS to prevent tax manipulation.
- 1932
The League of Nations carried out a detailed study of the taxation of MNEs. The studies were 
written by national experts and co-ordinated by Michael B Carroll, the US representative on 
the League's Fiscal Committee. Carroll's analytical report identified the problem of "transfer 
pricing", probably the first time, as one of the key issues posed for national regulators by the 
internationalisation of business organisations (Picciotto, 1992).
- 1935
Fundamental year - issue of US S482 regulations introducing ALP. Not used on a
international basis much at this time.
- 1954
S482 formally introduced into Internal Revenue Code.
- 1957
Germany introduced control of transfer pricing into S22 of Act Against Restraints of
Competition.
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Sixties
A second decade dominated by US actions.
- 1962
Brazil also took heed and encompassed transfer pricing control in Law Number 4137.
In this same year the US abolished the deferral privilege with respect to the profits of tax 
haven subsidiaries, which according to Plasschaert (1994): "Has proven quite effective in 
thwarting the tax haven escape channel."
- 1964
Individual Income Tax Act passed in the Netherlands. Article 9 regulated according to the 
following presupposition that: the business profits of a given year must be computed according 
to sound business practice, applied with consistency and without regard to the probable tax 
consequences. Cases of departure from this were dealt with according to the individual facts 
by local tax officials.
- 1968
The US introduced the three transaction methods (CUP, resale price and cost plus) into
Section 482 regulations in a strict hierarchy of preference (CUP first). The IRS given
authority to assert appropriate arm's length price on companies.
At the same time, the US began a campaign to draw worldwide attention to the ALP
willing everyone to adhere to it.
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Seventies
This decade demonstrates how successful the US were in their campaign. A large number of 
countries were quick to incorporate ALP methods into legislation. Emerging international 
trade among related companies and differing national tax rates signalled the inception of 
double taxation.
- 1970
Pakistan is one example of a country made aware of transfer pricing manipulations 
though US crusade and embodied control in Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices 
Ordinance Number V.
- 1975
Tax treaties could be seen as one solution to double taxation, the UK and US, two stable and 
respected countries, signed one in this year.
- 1976
Another solution came with the ECC "proposal for a Council Directive on the Elimination of 
Double Taxation in Connection with the adjustment of transfers of profit between associated 
enterprises" (Arbitration Procedure). The problem addressed through the provision of 
arbitration facilities, a means through which any disagreements arising between MNEs and 
governments could be submitted for review.
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- 1977
A way that governments can better understand MNEs is through a greater supply of 
information on them. In 1977 the EEC Directive provided for the exchange and share of data 
between governments.
- 1979
After the attempts of US to encourage ALP acceptance, the second main party in the
transfer pricing ring, the OECD, enshrined in Article 9 on the 1979 OECD Model
Taxation Convention on Income and on Capital this same principle and favouring the
same transaction methods.
The published guidelines also followed the EEC 1976 Directive addressing double
taxation matters and as a result became the "accepted blueprint for subsequent double
tax treaties (DTTs) between different nations.
Eighties
This was a period of further worldwide recognition of international transfer pricing, 
particularly after the publishing of 1979 OECD guidelines, which reaffirmed the US's 
approach, and some refinement of existing legislation.
- 1982
Australia issued Division 13 of Income Tax Assessment Act, containing recommendations to 
the Commissioner of Taxation as to ways in which the transfer pricing provisions are
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applicable. No mention of specific methods suggested, surprising considering OECD and US 
pronouncements.
- 1983
Germany regulates transfer pricing through three provisions of corporate tax law: the ALP; 
hidden profit distributions and hidden capital distributions. In 1983, according to Borstell et 
al (1997): "As an interpretation of these three provisions the tax authorities issued a Statement 
on the Principles Governing the Examination of Income Allocation Between Internationally 
Related Companies - the so-called Administrative Principles. The purpose of the 
Administrative Principles is to provide a directive concerning the tax audit treatment of 
transfer pricing cases and to ensure the uniform application of rules and methods within the 
fiscal services."
- 1984
Netherlands have been one of the most independent countries in development of transfer 
pricing supervision. In 1984 a group of local tax officials published a booklet on the treatment 
of transfer pricing disputes and common practice. This became identified as the standard 
rulings. A year later these ruling were incorporated into a paper released by the Ministry of 
Finance on cost resolution. The paper also showed support for the 1979 and 1984 OECD 
guidelines.
The OECD published more guidelines, "Transfer Pricing and Multinational Enterprises: 
Three Related Issues". This paper concerned itself with the mutual agreement 
procedure, and banking, and the allocation of central management and service costs.
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- 1986
Japan introduced legislation of intercompany pricing, based on OECD guidelines, in Article 
66.5 of Special Taxation Measures Law and in Special Taxation Law relating to a Tax Treaty. 
Borstell et al (1997) noted the following about Japan: "Since the introduction of the transfer 
pricing legal framework in 1986, the tax authorities have become very aggressive in 
monitoring cross-border transactions. Over ten years there have been 130 transfer pricing 
cases which have resulted in tax adjustments generating income of $1.54 billion". These cases 
have involved, amongst others, well know companies such as AIU Insurance Company (the 
first case), Nippon Roche KK, Coca-Cola Japan and Ciba-Geigy Japan Limited.
US Tax Reform Act passed to preside over the growing importance of intangibles. The act 
established the "super royalty" provision into S482 regulations: "Income with respect to such 
transfer or licensed shall be commensurate with income attributable to the intangible." 
This can be seen as one of the first controversial steps of IRS because it indicates IRS 
second-guessing and therefore a departure from ALP.
- 1987
Canada issued Revenue Canada Information Circular Number 87-2: "International Transfer 
Pricing and other transactions".
The Netherlands published their own standard treaty which closely follows OECD Article 9, 
the only difference with regards to a belief that specific service agreements are by definition 
are not caused by corrupt relationships.
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- 1988
Following the previous years actions in Canada another more prescriptive step was taken. 
S233.1 of Income Tax Act issued requiring a firm to annually fill in form T106, Corporate 
Information Return, to show non-arm's length transactions with non-resident persons. 
Significant penalties also introduced for failure to comply.
Serious of approach to transfer pricing also demonstrated in a reorganisation, around this time, 
of Revenue Canada Head Office to establish International Tax Progress Directorate.
The UK embodied transfer pricing rules in S770-773 of Income and Corporation Tax Act 
1988.
Most importantly to occur in this year was the publication, in the US, of what is 
commonly referred to as the White Paper, a discussion draft: "A Study of Intercompany 
Pricing.*' The paper included an outline of controversial regulations for implementation 
of "commensurate with income" standard for intangibles. Additionally, methods were 
more detailed and documentation requirements more demanding. The main issue, 
however, was the proposal of CPM as an alternative to the traditional transaction 
methods.
Nineties
Transfer pricing has reached peak popularity, high on both the tax authorities and taxpayers 
agendas.
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- 1990
The EU Arbitration Convention was signed by twelve member states.
South Korea established transfer pricing rules into Office of National Tax Administration 
Order Number 1062.
Two years since the White Paper comes the US Revenue Reconciliation Act requiring more 
documentation requirements with new stiff penalties of 20% on top of additional tax if IRS 
adjusts taxable income by at least $10 million. 
This year also marked by inception of APA programme.
- 1991
Rev. Proc. 91-22 authorises Canada and a taxpayer to write an APA.
- 1992
The final occurrence in 1992 was the EC issue of draft convention on transfer pricing 
arbitration.
The above proposed regulations resulted in the OECD setting up a taskforce to review them.
In 1992 US issued proposed regulations which covered transfer of intangibles, contained 
none of the disclosure or document requirements in the White Paper (or 1993 temporary 
regulations) and endorsed CPM.
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The second publication of the US in this year was the result of a number of hearings on 
transfer pricing in 1990 and 1992 and called "Issue of Foreign Income Tax Rationalisation".
- 1993
Australian Tax Office created a transfer pricing unit of International Tax Branch. In addition, 
Richards (1993) reported that the Taxation Office issued draft ruling TR93/D40 which all it 
does is indicate that the Taxation Office intends once again to give increased attention to 
transfer pricing.
Canada also concerned with APAs released exposure draft, after two pilot cases had already 
been tested, allowing consultation between taxpayers and the authorities for this purpose.
Japanese introduce polices with focus on intangible property between foreign parent 
companies and their Japanese subsidiaries.
Netherlands published new standard rulings regarding holding, licensing, financing, and 
cost-plus activities.
Additionally authorities released statement that the Rotterdam Tax Inspectorate would be the 
only body to hear applications for APAs involving potential investors.
OECD set up taskforce in order to undertake revision of 1977 and 1984 guidelines.
US issued temporary regulations which lists several factors to aid in best method 
selection process. Formally presented CPM and introduced the profit-split method. 
APAs encouraged in this paper. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act introduced
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accuracy-related penalties, under section 6662 of S482 regulations (Coopers and 
Lybrand, 1995b).
- 1994
Commissioner of Taxation in Australia introduced Income Tax Ruling TR94/14 - Transfer 
Pricing and Profit Shifting, signalling beginning of number of rulings and commitment of 
significant resources to tax avoidance. Rulings on matters such as ALP methods, 
documentation requirements and penalties.
Canada took more action with tax avoidance one year later. The Federal Budget introduced 
legislation to restrict income earned in Canada seeping into a low tax country. 
Revenue Canada moreover issued a joint press release with the Department of Finance 
providing further transfer pricing guidelines (to Circular 87-2).
OECD published Transfer Pricing for Multinational Enterprises and Tax 
Administrations, Discussion Draft of Part One: Principles and Methods. The latter 
provides detailed descriptions of the three different transaction methods with additional 
introduction of TNMM as alternative method. The Report admits that the US CPM has 
some strengths as well as weaknesses. 
Penalties advised to be applied in a fair way.
The US final regulations were issued incorporating the "best method" rule. CPM 
reduced in value from previous papers.
Additionally, under S6662(e), in S482 regulations, there is relief from penalties when a 
company enters into an APA.
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- 1995
Australian Tax Authority unhappy with lack of seriousness paid to transfer pricing 
requirements by firms that it announces an increase in audit activity.
EU Arbitration Convention came into force and taxpayers able to present their case to number 
of bodies if they disagree with rulings made on them.
The OECD published part two of the guidelines on intangibles and services and then 
later into 1995 the whole report: Transfer Pricing for Multinationals and Tax 
Administrations. Acknowledges difficulties in application of methods. Lack of 
recognition of burden on taxpayer with documentation requirements. Against global 
formulary apportionment method. Briefly discusses possibility of APAs.
In South Africa legislation on transfer pricing was incorporated into the Income Tax Act. 
According to Louw (1998), taxpayers are required to show that the sales of goods and services 
between "connected persons" who are managed or controlled in and outside of South Africa 
respectively are supplied or acquired at arm's length prices.
The US issued Announcement 95-40, Proposed Update of Advance Pricing Agreement 
Revenue Procedure. Largely restates Rev. Proc.91-22 with new measures to ensure views of 
taxpayers and Service personnel are represented fairly. In this paper the ERS shows preference 
for bilateral or multilateral APAs.
- 1996
On December 30 1996 Brazil passed a bill to introduce transfer pricing rules.
116
France enacted a law amending the transfer pricing rules from a procedural standpoint and has 
given greater power to the French tax authority to contest abusive transfer pricing practices 
(Layne, 1996). As part of the changes, the tax authority can demand information more 
speedily from a taxpayer instead of through a lengthy exchange of information process which 
was the norm previously.
OECD released an update on intangible property and Intra-group services in the above 1995 
report. Expanded intangibles definition to include marketing activities. Report expresses 
support for profit-split method. Also introduces concept of hindsight adjustments, a view 
more in line with US S482 regulations and one which contravenes existing European tax 
authorities opinion. Update believes charges for services should be commensurate with 
benefits. Finally the report concedes that there will be cases where service transfers should be 
acceptable at cost.
South Korea joined the OECD in December 1996. Borstell et al (1997) noted that as of 
January 1997 South Korean taxpayers were required to provide detailed information in their 
tax returns about their intra-group transactions (similar to the requirements of the guidelines).
- 1997
The Australian Taxation Office released an advance ruling (TR97/20), to replace a draft 1995 
ruling, setting out the eligible TPMs for cross-border transactions between associated legal 
entities (Riley and Diamond, 1997). Richards (1997) summarised the contents of this report 
as setting out: "the TPMs acceptable to the tax office, when they are considered appropriate, 
and the tax office's views on the concepts involved and the definitional issues that arise in 
applying them." In general the ruling appears to follow the OECD guidelines.
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In April, Brazil issued new transfer pricing regulations. Provides important guidance on the 
application of transfer pricing rules on a number of important issues and accepts the OECD 
principles of comparability (Wolf, 1997). Burden of proof shifted onto tax authorities.
Canada introduced new transfer pricing legislative initiatives in the 1997 Federal Budget and 
draft amendments were released by the Department of Finance in September (Mawani, 1997). 
These measures involved incorporating new contemporaneous documentation and reporting 
requirements similar to existing OECD guidelines. Canadian Income Tax Act amended to 
ensure all transfer pricing methods in the OECD guidelines are available to taxpayers, 
including TNMM and the profit split method (Forster, 1997). Also introduced penalties 
commensurate with degree of adjustments equal to 10% of the transfer pricing adjustment 
when taxpayer fails to make reasonable efforts to determine arm's length prices and 
allocations.
France also imposed new legislation in accordance with OECD guidelines because of 
problems with under compliance amongst firms.
Japan announced plans for tax reforms which include intentions to accept TNMM.
According to Chip and Coronado (1997), 1997 Mexican income tax reforms requires 
companies with international related-party transactions to document that their transfer prices 
were determined in accordance with the arm's length standard. Companies must document 
that one of the TPMs specified by law has been engaged. MacDonald (1997) noted that 
failure to pay taxes due to non-compliance with transfer pricing rules have been reduced by 
50% when documentation requirements are met.
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Poland (a non-OECD country) adopted OECD transfer pricing model as law. Ministry of 
Finance training staff to develop teams to carry out audits. Problems of consistency with 49 
regional tax offices. Focus on royalty transfers and documentation.
South Korea have new transfer pricing rules requiring contemporaneous documentation to 
support the transfer pricing regime opted by a company. Regulations, "effectively embrace 
ALP and the OECD methods. Must additionally justify why three traditional transaction 
methods not appropriate if another method used.
Sweden expected to gather a legislative working group, under a government directive, to 
review their current legislation. APAs may be accepted into new laws.
The UK Inland Revenue issued "Modernisation of Transfer Pricing Legislation", a consultative 
document, with the objective of making legislation more similar to the 1995 OECD 
guidelines. Changes include new documentation requirements, penalties and higher 
compliance costs.
It appears that the nineties so far have involved the most action particularly after the issue of 
the OECD 1995 guidelines and US 1994 final regulations. As far as the influence of the 
OECD (in particular) and the US on other countries is concerned, it appears that developed 
countries were more immediately affected by the directions of the two and have been quick to 
follow their actions. On the whole, only recently have developing countries really caught on 
to the benefits of implementing transfer pricing legislation.
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INFLUENCE OF THE OECD AND US
PARTB 
MODERNISATION OF THE UK TRANSFER PRICING LEGISLATION
The timeline showed that the influence of the OECD and US has been far reaching. The 
second half of this chapter is concerned with how one country has been effected by the OECD. 
The UK has been chosen because of the current plan to modernise the transfer pricing 
legislation in line with the guidelines. The chapter investigates the current legislation, 
followed by a look at the objectives of the change and finally a look at the important aspects 
of the changes to legislation.
Current UK Legislation
Currently, the UK transfer pricing legislation is embodied in Section 770-773 of Income and 
Corporation Tax Act of 1988 and endorses the use of the arm's length pricing although none of 
the methods, traditional transactional methods or otherwise, are explicitly mentioned.
An excerpt of Section 770 reads as follows: "In computing for tax purposes the income, profits 
or losses of the seller where the actual price was less than the arm's length price, and of the 
buyer where the actual price was greater than the arm's length price, the like consequences 
shall ensue as would have ensued if the property had been sold for the arm's length price."
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The legislation enables the Board of the Inland Revenue to give a Direction requiring certain 
transactions between associated parties to be taxed as if parties had dealt at arm's length 
(MacFarlanes, 1997). According to the Inland Revenue (1997c), the existing transfer pricing 
legislation is discretionary: unlike most of the provisions of the Taxes Acts, it does not apply 
to any transactions within its scope "unless the Board so direct" (Section 770). This means 
that, as the legislation stands, taxpayers are not under any obligation to apply the arm's length 
principle in filing their tax returns (Ernst and Young, 1997b). This represents a problem, 
firstly, to the Inland Revenue who are faced with the responsibility for substituting the 
appropriate arm's length prices when this has not already been done, and secondly, a 
competitive disadvantage to those taxpayers who are acting properly and expending resources 
in order to apply the ALP to their transactions.
In addition to the legislation, the Inland Revenue issued guidelines (1981) to foreign-owned 
taxpayers which described, amongst other things: the definitions of scope and control; the 
power of the Inland Revenue to demand information with their assurances that the information 
would not be disclosed except for tax purposes; that taxpayers could expect adjustments where 
prices were found not to be at arm's length.
The main point to make here is that the Inland Revenue has been and presently is expressly 
guided by the considerations set out in the OECD report on transfer pricing most recently 
released at the time of investigations.
As Chapter 2 of the Modernisation of Transfer Pricing Legislation paper says, "It has generally 
served its purpose well, and embodies the ALP, but it is increasingly perceived as falling 
behind developments in the global economy, international trading and world-wide fiscal
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practice". The fact that the onus is on the tax authority, the Inland Revenue, to ensure firms 
use the ALP is, in itself, an outdated concept. The removal of the directional basis and the 
planned integration of transfer pricing within the self-assessment framework will move the 
burden onto the shoulders of taxpayers to act correctly.
Proposed UK Legislation
In 1995, the then Chancellor, Kenneth Clark, in the UK Budget, initiated an informal 
consultation to discuss procedural changes regarding bringing transfer pricing within the 
self-assessment system (Elliott, 1998 and Freshfields, 1997). The announcement was greeted 
with concern as to the direction of this change. Guy Sellars speculated that the new system 
would operate similarly to the one in the US (Ernst and Young, 1995). Cannon (1997) noted 
that remarks of Levy Gee who expects to see the UK move towards an American system of 
self-assessment: "We will have the same bullish tactics here." It was announced in the 
following year's Budget that changes would involve bringing transfer pricing within a 
self-assessment framework. The current Chancellor, Gordon Brown, announced in his budget 
in July 1997 that he intended to update the transfer pricing rules and publish draft legislation 
by the end of that year.
On 10 October 1997, the Inland Revenue published the Consultative Document (ConDoc) 
entitled "Modernisation of the Transfer Pricing Legislation". The paper contained plans for 
the biggest change in almost 50 years on governing the ways that multinationals apportion the 
profits they earn in different countries. One reason given for the revolution of the legislation 
was that by being able to reach an international consensus on how transfer prices are
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evaluated, tax authorities are able to protect their own tax bases, eliminate a potential source 
of double taxation and encourage international trade. International assent increases in 
importance with increasing globalisation of international business, particularly considering 
how much of this activity involves multinational companies. The issues are more important 
for the UK than other countries because Britain is more dependent on international trade and 
investment (Stefan Wagstyl, 1997).
Although the proposed changes could have been predicted, especially with the developments 
of the OECD in recent times and the number of countries who have responded to this, the 
shock to multinationals has been the substantial compliance burden they will be expected to 
face.
The Governments' stated, intended changes are to:
a) remove the directional basis of the legislation, thus requiring taxpayers to apply the arm's 
length principle in making their tax returns;
b) modernise the legislation more generally;
c)modernise the administrative arrangements by integrating transfer pricing within the SA 
management framework; and
d) reinforce the UK's commitment to the arm's length principle on which there is international 
consensus expressed in Article 9 and the OECD Guidelines (Inland Revenue, 1998b).
This rest of this chapter looks at the intended changes to achieve the above aims introduced by 
the Government, the initial responses from taxpayers, in particular Coopers and Lybrand, 
KPMG and Ernst and Young, and the impact of these criticisms in altering the rudimentary 
form of the legislation.
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Andrew Hickman (1998), International Specialist and Competent Authority Specialist at the 
International Division, noted that as a result of the criticisms received some changes were 
necessary. In general, however, he said that there was broad support for the principle of 
modernisation and alignment with OECD guidelines and that was something which he 
expected. Chris Rolfe (1998), International Tax Partner at Coopers and Lybrand, London, 
noted that this is because the issue has been around and debated for a long time in the UK.
The Basic Pricing Rule
5.3 The new rule is intended to reproduce in UK law the effect of Article 9(1) of the OECD 
Model Tax Convention.
5.4 The basic pricing rule in Schedule 28AA refers to the "provision" between two persons by 
means of a transaction or series of transactions. It requires the adjustment of income, profits 
or losses where that provision (being the sum of all the terms and conditions attaching to the 
actual transaction or series of transactions) departs from the arm's length standard and creates 
a potential advantage for the purposes of UK taxation..
Many respondents including Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu (1997) noted with concern that this 
rule was extremely widely drawn. Some were worried, according to the Inland Revenue 
(1998a), that the legislation might go beyond what was envisaged by the OECD. This is 
because of the use of the all encompassing term 'provision'. Rolfe (1998) said of the rule, "I 
can't think of anything else they might want to put in there, I mean, that means everything 
basically."
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KPMG (1997) were concerned with the effect of the rule on the record keeping burden of 
firms because, "it is so wide in its scope that it may often involve documentation of many 
aspects of a company's arrangements with its affiliates that simply are not directly related to 
the transaction in question".
The Government's response to this was to say that, although the wording of the basic pricing 
rule is broad, the requirement to construe the rules in a consistent manner with the OECD and 
with the production of transfer pricing guidelines, the taxpayer can be assured that of the UK 
legislation not going wider than the OECD's.
One-Way Street
5.5. A potential advantage exists if, as a result of the actual provision, the taxpayer's income of 
profits are less than, or its losses are greater than, they would have been had the arm's length 
provision been made between the affected persons. The new rule permits adjustments only 
where these will increase taxable income or profits, or reduce allowable losses. In this way, it 
preserves the "one-way street" approach of the existing legislation and is consistent with the 
approach of Article 9(1).
A number of the respondents to the ConDoc perceived the operation of a one-way street to be 
inconsistent with the ALP. Coopers and Lybrand (1997a), said that they believed this would 
go against one of the stated Key Reasons for Change, to "ensure fairness between taxpayers in 
the requirement to apply the ALP". They also pointed out that Article 9(1) does not object to a 
two-way street being adopted, as hinted at by the Government in the above section, and which
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provides for adjustments to be made on an 'appropriate' basis. Similarly, the wording in 
Article 9 of many double tax treaties favours the use of adjustments either way.
The Government argued otherwise, maintaining that the "one-way street" approach is a basis 
of the existing legislation, and an integral part of the tax treaty network, and therefore, that the 
new rules did not represent a change. Their justification for such an approach was that 
taxpayers facing an adjustment in the UK would be able to seek relief from double taxation 
under the mutual agreement procedure of the relevant tax treaties or the new UK rules on the 
elimination of double counting which are expected to be introduced. In addition, the 
Government said: "To adopt a two-way street' approach in the UK might mean that taxpayers 
could make downwards adjustments, even where there was no upwards adjustments 
elsewhere. This could lead to profits going untaxed anywhere."
Secondary Adjustments
5.7.Unless the adjustment in the tax computation is matched by payments between the 
affected parties reflecting the adjustment, the economic circumstances of the parties will be 
distorted.
5.8. One way of addressing the distortion is to make a "secondary adjustment", which 
recognises the fact that funds which would have been retained by one of the parties of the 
provision had been made at arm's length have not actually been retained. This is done by 
deeming a secondary transaction, for example a loan, to have been undertaken.
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5.9. The Government does not propose to provide for such adjustments, but will keep the 
position under review to determine whether legislation is needed to ensure funds are restored 
following a transfer pricing adjustment (voluntarily).
Responses: "suggested that any payments should be treated on the same basis as payments for 
group relief. It was also suggested that the secondary adjustment might take the form of a 
one-off tax payment, to be made at the time of the primary adjustment, equivalent to the net 
present value of the tax projected to be generated by the 'missing' funds" (Inland Revenue, 
1998a).
KPMG (1997) wanted to know how the Government intended to encourage voluntary 
repatriation of funds; however, Ernst and Young (1998a) felt that in a majority of cases this 
would not be an issue.
There was general agreement with the Government's intention not to provide for secondary 
adjustments. KPMG (1997) were questionable about the Inland Revenue not being specific in 
their intention not to (ever) impose secondary adjustments. Ernst and Young (1998a) thought 
that such a provision would be unworkable, particularly if cases involved a number of periods.
The Government did not change its opinions on secondary adjustments, so they will not 
provide for them in the legislation.
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Scope of the Legislation
The ConDoc's proposals incorporated an extension of the control tests.
- Definition of Control
5.10. The current legislation applies to transactions between parties where one party controls 
the other or both parties are under common control.
5.11. Under present legislation, the test at section 840 is employed to establish whether the 
requisite control conditions are fulfilled. In applying this test, rights and powers of nominees 
and connected persons can be attributed to the potentially controlling party. The draft 
legislation continues to employ the test for partnerships, but adopts section 416 for companies. 
The proposed legislation also incorporates a series of attribution rules, including provisions 
which address situations where trusts or unit trusts are included in a control chain.
Many respondents expressed concerns with the rules for determining control. In particular, 
Coopers and Lybrand (1997a) felt that the need to test first the direct relationship and then the 
indirect relationship of the parties represented an unfair and onerous burden. They 
recommended either of the following:
- the proposed attribution rules be removed from the main body of the proposed legislation 
and contained instead in an anti-avoidance paragraph for which a Board direction and the 
involvement of International Division are required; or
- taxpayers who have not set out to abuse transfer prices are protected from the prohibitive 
costs of researching indirect relationships by the inclusion of a 'knows or should have 
known' rule.
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In addition, much concern expressed, by respondents, was directed at the effect of the 
partnership attribution rules. Coopers and Lybrand (1997a) wanted only the relevant 
relationships to be taken into account, by which they meant not to encompass partners "with 
interests which do not exceed 50 percent after attributing to the tested party all interests in that 
partnership held by connected parties from the control definition". The Governments reaction 
to this view, and the second of their proposed changes, was to drop such rules.
Two changes were announced by the Government with regards to their proposes legislation 
after receiving comments. There would be a change in the definition of control for 
companies, defined by reference to section 840 ICTA, and not section 416 as originally 
proposed. One consequence of this will be that otherwise unconnected parties will not be 
deemed to be connected solely because of a loan relationship between them. In addition, the 
legislation would be amended so that a control relationship will not necessarily be created 
between a lender and a borrower by reason solely of the lender taking a charge over the assets 
of the borrower as a security for the loan.
With regards to the protests over the partnership attribution rules, the Government proposed to 
drop them.
The aim of the changes is to narrow the original intended scope of the legislation to a level 
more acceptable to companies.
- Joint Ventures
The new definition of control brings within the legislation joint ventures between two 40% 
participants (Ernst and Young, 1997b). Coopers and Lybrand (1997a) said the proposed
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change represented a severe departure from the existing 50 percent rule. In addition, this is, 
arguably, an unnecessary extension of the compliance burden.
KPMG (1997) argues that since joint ventures are a means by which UK companies are able to 
penetrate 'emerging' markets, the instances where there are "entirely commercial 
arrangements for working with third parties may be put at risk".
Coopers and Lybrand (1997a) argued that it may not be in the power of the UK company to 
insist on changes in a joint venture agreement and that competent authority claims were likely 
to be unsuccessful if a proposed UK adjustment would exceed the profit attributable to the UK 
party under the joint venture agreement.
The Government decided that, despite the criticisms, it would bring the new joint ventures 
definition into the legislation. However, to allow UK participants who would need to 
renegotiate their position in agreements involving arm's length pricing the Government 
proposed to introduce a three year transitional period in the legislation which would act as a 
"grandfathering" provision to existing joint ventures.
Financial Transactions and Arrangements
5.19. All financial arrangements between or involving "the affected persons" are potentially 
within the scope of the proposed new legislation.
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The Government said that this was a natural progression to bring the UK legislation more in 
line with Article 9 of the OECD Model.
Coopers and Lybrand (1997a) felt that the impact, of bringing all financial transactions within 
the boundaries of the new legislation, on inward and outward lending of UK companies raised 
a number of "complex pricing issues". They used, as an example, the existence of an affiliated 
company guarantee, which not only affects the level of debt which a bank is willing to extend 
to a company, but also the terms under which such a loan is made.
5.20. Where the funding comes directly from a third party, but with the support of a guarantee 
from a non-UK group member, "excessive" interest will fall to be disallowed, as is sometimes 
the case now, if the provision between the two affected persons differs from the arm's length 
provision.
A number of respondents expressed concern at the intention to disallow interest on third party 
funding backed by guarantee. The Outcome of Consultations (Inland Revenue, 1998a) paper 
mentioned that responses had been made questioning how such a system could be 
implemented and requesting assurances that the legislation would not apply where the 
borrower was not thinly capitalised and the only effect of the guarantee was to reduce the 
interest rate or secure better terms. The Government responded by introducing plans to issue 
guidance on the application of the new rules, to be consistent with existing thin capitalisation 
rules.
KPMG (1997) said that if the Inland Revenue were to disallow interest of a UK subsidiary on 
a bank loan guaranteed by an associate, it appeared unlikely that there would be any
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mechanism by which double taxation could be avoided. Similarly, double counting could 
occur as a result of a corresponding adjustment which might not have been available under the 
relevant Double Tax Treaties.
"Since the new rules adopt the Article 9 approach, there will be no change where a borrower 
obtains loan funding from an unconnected lender under cover of a guarantee provided by an 
associated company resident in a country with which the UK has a tax treaty incorporating a 
provision of this type. The proposed legislation will, however, extend this approach to all 
such arrangements irrespective of the existence, or particular wording of, a double taxation 
agreement, thus achieving greater consistency in the application of the rules" (Inland Revenue, 
1998a).
Foreign Exchange and Financial Instruments
5.22. Transactions which are within the scope of the new legislation may give rise to foreign 
exchange gains and losses, and to payments and receipts under financial instruments. Special 
tax rules for such amounts are set out in Chapter II Part IV FA 1993 (foreign exchange gains 
and losses) and Chapter II Part IV FA 1994 (financial instruments). Where amounts are 
brought into account under those provision they will be excluded from consideration under the 
transfer pricing legislation.
The above exclusion received support from a number of respondents.
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5.23. There are at present specific provisions which deal with the adjustments to be made 
where arrangements which give rise to foreign exchange profits and losses or payments and 
receipts under financial instruments are other than at arm's length. These provisions only 
apply where the Board of Inland Revenue give a Direction to that effect.
5.24. The Government believes that in principle these provisions should be applied when 
taxpayers self assess their profits, without the need for a Board's Direction.
Coopers and Lybrand (1997a) and Ernst and Young (1998a) both argued that given the 
complexity of the legislation, the Board's direction should be retained. If the provisions were 
to be brought within the self-assessment framework, Coopers and Lybrand (1997a) requested 
the following areas of taxpayer protection be provided:
The safe harbour guidelines set out in section 3 of the Explanatory Statement should be 
preserved in statutory form, so that a company can rely on them when fulfilling its 
self-assessment obligations. If the taxpayer could show that it had behaved reasonably in 
assuming that the company was within a safe harbour, it should not be exposed to a 
penalty.
  The foreign exchange arm's length tests should be amended to operate on a proportionate 
basis. At present, if a loan is caught, the whole of an exchange loss is carried forward and 
ring fenced.
  To be consistent with Schedule 28AA (and the existing rules for debt) there should be an 
exclusion from the arm's length test for currency contracts where the contract is between 
two members of the same UK group.
The Government has, regardless of the criticisms expressed, decided to abolish the use of the 
Board's direction before the anti-avoidance provisions relating to foreign exchange differences
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and financial instruments. Legislation will be used to ensure that Inspectors are unable to 
impose the application of these provisions without obtaining the approval of Head Office first.
Commencement
5.3. On the basis of integration within the SA framework, the Government intends that the 
new regime for transfer pricing should come into effect at the commencement of CTSA.
The designated date for initiation has been announced as 1 July 1999.
Ernst and Young (1998a) asked the Government to appreciate the fact that companies do not, 
as a matter of practice, routinely record every discussion and arrangement they enter into, and 
to expect them to have the documentation in place for transactions occurring before July 1998 
would place an intolerable burden upon them. KPMG (1997) would have preferred the start 
date be delayed by one year,but as this would be an unlikely suggested some form of 
transitional relief for arrangements in place at the commencement date.
The Government have taken heed of these concerns and promised to adopt a 'common-sense1 
approach towards taxpayers and the difficulties they may experience in adopting the new 
system. The expected date of inception remains July 1999.
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Central Monitoring of Transfer Pricing Enquiries
6.5. Central Monitoring under the responsibility of International Division in two ways.
6.6. Firstly, responsibility for the statutory Direction procedure to senior officials of the 
Division ensures that the Inland Revenue adopts a consistent approach in this complex, 
specialised and sensitive area.
6.7. Secondly, cases are brought to the attention of the Division through a more general system 
of submissions to Head Office.
Coopers and Lybrand (1997a) suggested that in the initial enquiry stage, involving local 
non-transfer pricing specialist inspectors, the Inspectors Manual (IM4661) should require 
them to>
restrict initial questions to the minimum necessary to determine whether and to what
extent a transfer pricing investigation might be required;
conduct any investigation in an ordered manner, perhaps agreeing with a taxpayer that
different elements of its transfer pricing will be considered on a rolling basis year by year
and avoid the "scatter-gun" approach;
in relation to a field enquiry, explain what it is that the enquiry is addressing and what is
the Inspector's specific concern;
when presented with an argument in support of a position, respond with counter-argument
which the taxpayer can address; and 
  be obliged to refer to International Division any concerns of the taxpayer about the
conduct of the enquiry (e.g. burdensome requests).
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As a result of this criticism and those made by others the Government announced plans for 
some changes to IM4661. "The Revenue is considering how best to afford taxpayers access to 
International Division without prejudicing the Revenue's ability to undertake effective 
compliance work. The new IM4661 will form part of a more extensive revision of the 
published guidance of Inspectors on transfer pricing; this will be available before the first 
CTSA (Self Assessment for Companies) filing date."
6.9. The Government intends that central monitoring of enquiries should continue following 
the proposed abolition of the Board's Direction procedure.
Arguments for the removal of the directional basis include the fact that it would remove 
inequity and potential competitive disadvantage between taxpayers, and bring the UK more 
closely in line with what happens in other countries (Macfarlanes, 1997a). In addition, 
removing the direction imposes on taxpayers the obligation to apply transfer pricing 
appropriately themselves through the self-assessment framework. This would not be 
consistent with the continued use of the Board's direction.
After receiving comments on this proposal abolition, the Government intends to remove the 
Board's Direction only with regards to foreign exchange difference and financial instruments.
KPMG (1997) were amongst the respondents who believed in the maintenance of statutory 
central monitoring and the Direction system to afford the most protection to taxpayers. 
Arguments in favour included the notion that taxpayer protection could not be achieved 
satisfactorily through the operation of a purely administrative procedure. In the absence of 
this, they requested the enaction of 30C TMA (Appendix 5). Coopers and Lybrand (1997a)
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said that in the necessary enaction of the latter they felt "that it should by expanded in two 
ways: firstly, to cover more than the assumptions of paragraph 1(2) of Schedule 28AA since 
the experience of International Division is likely to be required to ensure the proper and 
consistent application of the OECD Guidelines (paragraph 1(3)) and the proper conduct of 
complex enquiries; and secondly, that a taxpayer can refer to the International Division where 
it has grounds for believing either than an investigation under Schedule 28AA is being 
conducted in an oppressive or unreasonable manner, or that it is being conducted without a 
reasonable expectation of approval from the Board for an adjustment.
Following the universal support for enshrining the central monitoring of enquiries into the new 
legislation, the Government announced its intentions to keep the "Board's Approval" 
mechanism.
Compliance Costs
KPMG (1997) requested confirmation as to the definition of a 'disproportionately high cost' 
(used in paragraph 6, Appendix II) so as to inform the debate on the extent of documentation 
required.
Ernst and Young (1998a), on the other hand, wanted more clarification on a number of issues, 
including penalties so that companies could satisfy themselves that they could be at risk from 
a minimal level of damages as possible. This too would help the Government and their 
objective to keep compliance costs as low as possible for firms.
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As a result of such opinions towards compliance costs the Revenue is to produce a Regulatory 
Appraisal of the proposals on transfer pricing, including a Compliance Cost Assessment. 
Revision of the guidance on documentation and changes to the control rules are also intended, 
to help meet some of the concerns on clarification.
Both KPMG (1997) and Coopers and Lybrand (1997a) wanted to see some confirmation from 
the Government that all costs incurred by a taxpayer, including those involved in meeting the 
compliance burden and, as Ernst and Young (1998a) suggested, the professional fees charged, 
would be fully tax deductible. In addition, KPMG (1997) brought attention to the idea that the 
Revenue should be obliged to consider financial redress if no adjustment is made and the 
Revenue have placed unrealistic demands for information on the taxpayer.
The Government decided to allow tax deducibility for all pre-filing costs of transfer pricing 
cases as long as they meet the rules on admissibility of expenses.
Return Requirement
6.21. The Government has decided not to impose any requirement upon taxpayers to disclose 
information about transfer prices in their tax returns. However, it has asked the Inland 
Revenue to keep under review the effectiveness of the administration of the proposed new 
regime in this respect.
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This attracted widespread agreement, although some thought that a limited return requirement 
might be preferable, if the result was greater taxpayer certainty (Inland Revenue, 1998a). The 
existing Taxes Management Act record keeping requirements, however, will still apply.
Documentation Requirements
6.23. Section 12B will be interpreted by the Inland Revenue, for the purposes of transfer 
pricing rules, according to Chapter V of the OECD Guidelines: Expect documentation to be 
created, referred to and retained in relation to a taxpayer's transfer pricing arrangements with 
the same prudent business management principles that would govern the process of evaluating 
a business decision of a similar level of complexity and importance.
6.24. Taxpayers will be expected to create and retain contemporaneous documentation of their 
efforts to comply with the ALP, including the information on which their transfer prices were 
based, the factors taken into account and the method selected. The Inland Revenue proposes 
to issue guidance in this area.
This section attracted considerable attention from respondents concerned with the 
expectations of the Government, namely the compilation and upkeep of a contemporaneous 
level of documentation.
Coopers and Lybrand (1997a) stressed that the list of items expected to be retained was not a 
realistic reflection of what would be readily available to the ordinary prudent business person. 
They thought the list far too long and that many items might not be relevant. KPMG (1997) 
wondered whether the Inland Revenue believed that companies routinely maintained the level
140
of documentation detailed in Appendix II of the ConDoc, and if they did, then KPMG felt they 
must be under a misconception.
Appendix II states that taxpayers are not expected to determine the 'best method1 yet, as 
KPMG (1997) questioned, how would taxpayers demonstrate they had considered the arm's 
length provision if they have not looked at comparable data and the methods available. Ernst 
and Young (1998a) was also concerned about this contradiction, particularly the resultant 
taxpayer uncertainty.
In addition, as Ernst and Young (1998a) pointed out, not every transaction, meeting or 
renegotiation, for example, between parties acting at arm's length is fully recorded. If it were 
the norm to do business in certain industries with the minimum of documentation then the 
Inland Revenue should recognise that fact.
The cost of complying with the proposed legislation may be unreasonable; Coopers and 
Lybrand (1997a) quoted one of their taxpayers: "For a large multinational enterprise with 
many cross border transactions this would involve collating reviewing and keeping copies of 
thousands of documents - an expensive paper chase. This makes Dawn Primarolo's assertion 
that 'compliance costs should be kept to the minimum necessary' look rather hollow."
Furthermore, how were the smaller and medium sized companies expected to cope with this 
increased cost? Ernst and Young (1998a) suggested a narrower, more defined list of 
requirements. The Outcome of Consultations (Inland Revenue, 1998a) paper noted an 
alternative expressed by some respondents for a system of governmental guidance, as opposed 
to a prescriptive list, which would involve taking account of the documents which businesses
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create and keep for commercial reasons, and recognising that different businesses have 
differing needs in this regard. Coopers and Lybrand (1997a), believed the recommended list 
should be reduced to the following three items: identification of relevant transactions; which 
TPM was used; and how it complied with ALP. The result would be a decrease in the 
compliance burden, relieving in particular the smaller companies.
Along the same line, Coopers and Lybrand (1997a) suggested the introduction of a minimum 
documentation requirement where maintenance of such would mean that companies could not 
be charged with neglect. Additionally, they wanted the legislation to introduce a permissible 
margin of error, "to reflect the fact that transfer pricing is a question of ranges and depends on 
data which may be difficult to obtain and interpret".
Ernst and Young (1998a) and KPMG (1997) both wanted to know what the Inland Revenue 
considered 'available to them' to actually mean. Ernst and Young (1998a) expressed concern 
at the idea that information availability might be assumed to be based on the concept 'if it is 
out there' and the associated problems, including the cost factor, for MNEs expected to keep 
extensive databases if they are to review the information availability.
There was general concern at the scope for creative interpretation that local Inspectors may 
take with regards to the regulation. In addition, the possibility of unreasonable information 
requests in the course of an enquiry and the prospect that an inability to provide certain items 
might lead to a verdict of guilty regardless of the relevance of such data to the case. 
Moreover, Emst and Young (1998a) talked about the problem of time delays when an 
Inspector is obliged to refer a case to the International Division before seeking to issue a
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penalty, and the likelihood that a company will pay the penalty just to see the matter resolved 
quickly, regardless of the actual ruling which may finally be made.
The Government had a limited response to the criticisms outlined above. It was accepted, 
however, that the draft guidance note needed revision in order to lay greater stress on the 
establishment of broad principles, and less on the identification of particular types of 
document.
The Government agreed with the introduction of transfer pricing ranges and acknowledged 
that because of the subjective nature of transfer pricing, they would allow prices to fall within 
a prescribed acceptable range.
On a concluding note, it can be said that despite the Inland Revenue's obvious attempts to 
reduce the extensive documentation and record keeping requirements, the compliance burden 
will be substantial if the approach of the ConDoc is fostered. Mike Godbee (1997), transfer 
pricing partner at Coopers and Lybrand, London, found, in response to a questionnaire, only 
27% of companies considered that they currently complied with the new standards for 
documentation. Furthermore, he said : "We expect that many companies, particularly inbound 
investors, will need to make a real effort to obtain sufficient documentation to be able to file 
complete and accurate returns under the new legislation without losing sleep."
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Penalties
6.31. If a return does not comply with the transfer pricing legislation, it will be an incorrect 
return, and if it is incorrect as a consequence of the taxpayer's fraud or neglect, then the 
taxpayer will be liable to a penalty.
6.32. The maximum amount of the penalty eligible under these provisions is equal to the 
amount of the tax lost as a result of the fraudulent or negligent conduct.
6.33. The Government does not propose to introduce specific penalty provisions.
6.34. Taxpayers should not be penalised if they make a reasonable attempt to comply by 
observing the arm's length standard in their tax returns. Clearly, it is important for taxpayers 
to have appropriate records to demonstrate what they have done in this area. 
6.36. Where there is a liability for penalties, the Board of Inland Revenue, will exercise their 
discretion to mitigate the penalties charged as appropriate based on the extent to which the 
taxpayer has disclosed any irregularities, the co-operation afforded and the size and gravity of 
any offences committed.
The proposals in this regard represent the greatest shift from the current regime (Ernst and 
Young, 1997b). There is no current legal requirement for firms to show that profits have been 
computed in accordance with the arm's length standard. Because of the change KPMG (1997) 
said they felt the penalty regime should be applied less harshly in the early years and Ernst and 
Young (1998a) suggested a three year transitional period.
KPMG (1997) requested the Inland Revenue issue a Statement of Practice on penalties and 
they requested information on what would be considered to be mitigating factors and how 
those factors would be applied. Coopers and Lybrand (1997a) suggested the use of a safe
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harbour rule, whereby no penalty could be applied where the amount of the adjustment failed 
to exceed a given percentage of profit and an absolute amount.
These criticisms led the Revenue to announce that they would produce a statement, "with 
illustrative examples, indicating when it would consider penalties appropriate in respect of 
transfer pricing adjustments, and outlining how the Board's criteria for the mitigation of 
penalties will be applied in transfer pricing cases".
Conclusion
The main point of the modernisation of UK legislation, to incorporate the basic pricing rule of 
the OECD guidelines into UK law, has been accepted an inevitable by all. In addition to 
incorporating the ALP into law the effect of the OECD on the UK update can be seen in a 
number of areas. These include the wide reaching scope of the legislation (for example 
encompassing financial transactions and arrangements) and the adoption of penalties. As far 
as the level of documentation is concerned, the Inland Revenue has said taxpayers should rely 
on Chapter V of the OECD guidelines to determine how much to produce (Deloitte Touche 
Tohmatsu International, 1997; Inland Revenue, 1998e and Patton, 1998). Similarly both 
parties refuse to recognise the extent of costs associated with the collection and maintenance 
of documentation. Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu International (1998a) said that the Revenue's 
estimated total cost of compliance of the most effected (2000-3000) businesses, during the 
transition period, of £25 million to £75 million was a substantial underestimation.
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ADVANCE PRICING AGREEMENTS (APAs)
Birth of the American Programme
The 1980s was a time of increased dissonance and aggravation with transfer pricing in the US. 
This was exacerbated by the growing use of intangibles over the period and the problems they 
brought in finding appropriate transfer pricing methods, combined with the growing number 
of cases being litigated as the IRS grew increasingly confrontational (Triplett, 1994). The 
publication of the White Paper in 1988 was perceived as a further act of government 
belligerence, with legislation becoming more and more constrictive. At the end of 1989 and 
into 1990 the IRS held a number of discussions with taxpayers to discuss the increasing 
unhappiness of both parties with transfer pricing and the application of the arm's length 
principle.
The consequence of such talks was to introduce the idea of advance rulings, whereby an 
agreement was made between the Office of the Associate Chief Counsel (International) and a 
company, involving the transfer pricing policy to be adopted on cross-border transactions prior 
to them being carried out. The proposal represented a departure from previous policy, as 
Rehder (1996) said, "in the past the IRS has been reluctant to enter into agreements based 
largely on projections rather than fact". The acceptance of the concept on the side of the 
authorities came in recognition of the growing complexity of transactions and the realisation 
that the resources were not available to complete as many audits as desirable (Rehder, 1996).
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Initially the agreements were referred to as advanced determination rulings (ADRs), but the 
name changed shortly after to advance pricing agreements (APAs) (Epstein, 1990). These 
APAs were formally proposed in March 1990, and the idea was finalised after further 
discussion with taxpayers, treaty partners of the US and other relevant bodies. In March 1991 
the IRS published Revenue Procedure 91-22 which authorised APA contracts to be made 
between the relevant bodies and contained a number of guidelines on the formation of such an 
arrangement.
Few companies showed interest in becoming the programmes' guinea pigs. It was Apple 
Computer that first piloted an APA, in response to years of transfer pricing attention from the 
American and Australian authorities and the many resultant adjustments which they had 
previously been compelled to make. Rehder (1996) highlighted the satisfaction which Apple 
Computer expresses with the system of APAs, having also entered into a number of similar 
agreements with other countries, including Canada and Japan. The avoidance of double 
taxation and the certainty of tax treatment were the two reasons the company cited for 
preferring APAs.
It is estimated that since March 1991 approximately 300 APAs of various types have been 
negotiated worldwide (Ernst and Young, 1997). The countries reporting the largest number of 
completed APAs are the US (100), Canada (12), Australia (9) and the UK (7). These numbers 
indicate that, compared to the number of enterprises doing cross-border trade with related or 
associated enterprises, the use of APAs is still very limited.
This chapter begins by looking at different types of APAs and the advantages and 
disadvantages of APAs. Then it reviews the APA procedure in the US, as the best
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documented and longest running system. Special interest will be shown on what aspects 
taxpayers are advised to consider when contemplating an APA with the US, followed by a step 
by step investigation of the process and guidelines of Rev. Proc. 96-53, the most recent 
framework for the US APA process. There have been some revisions to the APA process 
since the introduction of Rev. Proc. 95-22. In 1995 Ann. 95-49, for example, set forth changes 
to increase the flexibility of the process and, according to Laffie (1995), "to ensure that the 
views of the taxpayer and all involved IRS personnel were represented effectively". Critical 
changes from the original Rev. Proc. 95-22 format will be discussed in detail.
This chapter also discusses briefly the experience and views of other countries to APAs, with 
particular reference to the attempts of the UK aiming to establish an APA framework formally 
into their legal system.
Uni-, Bi- and Multilateral Agreements
A taxpayer may choose to form a unilateral APA, where an agreement is made between 
himself and one tax authority. Alternatively, a taxpayer may choose to commence 
proceedings for APAs with two (bilateral) or more (multilateral) jurisdictions simultaneously. 
This would bring about several sets of agreements between the taxpayer and the home 
country, the foreign affiliate and the foreign countries, and the home country and its treaty 
partners (Ryan and Patton, 1991). The purpose of a number of'international' settlements are 
that, subject to compliance with the contracts specified terms, the taxpayer can report 
transactions in the different jurisdictions and not find himself subject to adjustments upon 
audit in any of them.
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In the US, the taxpayer can elect whether his APA will be unilateral, bilateral or multilateral 
under Rev. Proc. 91-22. According to Gould (1997), APA requests in 1997 were about 80 
percent bilateral and multilateral, and 20 percent unilateral. The next two sections aim to 
explain the popularity of the former types of APA compared to unilateral APAs in the eyes of 
both tax authorities and companies.
- Unilateral Agreements
According to Ryan and Patton (1991): "While IRS officials had indicated informally they are 
willing to consider requests for APAs on a unilateral basis it is clear that their primary 
emphasis is currently on APAs with respect to countries that are willing to enter into bilateral 
agreements."
It is interesting to note that when a company wishes to enter into a unilateral APA and cross 
border transactions involve entities in treaty countries, the tax authority concerned can 
disclose information, given to it by the company in the course of the APA, to foreign treaty 
partners under treaty provisions if asked so to do. This information may be imparted to the 
treaty partner for issues that may not even be related to the APA.
- Bilateral and Multilateral Agreements
The benefits of bilateral and multilateral agreements are: firstly, the likely fall in the risk of 
double taxation than with unilateral APAs; and secondly, the costs are minimised. The latter 
is partly because the taxpayer has assurance that he will not have the cost of being challenged 
by relevant governments and the governments do not have the cost of challenging the taxpayer 
or the cost of questioning other governments on their taxation of the cross-border transactions. 
This is view is shared by Schwartz et al (1995) who said: "A move for a procedure to
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encourage bilateral APAs was supported because of the adverse impact of transfer pricing 
enforcement on tax revenues, the deficiency in bilateral tax treaties to avoid double taxation, 
and the willingness of tax authorities to settle the transfer pricing issues in advance."
Ryan and Patton (1991) list the speed of the process of negotiations and the likelihood of 
reaching a successful outcome as two further stimuli for concluding bilateral and multilateral 
agreements. They ascribe this quickness in dealings to the fact that the negotiations at 
governmental level take place before revenue has been collected and government positions 
have been solidified. Gould (1997) agreed with this, having said that the involvement of all 
Competent Authorities, those bodies authorised to deal with the international transfer pricing 
representations of their countries, from the onset of the APA process and the ability of all 
parties to have an input shortens the final negotiating time period. Ryan and Patton (1991) 
pointed out the added advantage of APAs as the only way that foreign-controlled, US 
taxpayers can obtain any security from arbitrary IRS assessment action.
- Competent Authority
Reaching a common understanding between governments on company's results and reporting 
on the TPMs requires the participation of the competent authorities, and a successful outcome 
will mean the formation of a competent authority (CA) agreement. The taxpayer will be 
expected simultaneously to submit APA requests and related correspondence to the competent 
authorities involved to allow fair consideration from all sides at the programme's inception. 
By adhering to the agreed terms of the agreement, the contract ensures that the taxpayer 
reporting in a jurisdiction will not be subject to adjustments upon audit on these issues in any 
of the jurisdictions (Ryan and Patton, 1991). The US CA, responsible for dealing with 
international APA issues, is the ERS Assistant Commissioner (International). Rev. Proc. 96-53
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said that where there was an inability to come to an arrangement among competent 
authorities, the Service would attempt to negotiate a unilateral APA.
With regards to the request for disclosure of specific sensitive data, which might affect the 
competitive position of the company if divulged, the IRS said, in Rev. Proc. 96-53, that the 
"parties would attempt to negotiate a mechanism to permit verification by a foreign CA 
without disclosing such information". Between Competent authorities the exchange of 
information extends beyond the initial formation of an APA. Rev. Proc. 96-53 expects 
information notification from foreign competent authorities "concerning any subsequent 
modifications, cancellation, revocation, requests to renew, evaluation of annual reports, or 
examination of the taxpayer's compliance with the terms and conditions of the APA". Finally, 
Rev. Proc. 96-53 Section 7 on CA Consideration finishes by saying on the matter of the types 
of APAs: "A unilateral APA may hinder the ability of the US CA to reach a mutual agreement 
which will provide relief from double taxation, particularly when a contemporaneous bilateral 
or multilateral APA request would have been both effective and practical to obtain consistent 
treatment of the APA matters in a treaty country.
The role of the CA is discussed in the next chapter in more detail because the main objective 
of such a body is the resolution of double taxation on a greater scale than just dealing with 
APAs.
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Advantages of APAs
- Certainty of Treatment and Protection From Penalties
As a binding agreement, an APA provides a high level of comfort with respect to transfer 
pricing, and helps taxpayers avoid contesting expensive audits because the IRS (and any other 
authority) will not investigate the TPM annually (Schwartz et al, 1995). This is corroborated 
by Rehder (1996) who said that corporate taxpayers welcomed the opportunity to enter into 
APAs as otherwise legislative amendments heightened their concern that they were violating 
transfer pricing rules, and, therefore, subject to possible adjustments and penalties. Certainty 
of treatment appeared to be one of the most commonly cited reasons for entering into an APA, 
together with protection from double taxation. In entering into an APA, there is relief in the 
US from penalties under Section 6662(e). Conflict with the authority over the TPM could also 
bring the negative publicity of litigation. Certainty of treatment in the US comes under 
Section 482 regulations.
- Protection From Double Taxation
There is some protection from double taxation where agreements coincide with other 
countries party to an APA (Triplett, 1994). Alternatively, bilateral tax treaties may have the 
same effect, and are used by countries who are party to APAs in preference to unilateral 
agreements. Those jurisdictions most in favour include the United States, Canada, the 
Netherlands, Japan and the UK. The preference for bilateral and multilateral APAs in 80% of 
cases in the US is a demonstration of the awareness of the problem of double taxation for 
US-based multinational enterprises.
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- Application to Other Jurisdictions
If an APA is agreed between a firm and a number of countries, Triplett (1994) commented it 
would be difficult for methods to be challenged by another, different country. From 
comments made by French and German officials (see next page), however, this does not 
necessarily appear to be the case.
- Review in Non-Confrontational Environment
One of the general objectives of the APA process is to create an environment that encourages 
common understanding and cooperation between the taxpayer and the tax authority. Wrappe 
(1997) said this is achieved, "because the APA process allows the taxpayer to propose and 
support its transfer pricing methodology, it encourages efficient communication that 
eliminates adversarial, position-based negotiation." Rev. Proc. 96-53 supports this view: "The 
APA process is designed to be a flexible problem-solving process based on cooperative and 
principled negotiations between taxpayers and the Service." The wording is positive and 
suggests meetings are held between equals as opposed to the IRS taking on the role of the 
accuser and the company as the defendant. The fundamental principle of the APA is to create 
understanding, finding solutions not problems, for the TPMs of cross-border transactions.
- Present Cases
The existing examples should give the taxpayer some confidence and increase the appeal of 
the APA process. These include Apple Computer, Barclays Bank, Sumitomo Bank Capital 
Markets, and Matushita Electric Company (Plambeck, 1994).
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- Record Keeping Burden
Ogum and Kirn (1995) held that since the taxpayer and authority agree in advance on what 
information is relevant for purposes of the APA, this can reduce the taxpayer's record keeping 
burden. This is a debatable point, since the process of attaining an APA will require the 
production of more sensitive data than would otherwise be expected to be produced in the 
normal process of defending the use of a TPM to the IRS. This could, therefore, be said to 
represent an increasing record keeping burden, with the problem of requiring extra time to put 
together facts which might never have been required previously. The suggested Appendix II 
of the UK "Modernisation of transfer pricing" consultative document (Appendix 6) 
demonstrates the increasing demands for information, which is not necessarily an advantage to 
APAs. This is a point related to the disadvantage of information disclosure discussed below.
- Maturing of US Programme
As the programme develops agreements are being made in an ever increasingly efficacious 
manner (Plambeck, 1994). Revenue Procedure 96-53, according to Gould (1997), currently 
streamlines the bilateral and multilateral APA processes. Perhaps this will encourage the 
production of generic descriptions of industries as mentioned before. Over time authorities 
are able to refine the APA process and this should work to decrease the time necessary to 
complete an APA and lower the present seemingly high cost of the procedure.
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Disadvantages of APAs
- Information Disclosure
All countries which participate in APAs require extensive information to be provided. The 
process requires a major commitment from the taxpayer's management, tax and accounting 
bodies. If most countries mirror the US, then in the instances when an APA is not concluded, 
the information gained will almost definitely be used (against the companies) in the future by 
tax authorities and possibly for examination of the past. The IRS offers more guidance than 
most on what would happen in this event.
The taxpayer must voluntarily expose itself to scrutiny by providing detailed industry and 
taxpayer specific information. Some procedural safeguards are needed to protect the taxpayer; 
for example, a company should be able to request that the tax authorities keep any disclosed 
information confidential (Rehder, 1996). The IRS guarantees confidentiality through section 
6103, and tax treaty confidentiality provisions also apply (Plambeck, 1994). Revenue Canada 
offers the same protection as the Income Tax Act prohibits it from providing briefing material 
obtained by it regarding a taxpayer to anyone other than a specified government official (Ward 
and Armstrong, 1994). The taxpayer, however, should still evaluate the risks of disclosure in 
a treaty country (Ogum and Kirn, 1995). As well as providing this information, the taxpayer 
may be at risk from being influenced by authorities as to their pricing decisions, which, the 
ICC says, "is contrary to the fundamental principles of a free market economy" (Sayer, 1995).
In developing a more flexible APA regime to encourage more firms participation, Takashi 
Tokunaga, general manager at the office of financing and accounting at Japan's Kansai
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Electric Power Company, says that companies' wishes to retain confidential information must 
be taken into consideration (Sayer, 1995).
When providing detailed knowledge of a company, a MNE must also consider adverse, 
retroactive effects of what they may be asked to reveal, especially where this affects tax years 
not already agreed, and where they may inadvertently contradict previously submitted 
information (Triplert, 1994). The taxpayer is likely to be challenged as a consequence of this 
information. In Rev. Proc. Section 3.06, it says on the matter of 'rollbacks' (looking back at 
the results of previous years): "Taxpayers should recognise that, even absent a (taxpayer's) 
request for a rollback, the Service may, under regularly applicable procedures, determine that 
the TPM agreed in an APA should be applied to prior years." This is illustrated by Patton and 
Wood (1995), who concluded that as many as 80% of the US APA applications filed involved 
a potential investigation into the APA of material for tax years for which returns had already 
been committed.
A final concern, on information expected, involves the requirement that firms submit annual 
reports evidencing compliance with the terms and conditions of the agreement to the various, 
relevant authorities. These do not, however, protect the taxpayer from additional scrutiny in 
the future.
- Complexity and Length of Time to Complete an APA
It is debatable whether the length of time to complete an APA is disadvantageous or 
advantageous, since it is dependent of the revenue authority's experience with APAs (the US 
being the most versed) and the size and complexity of the company applying.
157
Notwithstanding that, the previous section examined how the US had experienced a number of 
'growing pains' in the early 1990s, the result of which was a considerable slowing down of the 
process.
With companies constantly changing, in structure and size for instance, APAs needed to be 
completed speedily, since APAs only apply under a given set of conditions (Elliott, 1997). 
The relevance of an APA could be short-lived, even though countries are attempting to 
construct the programmes for longer time spans, more than the typical five year period for 
example. As the critical assumptions on which the APAs are based change, so the taxpayer 
must justify the use of the original transfer pricing methodologies, unless the APA is wholly 
adapted with new negotiations to meet the revised circumstances.
- Cost to Taxpayers and Revenue Authorities
The longer the process of application and approval, the greater the cost of participation. In 
addition, the firm may have accrued added expenses such as compiling a requested document 
of data which would otherwise not have been produced. This document might also have 
required a level of expertise that the firm would not normally internally supply and hence 
involve the cost of external sourcing.
Humphreys (1994) argued that, in reference to the Canadian APA process, much of the 
information-gathering, analysis and documentation necessary in developing an application for 
APA consideration requires the same effort as is necessary to otherwise assess and establish an 
appropriate policy and transfer price. This cost should be compared to the cost of defending 
an historic price through audit, CA, or through the Courts, all of which may take longer than 
the nine months Revenue Canada average the completion of an APA.
158
Wrappe (1997), argues, indeed, that significant time and cost savings are achievable through 
both the taxpayer and, in his example using the US, the IRS's "effective communication and 
narrowly defined information disclosure of the APA process".
A firm needs to weigh the direct and indirect costs of the APA against the expense of 
undergoing transfer pricing audits in several jurisdictions (Ryan and Patton, 1991).
- Breadth of APAs
It would be logistical nonsense to have an APA for each of a multinational enterprise's product 
lines as no one product line could be singled out as representative (Mazerov, 1994). The 
previous section quoted Ryan and Patton (1991) suggested list of transactions that might be 
appropriate for APAs.
- Cancellation of an APA
An authority may cancel an APA at any time on the grounds of suspected fraud, or 
misrepresentation in the provided information, or if a company has failed to comply fully with 
the terms and conditions of the APA. This is perhaps subject to (too much) judgment rather 
than fact since most of the APAs will be based on future projections rather than specifics.
- French and German Views
Lerat, group senior vice president, tax department at French multinational Rhone-Poulenc, 
founds his dislike for APAs, a view consistent with the French tax authorities, as a positive 
action against the policies of the US (Swiss, 1995). He also strongly opposed the American 
introduction of CPM. According to Swiss (1995), Lerat felt resisting APAs was a step boding 
well for resisting the influence of the US transfer pricing regime in Europe altogether. The
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French authorities are not confident that they will receive as much tax from companies with 
the power of the US. This concern is echoed in Germany, which has adopted a wait-and-see 
approach warily regarding how APAs are received elsewhere first (Rehder, 1996). The tax 
authorities of Baden-Wurttemburg holds a view held by number of other German states, that 
they would not readily honour an APA felt to have an adverse effect on Germany's tax base.
A further reason Lerat used to justify opposition to APAs was, in his words, that: "Effecting an 
advance pricing agreement amounts to asking the authorities for an advance ruling on a matter 
of fact - it is asking the tax authorities, taking into consideration the specific circumstances of 
the issue, if the transfer price in question is a good one. This is something the French tax 
authorities are not in a position to accept" (Swiss, 1995). This is a problem which has already 
been brought up in relation to the cancellation of an APA (see last page).
- Concluding Remarks
The advantages and disadvantages have now been discussed, but the extent to which each 
effects MNEs will be dependent on the individual countries, their APA process, experience 
and relationship to other nations. The next section investigates the US APA framework and 
their commitment to advance rulings as a solution to international transfer pricing.
US APA System
- Considerations Before Application
When considering entering into an agreement, a company must be aware of the demands the 
IRS will place on them, particularly with regards to information requirements. It has become
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imperative, for example, that a company be ready for the tax investigation and exposure it will 
receive with regards to audit history and prospective future audits. An important objective 
should, therefore, be to limit the liabilities of such divulgence through, as proposed by 
Plambeck (1994), making sure the company construct its internal accounting procedure to 
comply with the applicable US and foreign countries rules.
A taxpayer needs to decide which transactions will benefit the most from APAs; perhaps those 
already subject to the most scrutiny from the IRS. Ryan and Patton (1991) suggest the 
following transactions be considered:
a) Distribution of finished goods - The foreign affiliate acts as a marketeer of products 
manufactured by the US entity. The taxpayer might propose a specified gross profit margin 
range for specific lines of products. The proposed transactions could also involve the 
distribution of product in the US produced by a foreign affiliate of foreign parent company.
b) Sales of Raw Materials or Components - The APA could cover transactions between 
manufacturing sites that each use common components in the manufacturing process. 
Affiliates may trade components or raw materials among themselves to make up for shortages 
or surpluses. These transactions could be conducted an a predetermined cost-plus basis.
c) General and Administrative Expenses, Managerial Services - The APA could cover G&A 
or management services. These services could be identified and compensated for on a strict 
cost or cost-plus basis.
d) Technical Services - An APA could cover technical services rendered by foreign affiliates 
on behalf of or in connection with foreign marketing activities. A uniform basis could be 
agreed upon for the intercompany charge.
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e) Global Trading - The IRS has indicated that it is interested in obtaining taxpayer comments 
regarding trading of currency and financial instruments. An article by an IRS attorney 
suggests that such transactions might be an appropriate subject for an APA.
f) Cost Sharing Arrangements - The APA could cover the computation of the buy-in, the 
amount and duration of any royalty for preexisting technology, the product coverage of the 
agreement and the affiliates covered by the agreement.
If products are similar enough then it may be possible for an agreement to be signed for more 
than one transaction. In addition, the company must decide on the transfer pricing 
methodology (TPM) which is acceptable under Section 482 regulations, for each cross-border 
exchange. This includes the provision of data to prove the TPMs are the *best methods'.
Supplementary issues include considering the new reporting requirements which will be 
imposed on the taxpayer in creating an APA, proving compliance with the contract, and 
finally, whether the company will benefit from simultaneous APAs with more than one nation.
- Pre-Filing Conference
A taxpayer is given flexibility to request a pre-filing conference prior to the application of an 
APA. The aim of this meeting (or more likely a sequence of them) between the company and 
the Office of the Associate Chief Counsel (International), the main party in the IRS 
responsible for establishing APAs, is to informally discuss the prospect of an APA. 
Objectives of such a preliminary meeting may be, according to Rev. Proc. 96-53, to discuss 
the data, documentation and analyses that may be necessary; the need for an independent 
expert; the suitability of the chosen TPM; the possibility of an agreement among competent 
authorities; and IRS methods for scheduling, coordinating and evaluating such requests.
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An independent expert's report is required under Section 5.02 of Rev. Proc. 91-22, and is to be 
compiled by specialists from each of the countries involved in the APA. Rev. Proc. 96-53 
does not contain much detail on using these experts, merely mentioning it as a topic for 
discussion at the pre-filing stage. The value of such a report to the taxpayer is dependent on 
the belief that an independent's support for the formation of an APA will have the effect of 
lessening resistance to the request by the District Director's Office (International).
There have been a number of criticisms of the independent reports. In particular, the expense 
of such a report, which the taxpayer bears but is not guaranteed a result in his favour. In 
addition, as noted by Ryan and Patton (1991), the extent of independence of each report is 
likely to be limited. This is because any of the few real experts in transfer pricing are bound 
to have, at some time, had some involvement with the taxpayer, their representative or the 
IRS.
A company may, if they wish, participate anonymously in a pre-filing conference, however, 
representatives of the District Counsel Office, who have responsibility for the taxpayer's 
returns and who would normally partake, will have no information on the company and 
therefore will not be able to join in preliminary discussions. Anonymous involvement, 
therefore, will limit the information the IRS can say to the taxpayer with regards to specifics 
about their industry and the usefulness of such a conference.
- Apportionment Methodology
When a taxpayer has decided to go ahead with the application for an APA he is obliged to 
provide substantial information with respect to the TPM. According to Rev. Proc. 96-53: "The 
request should illustrate each proposed TPM by applying it, in a consistent format, to the prior
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three taxable year's financial and tax data of the parties. When the TPM applies to a new 
product or business, the request should include an illustration based on projected or 
hypothetical data." This constitutes expensive documentation for the taxpayer to collate and 
attempt to present in a way biased towards the preferred TPM.
Once a TPM has been agreed upon, the IRS can continue to scrutinise the results, and 
although a single result may be challenged, the TPM cannot be changed, against the wishes of 
the taxpayer, by the IRS.
- General Factual and Legal Items for All Proposed TPMs
This section in Rev. Proc. 96-53 contains a list of the articles which must be included in each 
request for an APA. The following is a summary of this catalogue.
(1) The organisations, trades, businesses, and transactions that will be subject to the APA.
(2) The details of the controlled taxpayers that are parties to the intended APA.
(3) A properly completed Form 2848 for any persons authorised to represent the parties in 
connection with the request.
(4) A brief description of the general history of business operations, worldwide organisational 
structure, ownership, capitalisation, financial arrangements, principal businesses, and the 
places where such businesses are conducted, and major transaction flows of the parties.
(5) Representative financial and tax data of the parties for the last three taxable years, together 
with other relevant data and documents in support of the proposed TPM.
(6) The functional currency of each party and the currency in which payment between parties 
is made.
(7) The taxable year of each party.
(8) A description of significant financial accounting methods.
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(9) An explanation of significant financial and tax accounting differences between the US and 
the foreign countries involved which could effect the TPM.
(10) A discussion of any relevant statutory provisions, tax treaties, court decisions, 
regulations, revenue rulings, or revenue procedures that relate to the proposed TPM.
(11) A statement describing all previous and current issues that relate to the proposed TPM.
- Specific Factual Items for a Proposed TPM Other Than a Cost Sharing Arrangement
This section contains information which might have some relevance in establishing that the 
requested TPM be in accordance with the ALP.
(1) Pertinent measurements of profitability and return on investment.
(2) A functional analysis of each party setting forth the economic activities performed, the 
assets employed, the economic costs incurred, and the risks assumed.
(3) An economic analysis or study of the general industry pricing practices and economic 
functions performed within the markets and geographical areas to be covered by the APA.
(4) A list of the taxpayer's competitors and a discussion of any uncontrolled transactions that 
may be comparable.
(5) A detailed presentation of the research efforts and criteria used to identify and select 
possible independent comparable and of the application of the criteria to the potential 
comparable.
(6) A detailed explanation of the selection and application of the factors used to adjust the 
activities of selected independent comparable for purposes of devising the proposed TPM.
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- Specific Factual Items for a Cost Sharing Arrangement
APAs for intangibles are extremely rare, if indeed any exist. The complexity of forming such 
an APA is demonstrated by the length of the following list of the information, which may all 
be necessary to establish that the proposed agreement involved a cost sharing arrangement.
(1) The history of the business operation, the geographic locations, and principal business 
activities of each of the parties involved.
(2) Documentation of the arrangement and any changes made to it.
(3) The participants, their dates or entry, each participant's contribution, each participant's 
interest in any covered intangibles, and how each participant reasonably anticipates that it will 
derive benefits from the use of covered intangibles; a statement whether there has been or will 
be any transfer by any participant of covered intangibles to another taxpayer under common 
control and, if so, how benefits will be reflected under those circumstances; and evidence of 
participants' compliance with the reporting requirements under the cost sharing regulations.
(4) The method for calculating each participant's share of intangible development costs; and a 
statement whether and how the participant's shares of intangible development costs will be 
adjusted to account for changes in economic conditions.
(5) The scope of research and development to be undertaken.
(6) The duration of the arrangement; the conditions under which the arrangement may be 
modified or terminated; and the consequence of such modification or termination.
(7) The scope of intangible development costs, and which costs are included and which are 
excluded; a description of any services performed for participants and how those services 
would be taken into account; and, for a representative period, a breakdown of total costs 
incurred, and costs borne by each participant, pursuant to the arrangement.
(8) The basis used for measuring benefits, the projections used to estimate benefits, and why 
such basis and projections yield the most reliable estimate of reasonably anticipated benefits;
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a description of any amounts to be received from nonparticipants for the use of covered 
intangibles and how such amounts would be taken into account; and, for a representative 
period, a comparison of projected and actual benefit shares.
(9) The accounting method used to determine the cost and benefits of the intangibles 
development, and to the extent that the accounting method differs materially from US 
generally accepted accounting principles, an explanation of any material differences.
(10) Prior research undertaken in the intangible development area; any tangible or intangible 
property made available for use in the arrangement and any compensation paid for that 
property; and any other information used to establish the value of preexisting and covered 
intangibles.
(11) Whether and how participants may join or leave the arrangement; any adjustments that 
will be made to the participants' interests in covered intangibles in such cases; any payments 
that must be made in such cases, and how such payments will be calculated and made; and 
whether any changes in the participants' interests in covered intangibles have already occurred, 
any compensation paid for those interests, and any information used to establish the value of 
such interests.
(12) How cost sharing payments and buy-in or buy-out payments made or received have been 
treated for US income tax purposes.
(13) Representative internal manuals, directives, guidelines, and similar documents prepared 
for purposes of implementing or operating the cost sharing arrangement.
(14) Each participant's gross and net profitability with regard to the product area covered by 
the arrangement.
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- Critical Assumptions
It is also necessary for a taxpayer to describe what they perceive as a set of critical 
assumptions, incorporating those factors which, if they were to change, would effect the 
nature of the APA. Rev. Proc. 91-22 describes these as, "objective, business and economic 
criteria that are fundamental to the operation of the taxpayer's principal TPM". Rev. Proc. 
96-53 suggests as examples: a particular mode of conducting business operations, a particular 
corporate or business structure or a range of expected business volume.
- Annual Reports
As part of the contract, the taxpayer agrees to provide annual reports demonstrating company 
compliance with the APA, in particular highlighting the appropriate application of the selected 
TPM. Additional items to be included in each report are: "A description of any tangible lack 
of conformity with critical assumptions; and an analysis of any compensating adjustments to 
be paid by one entity to the other, and the manner in which the payments are to be made" 
(Rev. Proc. 96-53).
When commenting on problems found with the annual reports of companies, Ryan and Patton 
(1991) said that there ought to be limited allowance for the District Director's Office to make 
adjustments to simple mistakes or oversights made by the taxpayer.
The annual report also acts as a channel through which the taxpayer can communicate 
requests to renew, modify or cancel the APA.
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- Term and Timing
The taxpayer is responsible for suggesting the initial period for which they want their APA to 
last. The desire for an agreement to last for as long as possible, to avoid periodic renewal 
fees, must be balanced against the likelihood of the company experiencing considerable 
changes over time, with particular respect to the critical assumptions which would render an 
APA obsolete. The longer the period the greater the possible divergence for the original 
terms.
The actual start date is also at the taxpayer's discretion. It is possible to activate an agreement 
to apply from the beginning of a tax year in which the request is made for such a contract; 
although limited retroactivity is permissible, full retroactivity is sometimes provided for in the 
APA (Feinschreiber, 1992).
- User Fee
The US charges a taxpayer requesting an APA a sliding scale registration fee, dependent on 
the company's gross income. This payment is required as a demonstration of the taxpayer's 
good faith in pursuing a contract (Gould, 1997). Rev. Proc. 96-53 summarises the user fee 
provision on the following page.
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Table 8.1
Each Additional 
Taxpayer Gross Original Request Multilateral Routine Small
Income Request (1) Renewal (2) Transactions (3)
$1 billion or more $25,000 $7,500 $7,500 $7,500 
Less than $1 $15,000 $7,500 $7,500 $7,500
billion and greater
than or equal to
$100 million
Less than $100 $5,000 $5,000 $5,000 $5,000 
million
US APA User Fees
(1) Only if such additional request involves the same issues, covers the same years, and proposes the 
same TPM as the first request (as opposed to subsequent requests).
(2) Only if the material facts, critical assumptions, and proposed TPM have not substantially changed.
(3) Regardless of taxpayer size, applies to transactions that involve (i) tangible property or services 
valued at no more that $50 million annually, or (ii) payments for intangible property not in excess of 
$10 million annually.
- Processing of APA Requests
After the request has been received, the IRS reviews the information, asking any questions 
they have and requesting further documentation.
Upon receipt of the request, according to Rev. Proc. 96-53, the APA Director organises for the 
coordination of the request with other officials who may also have an interest, such as the 
District Director, Regional Director of Appeals, District Counsel and, where appropriate, with 
the US competent authority (CA). The APA Director is also responsible for appointing a team 
of officials for each request, with a leader to oversee the negotiations, one who had preferably,
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been present at the pre-filing conference and, therefore, aware of the concerns and points 
addressed at that time by the taxpayer, and any informal agreements which may have been
maHft Hnrino this initial rnntartde duri g t is i iti l co t ct.
The request will then be evaluated, through discussion with the taxpayer and examination of 
relevant data. A case plan and schedule would then be created, setting dates for the 
completion of different targets by the participants to the APA and the IRS. These will contain 
a list of questions raised in the initial stages and an itinerary organising the time plan for 
resolving them. The case plan and schedule will also be responsible for setting out the basis 
of the agreement between the taxpayer and Service personnel on the "scope and nature of any 
additional information that will be required to resolve these questions in order to negotiate an 
APA". "Milestone dates' for completion of parts of the APA should also be included in the 
documents and which both parties must make a great effort to abide by and achieve. By 
mutual decision making, these milestones may be adapted to retain flexibility in the process. 
Consistent failure, however, on the part of the taxpayer can result in a withdrawal of the APA 
request.
- Concluding an APA
The conclusion, according to Plambeck (1994), is a memorandum of understanding between 
the governments and the taxpayer. Once this has been agreed, the taxpayer has the legal 
document drawn up, the APA, and the final act is the execution of this legal document.
- Revocation or Cancellation of an APA
Feinschreiber (1992) finds that the IRS will revoke an APA in the event of fraud, malfeasance, 
or disregard as to any of the following three factors: material facts set forth in the request;
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subsequent submissions including in any annual report; or the lack of good faith compliance 
with the terms and conditions of the APA. As Ryan and Patton (1991) point out, however: "To 
obtain an APA it is unlikely that any taxpayer who is going to volunteer the extensive 
information required by both jurisdictions to obtain an APA will enter into this process either 
lightly or in a malevolent spirit." This being the case, the IRS can not expect to have to revoke 
many agreements.
With regards to the cancellation, any party is able to stop the negotiations at any stage, even 
after the start of the final agreement. If the IRS decides to cancel, the taxpayer should be able 
to attend discussions as to the reasons why, and in extreme cases can exercise the right to 
challenge the decision by going to Appeals or the Tax Court. Cancellation can result from a 
misrepresentation mistake, for example, and the procedure should permit the taxpayer the 
opportunity to make a correction first (Feinschreiber, 1992).
- Growth and Maturity of the Programme
The programme has continued to grow in popularity since its inception in 1991, and this can 
be put down to a number of factors. In particular, that this has all been possible as a result of 
the huge investment of resources committed by the US government, particularly during the 
Clinton administration, to assure that the process works and the integrity of the programme is 
high (Triplett, 1994). An example of this commitment was to change to the Section 482 
regulations making them more relevant to APAs. This was achieved through the participation 
of APA staff in the formulation of the 1994 final regulations. Plambeck (1994) highlights the 
introduction of the best method rule as a beneficial example of this participation, with the 
TPM choice dependent of the value of comparable available data, industrial descriptions and
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functional analysis. In addition, the regulations provide a framework to enable firms to assess 
whether they should enter into an APA.
The US APA process has not been without inevitable 'growing pains', which can be routed 
back to a number of places. Most critically was the popularity of the programme compared 
with the resources available. In 1994, Plambeck recorded the following results of 
participation: 1990-1994 46 cases completed.
1994 47 applications at pre-filing stage
1994 72 cases open
1994 Average rate of entrants at 15 per quarter.
A number of authors on the subject reported that the programme was almost full. 
Unfortunately, this can be interpreted as a variable slowing the speed in the completion of 
agreements, and with the IRS trying to encourage more entrants than it could reasonably 
expect to accommodate. The IRS, however, was quicker to blame the growing problems on 
the taxpayers, accusing them of not meeting the 'milestone' dates. It is difficult to set 
milestones, especially when taxpayers previously unaccustomed to APAs are unfamiliar with a 
number of the new requirements placed upon them, and can not anticipate the time required to 
collate this data.
Schwartz et al (1995), on the other hand, account the delay to two other factors. First, the 
change in the leadership of the programme at the IRS, however, the appointment of Michael 
Durst as director in 1994 came with an apparent renewed emphasis on the completion of more 
settlements and hence this disturbance was short lived. Secondly, the amount of time it takes 
when a company is looking to conclude an APA with more than one country, when competent 
authorities are involved and there is a requirement for an accordance on the TPM of
173
companies. As Schwartz et al (1995) pointed out, work is being done to develop broad 
guidelines for handling the CA portion of APAs. Although there are time delays and growing 
pains there is a conscious effort on the part of the IRS to minimise these disadvantages.
Additional efforts are being used towards maximising the organisational efficiencies of the 
process, resources are being expanded to meet the increasing demand for APAs and the 
authorities are looking to industries to develop generic descriptions to minimise the process 
time (Plambeck, 1994). Previous examination (see earlier chapters) of the problems of 
comparability between even apparently similar companies with like transactions demonstrates 
that to develop general descriptions for some of the basic features would be almost impossible 
in a majority of cases. Continual change in industries would require constant updating of 
generic descriptions. In addition, it would be impossible to guarantee that the companies, on 
which these generic descriptions were created, would develop in similar enough ways over 
time, rendering the depictions of the industry obsolete. On the other hand, however, Andrew 
Hickman, International Specialist and CA Specialist at the Inland Revenue, noted that 
specialist advisors, who are employed to develop methodology, may have a generic APA 'on 
the shelf that could be adapted for each case, but that it is the adaption which is important not 
the generic nature.
The programme has matured since its inception in 1991 and continues to do so with the 
immense commitment on the part of the IRS. For many MNEs, a well proven and well 
defined APA system is increasingly preferred to the alternative of increasing audit attention 
from tax authorities.
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To be able to compare the US experience of APAs it is necessary to examine the approaches 
of a number of other countries and their views on and commitment to such a system.
Different Countries Experiences with APAs
To be able to put the US experience of APAs into context it is necessary to examine the 
approaches of other countries. This final section charts the experiences general opinions of 
fourteen countries, listed alphabetically, with APAs.
- Australia
Australia was involved with the US and Apple Computer in the first ever APA and has 
continued to encourage the completion of similar agreements. The procedure is enshrined in a 
draft ruling released by the Australia Tax Office on July 14, 1994. According to the 1997 
Ernst and Young Report, at least 9 APAs had been completed by that time, with 15% of all the 
Australian-based firms (including the firms interviewed who had not already completed an 
APA) having said they would consider the use of one in the future.
- Canada
Canada has embraced APAs to almost the same extent as the US, the main difference being 
the deliberate decision to create a less detailed procedure in order to encourage maximum 
participation. So far this objective has been achieved, with Ernst and Young's 1997 Report 
finding that 14% of the firms they interviewed had used APAs in the past and recorded a high 
level of satisfaction. The success of the programme could also be measured by the 50% of 
companies who would consider future use.
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Canada started a formal APA programme in July 1995, subsequent to initiating two successful 
pilot programmes in 1991, a short while after the introduction of Revenue Procedure 91-22 in 
the US. One trial dealt with 'inbound1 transactions and the other with 'outbound' transactions. 
After evaluation of these cases, Revenue Canada announced its intentions to introduce an 
APA service for determining transfer prices in selected cases in July 1993 (Ward and 
Armstrong, 1994). The responsibility of administration was given to the International Tax 
Programmes Directorate in Ottawa.
The achievement of an APA is guided by Information Circular 87-2, which, according to Ward 
and Armstrong (1994), provides an overview of the process and highlights the key provisions 
and requirements of the programme. The following, for example, is a list of the criteria which 
Revenue Canada will consider:
- whether the particular transfer pricing issues and problems outlined in the APA request are 
best dealt with through the APA process, and not through the normal audit process;
- whether the application of any APA would be ongoing in nature and have long-term 
implications. Although not stated in the draft circular, it is understood that the usual term for 
an APA will be three years, plus any renewal periods;
- whether the transactions to be covered include all related cross-border transactions between
»
the applicant and the relevant foreign-based related entity;
- whether the transactions are prospective and not completed or near completion (Revenue 
Canada states that it will not consider applications for APAs for future transactions that are 
not seriously contemplated, or that are of a hypothetical nature);
- whether the applicant is one of a number of participants in a major industry, and conclusions 
reached under the particular APA request will have wider application to similar companies;
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" whether the other involved is a treaty partner, and it is favourably inclined to considering an 
APA request in entering into a bilateral APA (Ward and Armstrong, 1994).
With regards to creating a less detailed approach in comparison to the American approach, 
Canadian APAs are expected to be quite universal, encompassing all cross-border 
intercompany transactions, as opposed to a US-style APA per transaction. The result of the 
APA is a broad understanding and agreement of TPMs to be used and data required to support 
them and the critical assumptions, rather than specific agreement on prices (Coopers and 
Lybrand, 1995).
Like the Rev. Proc. 91-22, taxpayers are allowed pre-filing conferences with Revenue Canada 
to explore the suitability of an APA for them. Upon application, no fee is required, unlike in 
the US, but taxpayers must pay all costs for independent experts.
A further similarity to the US experience is the problem of funding the enormous resources to 
solve the transfer pricing problem and, as a result, it would be virtually impossible for 
Revenue Canada to provide an APA for everyone.
- China
China is not amongst the most experienced countries in the world of transfer pricing however, 
the authorities are starting to become more alert to the potential for transfer pricing abuses. 
Sherwood, Huang and Shum (1997) commented on the country's progress, "China is rapidly 
moving towards international standards in terms of settling controversies and disputes in the 
transfer pricing arena through APAs". This includes the completion of one such agreement 
involving both the US and China.
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- France
The French appear to be most against the idea of APA. Swiss (1995) hinted that this is a 
reaction founded on the belief that the power and influence of the US will mean that somehow 
companies will end up agreeing to pay more tax in the US than France. Swiss (1995), 
therefore, was able to conclude that: "The French authorities are unlikely to recognise a 
transfer price fixed by the US tax authorities. There is thus no point in participating in such an 
advance pricing agreement programme." Ernst and Young (1997) substantiates this, finding 
only one French respondent to have actually used an APA, only 6 percent willing to consider 
the prospect and a significant 53 percent against the idea.
Consultations are currently being held among the French authorities to consider whether or not 
to introduce a system suitable for APAs are not likely to be successful if they mirror the views 
and results expressed above.
- Germany
Germany holds a similar opinion to the French, opting to watch progress elsewhere before 
committing itself. Although Ernst and Young (1997) found that 20 percent (14 percent), more 
than in France, would consider using an APA, a greater portion (60 percent), in comparison 
with France, said they would not consider using an APA.
Render (1996) offered the following warning to US firms with affiliated German companies: 
"If information shared with the IRS during the APA negotiations is not shared with German 
tax authorities, and those authorities determine that their tax base was not sufficiently 
considered during negotiations, companies can be quite certain that German authorities will 
review the APA with great scrutiny and possibly demand an adjustment and penalties."
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- Italy
Ernst and Young (1997) reported the following on the Italian use of APAs: "Two respondents 
report having used an APA. However, since Italian law does not envisage APAs, it may be 
that Italy was not a party to the APA, or that less formal clearance procedures available are 
viewed as APA-type arrangements."
Ernst and Young recorded a negative attitude towards the use of APAs in the future, finding 
that 56% of those interviewed were not likely to use them. There was a totally different mood 
towards the EU Arbitration Convention with 76% saying they would consider using it, and 
furthermore, 53% would consider the use of bilateral CA procedures.
- Japan
Japan is another of the minority countries which supports the use of APAs; with the National 
Tax Administration Agency (NTA) actively encouraging taxpayers to apply for such 
agreements. Dealing with APAs is just one of the responsibilities of the Director of 
International Tax, who also deals with CA negotiations and other double taxation issues.
Currently, Ernst and Young (1997) found that 2% of interviewees had used an APA previous 
to the report and that 24% would consider use at some point in the future.
The Japanese refer to an APA, however, as a pre-confirmation agreement and it is not legally 
binding. This system has been in place since 1987. According to Yoost and Miyajima (1997), 
the requirements include information: "about the taxpayer's overseas affiliates, including the 
volume and value of related-party transactions, the terms and conditions of the transactions, 
market conditions, and an explanation of why the selected transfer pricing methods are the
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most appropriate. A functional and risk analysis, and profit split calculations generally are 
required."
The NTA discourages the application for unilateral agreements unless there is good reason for 
not securing bilateral or multilateral agreements. This can be demonstrated by the 32 
multilateral pre-confirmation applications pending out of a total of 42 in September 1997. 
Yoost and Miyajima (1997) noted that in 1995 Apple Computer Inc. was the first 
foreign-owned company to acquire a multilateral pricing agreement, followed by JP Morgan.
Yoost and Miyajima (1997) warn taxpayers about the future of the pre-confirmation system 
and the proposal to introduce the procedure into tax law: "Some practitioners believe the 
proposed legislation could be an effort to prepare for eventually requiring all taxpayers with 
transfer pricing issues to enter into agreements with the Japanese tax authorities."
- Korea
In 1995, Korea's National Assembly passed the Law for the Coordination of International Tax 
Affairs (LCITA) to establish new rules with regards to international transfer pricing. Under 
the LCITA the National Tax Administration (NTSA) could issue APAs to take effect after 
January 1, 1997. The Law's Enforcement Decree, passed by the Ministry of Finance and 
Economy at the end of 1995, lists the details regarding the application, screening procedure, 
notification procedures, reporting requirements, and legal ramifications of such APAs (Kim, 
1997). The Decree also provides for cooperation with foreign competent authorities where 
appropriate.
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Kim (1997) wrote that the NTA is required to consider opinions from regional and district 
offices on APAs to ensure field inspectors' input into the APA proceedings. Given the 
relatively new inception of the programme, it is unsurprising that only a few applications have 
been made; however, the idea has been welcomed, with Ernst and Young (1997) having 
reported that 34 percent of MNEs investigated would consider using the procedure.
Mexico
Mexico supports the use of APAs, and in 1995 Schwartz et al (1995) reported that the: 
"Mexican tax authorities are currently considering eight requests for APAs. This includes one 
trilateral APA involving all three North American Free Trade Agreement (Nafta) jurisdictions. 
The Mexican Department of Finance and Public Credit is currently developing its own formal 
APA ruling procedure."
- Netherlands
The Netherlands allow a number of advance rulings to control the problem of transfer pricing, 
all of which are applicable to a four year period, beginning on the day the Dutch ruling 
activities are initiated. Thereafter, agreements can be extended for a maximum of four 
additional accounting periods. An article by Groenen and Spierendonk (1994) contains 
information on the general terms for specific types of transactions. In dealing with other 
governments, the Dutch authorities rely on their treaties, largely based on the 1977 OECD 
Model Treaty on associated enterprises..
Ernst and Young (1997a) reported that the number of companies who had used APAs in the 
past (25 percent) was the highest proportion amongst the countries involved. Despite this, 
only 38 percent were actually found who would consider using one at a later date. Perhaps
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Only 11% of those interviewed by Ernst and Young (1997) would consider the use of an APA 
in the future. The bilateral CA procedure appeared more popular, with 44% who would 
consider its use in the future.
- Switzerland
According to Ernst and Young (1997): "Four Swiss parents report having used an APA in the 
past. Only 20 percent of Swiss respondents would consider using an APA in the future, while 
55 percent would not. Swiss MNEs resort to bilateral CA procedures less frequently than any 
other country's respondents."
Unlike Sweden, Switzerland permits the use of APAs and Ernst and Young (1997) said that 
they are treated in a manner comparable to an anticipated CA claim.
- UK
Until recently the UK has been relatively 'lukewarm' regarding APAs. In an article in 
Management Today in 1995 John Hobster, then of the Inland Revenue's International Division 
now a Partner with Ernst and Young, suggested that "the case for extending APAs outside of 
the financial services sector is not, we feel proven". However, the issue of consultative 
document, "Modernisation of Transfer Pricing Legislation", (Inland Revenue, 1997c) marked 
a change in this position. The Inland Revenue invited views in this Consultative Document 
(ConDoc) on whether there should be a wider role for APAs to play (Appendix 7). The 
response (Inland Revenue, 1998a) showed a high level of support and, as a result, a statutory 
procedure for their use in the UK is to be introduced in the 1999 Finance Bill Budget (Inland 
Revenue, 1998c). To help achieve this, and to make the process work in practice, the
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this is an indication of the dissatisfaction with the APA process as it currently stands, or that 
the Netherlands have experienced 'growing pains' similarly experienced earlier in the US and 
which severely lengthened the process and increased the cost of participation.
- Spain
Spain is new to APAs and has only recently introduced a provision allowing them into 
legislation. Calleja (1997) noted the following, which differentiates a Spanish APA from any 
other: "Article 16 of the Corporate Income Tax Law reduces the APA concept to the 
possibility, available to the taxpayer, of submitting for approval by the tax authorities a 
proposal for the valuation of related-party transactions. The law, however, does not clearly 
treat APAs as the result of genuine negotiations between the two parties." A taxpayer does 
have contact with their relevant tax inspection authorities to discuss for example, the TPMs 
and level of documentation necessary. If these discussions have been detailed enough a 
taxpayer's proposal should not end up being rejected.
To conclude, Calleja (1997) noted that: "APAs in Spain take the form of an approval by the 
authorities, rather than an actual agreement between taxpayer and tax administration. In this 
respect the success and effectiveness of the figure will largely depend on the adoption by the 
authorities of a practical and truly negotiated approach in the application of the law."
- Sweden
Ernst and Young's 1997 transfer pricing report found that: "Under a government directive, a 
legislative working group was to be established in 1997 to review the current legislation on 
transfer pricing." It was understood that this might review the use of APAs which was not 
previously mentioned in legislation.
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Chancellor, has authorised the Inland Revenue to enter into consultations with taxpayers to 
discuss the details of the new arrangements.
The Ernst and Young 1997 Report recorded that 25% of the UK respondents interviewed had 
used an APA in the past and 68% indicated they would not, at present, expect to consider an 
APA in the future. The APAs formed would have been carried out with the agreement of the 
Inland Revenue and under the powers of the mutual agreement procedure, granted under the 
terms of Double Taxation Conventions, to participate in APAs with tax authorities which have 
introduced legislation enabling them to create APAs. This has involved the Inland Revenue 
engaging in bilateral negotiations with other relevant tax administrations. The consultative 
document recognises that the consequences of such dealings are that the arrangements tend to 
be geared towards the formal procedures established by the other involved jurisdictions. 
Dissatisfaction for such a process can be seen; firstly, by not even letting firms situated in 
countries which do not have treaties with the UK enter into any such arrangements; and 
secondly, where countries are linked by treaty, the mutual agreement procedure has been 
responsible for causing a number of time delays. KPMG report they were aware of 25 APAs 
involving the UK at present.
At present the UK APA process is not clearly understood currently, and this has acted as a 
major deterrent for taxpayers considering its use. Ernst and Young (1998) suggested that: "A 
demystification of the process, possibly through the publication of a set of procedural 
guidelines, results and case histories could possibly expand the demand for APAs but unless 
the procedure is open to every UK taxpayer, the process will remain of limited value." In 
addition, many taxpayers are dubious as to the specific advantages and disadvantages to them, 
which prevents accurate decision making and planning with regards to APAs.
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The cost of obtaining an APA is one of the disadvantages. Ernst and Young (1998b) conclude 
that the high cost of an APA would mean the process will only hold value where either a 
taxpayer has significant transfer pricing issues which are almost certainly going to attract 
attention from a Fiscal Authority at some point, or where the certainty of tax treatment is 
crucial, for example in the case of a single but very large prospective transaction.
Coopers and Lybrand (1991) make reference to the cost of an APA process relating to this 
time factor. They say that although the Inland Revenue may be constrained by other tax 
authorities when dealing with multilateral APAs, it should ensure that the Inland Revenue do 
not create the same restraints and that unilateral APAs are available within a reasonable time 
frame. The US and Canada both started out with APAs taking over a year to complete. UK 
firms may not be willing to suffer the same, specially when the transfer pricing regulations 
have not been framed and are not believed to be enforced as strictly in the UK as other 
countries.
With regards to unilateral APAs, there appeared to be a demand from companies for 
regulations to exist to establish them in UK law. Support was particularly strong for 
circumstances where Agreements involve non-treaty countries or where the other country has 
yet to establish any sort of formal APA procedure or where APAs were not so clearly 
supported by other Fiscal Authorities, for example France and Germany at present. This 
would, in effect, reflect the formal situation in the UK prior to March 1998. Furthermore, this 
type of agreement is often simpler and quicker to establish, compared to the bilateral and 
multilateral agreements. As the tax treaty network expands, and with more countries adopting 
an approach based more and more on APAs, the demand for unilateral agreements should fall,
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but the response to the ConDoc (Inland Revenue, 1997b) clearly suggested that the need is 
enough at present to warrant its introduction.
A further clear message from the responses to the ConDoc was that it would be unfortunate if 
the current informal 'advanced agreements' were lost as a more formal APA system was 
established. It appears to be the Revenue's aim to continue to allow informal approaches 
(without fees at present) ahead of any formal APA or other submission to the International 
Division. This continues to be considered a 'good use of resources' by the International 
Division.
In general the demand for a clearly defined APA procedure is a positive step towards solving 
the problems of transfer pricing, but the question remains as to how much will the Inland 
Revenue be in a position to create the legislation and guidance taxpayers need to make viable 
decisions concerning entering into APAs.
Conclusion
This chapter has explored the advantages and disadvantages of APAs and it can be seen that 
this is an idea which will be no means be the panacea to transfer pricing disputes around the 
world. The relatively small demand for such arrangements demonstrates that companies are 
obviously aware of that fact. APAs do help those firms who are experiencing a lot attention 
on their transfer pricing practices from tax authorities and probably having to make a lot of 
adjustments. As tax authorities are observing the cross-border transactions more and more
CHAPTER 9.
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DOUBLE TAXATION RELIEF
When the complexity of the law and the sophistication of financial transactions are coupled with 
technological change in both commerce and tax administration, the combined impact on tax 
compliance, administration and enforcement is phenomenal (Peterson, 1994). Co-ordinating the 
approaches towards international transfer pricing of governments world-wide is an almost 
impossible task and where the relevant regulations are not complementary MNEs can expect 
some level of double taxation. This chapter is concerned with how double taxation arises and 
some of the legislative approaches adopted by governments.
- Territoriality and Residency
A multinational company, with operations in a country outside its home will be subjected to 
taxation by that country, on any profits recorded by the subsidiary located there. This is in 
accordance with the 'territoriality' or 'source1 criterion, the taxation of profits in the country where 
they originate. When a subsidiary consigns dividends from these profits back to the parent 
company, the host country is likely to impose a withholding tax on these outgoing dividends. 
Withholding taxes can also be applied to interest, royalties and management fees.
According to Wagner (1998), withholding taxes can trigger double taxation in two ways: firstly, 
business income that is required to a parent is taxed first at business income tax rates and then 
again on the payment of the dividend; and secondly, all payments subject to withholding taxes 
are also subject to regular income tax in the country of the recipient. Plasschaert (1979) noted 
that a number of host countries will discriminate against intra-corporate dividends paid to foreign 
parent companies and tax them more heavily than dividends remitted to domestic parent
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companies. Alternatively some countries will implement restrictions on the level of dividends 
repatriated. Plasschaert (1994) noted that the Andean group operated one such system. This 
clique of Latin American countries fixed the allowed dividend pay-out from subsidiaries back 
cross-border to their parent companies to 14 % of the net capital value.
It is also important to note the taxation 'rights' of the home country of a multinational 
corporation according to the 'residence1 principle. This rule believes the location of a company's 
headquarters has some entitlement to the subsidiary's profits because the headquarters will 
contribute to the world-wide profit of the company. The result of concurrent claims by 
jurisdictions on the same profits is double taxation. A company being taxed on the same profits 
by two different authorities could, in the severest example, entail payment of more tax than the 
actual profit earned.
- Effect on International Trade
Double taxation interferes with international trade, making profits more tax-costly to attain 
abroad, discouraging firms from expanding their activities into other countries. An example of 
this interference comes from Johnstone (1998) who quoted a European Commission official: 
"Experience shows that reducing withholding taxes can lead to a substantial increase in foreign 
investment." It is an issue currently at the forefront of many multinational corporations concerns 
and effects their decisions towards carrying out business on a global scale. In the Ernst and 
Young Transfer Pricing 1997 Global Survey, it was found that 88 percent of the companies 
interviewed world-wide believed that the single most important international tax issue was 
double tax relief.
189
According to Simon (1997): "The ideal situation would be one in which there was neutrality both 
between the tax burdens of a person trading at home and abroad and between a resident and a 
non-resident trading in the same country. Until, however, there is one tax system common to all 
countries it will be impossible to achieve both these objectives." Unfortunately tax 
harmonisation is a long way off, so businesses must satisfy themselves with two types of relief 
measures to alleviate international double taxation. Firstly governments offer a number of 
unilateral options such as the use of foreign tax credits and secondly, governments partake in 
bilateral tax treaties which attempt to eliminate dual claims on profits. The following sections 
will examine both possibilities.
Unilateral Relief
- Foreign Tax Credit
One method of unilateral relief, which is offered by a large number of countries including the 
US, the UK, Germany and Japan, is a system based on foreign tax credits (FTCs). An FTC acts 
as a direct reduction on the tax levied by the country (offering relief) and the amount of credit 
allowed will normally be the lesser of the foreign tax paid (including withholding taxes on 
payments received from abroad) and the domestic taxes owed on foreign income. The result is a 
payment of taxes in both countries totalling the tax that would be paid at the highest rate of the 
two countries involved.
The UK first introduced unilateral relief in the form of a tax credit in 1950. Simon (1997) said 
that: "At first the credit was to be for three quarters of Commonwealth taxes and half of foreign 
taxes. This may have been because of the notion of imperial preference or because to give full
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credit unilaterally would weaken the hand of the UK negotiators as they worked towards a full set 
of bilateral arrangements." These limits were removed shortly afterwards in 1953. Today the 
system of tax credits is formalised in the UK in Section 790 of the 1988 Income and Corporation 
Tax Act (ICTA). Credits can be used when the UK does not have a treaty with the country 
involved or when the tax in question is not included in the treaty.
In the case of dividends "underlying" taxes paid on business income by the subsidiary might be 
eligible for a foreign tax credit, depending on the country (Wagner, 1998). In the US this is 
permitted under Section 902(a)(IRC) and in the UK the relief is facilitated in Section 
790(5)(ICTA), and governed by Sections 800 and 801(ICTA), as long as the US or UK owned 
corporation has at least a 10 percent ownership in the foreign corporation in question.
The FTC mechanism is extremely complex and not easily facilitated in the US because of 
Section 904(a)(IRC) which requires the determination of an FTC limited to the Federal income 
tax that would otherwise be due on the US taxpayer's foreign income (Benson, 1996). 
Furthermore, the establishment of the FTC limitation in the US under Section 964(IRC) is 
calculated using US tax accounting principles and not the amounts stated in the foreign accounts 
of the corporation in question. Benson (1996) also said that: "Certain US-incurred expenses must 
be allocated against foreign taxable income for this purpose. Thus, the effective foreign tax rate 
will almost always be different from (and is frequently higher than) the foreign statutory rate, 
making it potentially more difficult in many cases to fully use FTCs."
When a taxpayer has excess FTC's in the US, Section 904(c)(IRC) allows taxpayers to carry 
these residual credits and apply them to tax on that source for periods up to two years previously 
or forward five years. This is not permitted in the UK.
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The use of FTC'S are restricted in a number of countries. Simon(1997) reasoned with the UK's 
reluctance to FTC'S: "There is of course no reason why the UK's Revenue should refund tax 
collected by another country, unless to encourage exports and for this there may be more efficient 
methods."
- Treat Tax as a Business Expense
An alternative option to a system of FTCs is to treat the foreign tax paid as another business 
expense and deduct it for computing the profits of the business. In the UK this is permitted by 
ICTA 1988, although it excludes the deduction of any foreign tax paid with respect to income 
charged on a remittance (paying back) basis.
- Exemption Method
Another mechanism for relief could be simply for tax authorities to not lay a claim on any profit 
companies earn outside their home territory, rendering a credit mechanism futile. This 
'exemption' method has been used in the Netherlands, Canada and in the UK until 1974. 
According to Plasschaert (1979) using this 'exemption method' results in a lower burden on 
foreign direct investments than on domestic investments, provided the tax rate in the home 
country exceeds that in the host country.
Double Taxation Treaties
Bilateral relief is offered with a double taxation treaty, an agreement between countries to 
discuss the issue of double taxation when the problem arises for companies. As well as 
protecting against double taxation, the Inland Revenue (1997a) points out that the treaties also
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aim to provide certainty of treatment for cross-border economic activity and prevent fiscal 
discrimination against a company's business interests abroad. Treaties act to override domestic 
law and will place some limitation on one country's rights to tax a resident of another country. 
Most countries, developed or otherwise, will have a network of tax treaties. Bilateral treaties are 
most common although some multilateral treaties may be found in Africa and in the Nordic 
countries (Simon, 1997).
- Model Tax Treaties
The US framework for participation in bilateral tax treaties is the Treasury Department's Model 
Income Tax Treaty of June 16, 1981. In general, however, most treaties, including those 
involving the UK, will have followed the structure laid down in the successive 1946, 1963 and 
1977 OECD Model Tax Treaties (Appendix 8). In March 1998 the OECD said: "There are over 
225 treaties between OECD member countries and over 1,400 world-wide which are based on 
the Model, and it has considerable influence on the bilateral treaties between non-member 
countries. Simon (1997) remarked of the OECD Model Treaty that it: "Has been criticised for its 
bias in favour of the country of residence over the country of source. This bias may have been 
acceptable to West European governments anxious for foreign, particularly American, 
involvement but has caused great difficulties for less developed countries." The OECD 
Committee, however, participated with experts of the United Nations Economic and Social 
Council in the development of a model convention specifically designed for treaties between 
developed and less developed countries. In 1988 the UN published this model treaty.
One particular problem with tax treaties among different jurisdictions is that, ultimately, because 
of the language differences agreements are not interpreted in exactly the same way. In addition, 
Zach (1993) commented on agreements with many developing countries and made the complaint
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that, "in the effort to maximise tax revenues realised from foreign investment, they are inclined to 
comply with the letter, but not the spirit of tax treaties". Another problem largely applicable to 
developing countries, is that as the financial system of the countries change so the treaties, if not 
regularly updated, become outmoded. On the other hand, the speed and regularity with which 
most developed countries maintain relevant up to date treaties with their partners, however, 
limits the likely number of obsolete treaties to those formed between developing countries. 
Outdated or not, Knight and Knight (1997) pointed out that you can tell a country's interpretation 
of a treaty by the actual practice of the treaty signatories because "their conduct generally 
indicates their understanding of the agreement".
The OECD tries to minimise any problems countries may face with their Model Tax Treaty, 
through the establishment of a Working Party which regularly makes contact with OECD 
member and non-member countries and reviews the application of the treaty (OECD, 1998b).
- Competent Authority Procedure
Most bilateral treaties contain instructions by which a taxpayer can seek relief from double 
taxation using the competent authority (CA) procedure. The earliest availability of such a 
procedure was in 1970 and it was offered in the US. The process involves CAs exchanging 
information on the company in question and attempting to reach a suitable resolution through 
mutual agreement. This procedure is described and authorised by Article 25 of the OECD Model 
Tax Convention. Knight and Knight (1997) described the role of the CAs as having been given 
the authority to interpret the implementation of the treaties to achieve the effect of eliminating 
double taxation. The deletion of double taxation will involve a reallocation of income and a 
correlative adjustment. In addition, the CAs must inform each other of any changes made to their
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domestic laws because an alteration could bring about double taxation for companies operating 
in both.
The CAs may be used by taxpayers to help elucidate their residency status and hence how they 
will be classed with regards to corporation taxation. For the purpose of this section, however, we 
will be concerned solely with the role of the CA towards the elimination of double taxation.
The CAs of different countries will have varying relations with their local tax inspectors. In the 
US, for example, there is a gap between their CA staff and audit staff and this created tension as 
the former, when they have made decisions, must persuade local staff to adjust. The UK 
situation, on the other hand, is different because there already existed a system whereby local tax 
inspectors were used to approaching the International Division for direction on decisions, thereby 
creating a situation where both parties were very familiar with one another.
As far as the legal courts of the countries are involved, they are ordinarily unwilling to intervene 
in the mutual agreement process and unlikely to interfere with the final adjudication of the CAs 
whether the outcome involves the entire elimination of double taxation or not. If there is a tax 
lawsuit already pending, however, then there will be a number of circumstances in which a CA 
may be requested and, in the case of a petition for relief from an adjustment, the outcome should 
be co-ordinated with the court official and the CA. In the US this former would be the district 
director from whom the relief would have been asked.
Taxpayers must make sure they comply with the requirements contained in the relevant treaties 
with regards to seeking CA relief and must request help, according to the US and OECD Model 
Treaties, within three years of first finding out that an action would result in double taxation. In
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the US, with the updating of the CA process, taxpayers must also comply with the requirements 
of two additional Revenue Procedures, 96-13 and 96-14, when asking for assistance (Knight and 
Knight, 1997). These procedures, taken from Knight and Knight (1997), are summarised below.
- Rev. Proc. 96-13
Clarification of Residency Applicability - CA assistance may be available for taxpayers seeking
to establish their residency status in the US.
Limitation on Benefits - Details requirements that must be met to qualify as a resident eligible for
benefits under the treaty.
Time for Filing - In a US initiated adjustment, taxpayer can ask for CA assistance as soon as
aware of amount of adjustment or in a foreign initiated adjustment, as soon as can establish
probability of double taxation.
Prefiling Conference - Can be requested at any time to discuss any issues relating to a treaty.
Small Case Procedures - Taxpayer can file abbreviated request form for CA assistance if a
proposed adjustment is not greater than: $100,000 for an individual taxpayer; or $200,000 for a
corporation or any other.
Co-ordination with Appeals - Taxpayers can choose to (1) bypass appeals and request CA
assistance immediately or (2) select a new simultaneous appeals procedure, under which the
taxpayer or US CA requests that the issues be considered at the same time by both appeals and
the US CA.
Co-ordination with Litigation - US CA must obtain the consent of the IRS Chief Counsel before
accepting a request for assistance in a case pending in court or designed for litigation.
Accelerated Competent Authority Procedure - Taxpayers who engage the CA on one issue may
request resolution of the same issue for subsequent periods. A request for such action can be
made so long as the controversy has not already been resolved for the initial requested period.
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According to Wrappe (1997): "The request should state that the taxpayer agrees that inspection of 
records under the procedure will not impede a later examination for any period covered in the 
request, and the IRS need not comply with any procedural restrictions before beginning such 
examination or inspection. If agreed, the US CA will present the request to the foreign CA. 
Protective Measures - Taxpayers may need to take protective measures to make sure any 
agreements made by CAs are not barred by administrative, legal or procedural barriers.
- Rev. Proc. 96-14
This procedure sets forth procedures for requesting CA assistance when a tax case is pending in a 
US court or has been designated for litigation. The procedure provides that relief under Rev. 
Proc. 65-17 can be requested from the appropriate district director, rather than the US CA. Rev. 
Proc. 65-17 sets forth procedures to obtain an adjustment when a taxpayer's taxable income is 
increased because of an allocation of income between related US and foreign corporations under 
IRC 482.
As a concluding note on CAs, Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu International (1998b) said: "To a 
multinational enterprise exposed to double taxation, a well-constructed competent authority 
request can mean the difference between a highly favourable settlement and a slow, expensive 
process that produces an unsatisfactory result."
- Problem of Not Reaching a Conclusion
One of the problems with the competent authority procedure is the lack of any formal 
requirement to reach a solution. OECD (1995) noted that the competent authorities may be 
unable to come to an agreement because of conflicting domestic laws or restrictions imposed by 
domestic laws on the tax administration's power of compromise. If two competent authorities
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fail to agree they have the option to leave the problem as it stands and let the company ultimately 
suffer the consequences of international business. When interviewing Andrew Hickman (1998), 
Competent Authority Specialist at the Inland Revenue (1998), he remarked that although it is 
difficult to reach acceptable agreements with other jurisdictions, that is not the most important 
factor to the Inland Revenue. He said that the International Division would be more concerned 
that the arm's length principle was being applied properly, which supposedly demonstrates a 
willingness to offer foreign tax credits if it means they are going to be more happy with a 
company's application of the ALP rather than compromising to reach an agreement.
The concern of companies over the non-resolution, by competent authorities, of double taxation 
is shown, according to Andrew Hickman (1998), in the relatively marginal execution of the 
mutual agreement procedure compared to the actual occasions of double taxation. In response to 
this, however, Chris Rolfe (1998), International Tax Partner at Coopers and Lybrand (London), 
said that the increasing number of disputes there are around the world has forced companies to 
make more use of the competent authority process. He continued to say that if you asked any 
multinational companies if they had used the mutual agreement procedure and if they intended to 
then the answer would almost certainly be that no one had used it and no one intended to. Now 
the transfer pricing audits are becoming ever more rigorous and the documentation demands ever 
more difficult to comply with that, according to Chris Rolfe (1998): "they (taxpayers) know 
perfectly well that they are going to end up settling in some countries and if they don't put some 
faith in the mutual agreement procedure there really is going to be double taxation here." If that 
faith is met with encouraging outcomes then the process will certainly be invoked in the 
increasing cases of double taxation.
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Some companies alternative opt to absorb the double taxation. Reasons for this include a 
preference not to declare any adjustments suffered to the other jurisdictions and a belief that the 
actual resultant time and cost of the CA procedure would not justify the amount of double 
taxation saved.
Although taxpayers are not helped by the courts, as we have said already that they are averse to 
intervention on the decisions and battles of the competent authorities, taxpayers are aided by the 
recent introduction of the European Arbitration Convention and a number of alternative 
mechanisms for dispute resolution. Some treaties now contain provisions to allow companies to 
pursue further help and mediation.
- Timely and Expensive
"A company will have to go via a competent authority claim through the treaty and a competent 
authority claim is time consuming and an expensive way of approaching the double taxation 
problem" (Dykes, 1998).
It is actually very difficult to measure the average time spent on a case, depends what point one 
could begin timing from and when in the taxpayers' (tax) year they make the claim. It depends 
very much on the response time between the different competent authorities. Andrew Hickman 
(1998) remarked that when the Inland Revenue writes to the IRS it is going to be the first time 
they know of the issue. The company has, therefore, not simultaneously contacted the competent 
authorities with the problem, which might have speeded up the process since both parties would 
have begun at the same time to collect information and create their own negotiating positions.
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Most of the activity involving the Inland Revenue trying to resolve over-taxation also involves 
the IRS. This is a reflection of the trade flows. The regularity of the communication between 
these two bodies and the good relationship created as a result is evidenced in the faster than 
average speed with which most of the double taxation is eliminated. Andrew Hickman (1998) 
estimated an average time of two years spent on such cases. He also pointed out the importance 
of physically meeting one another, the use of video link ups and regular conversations over the 
phone in the resolution process are important in maintaining that good relationship. As trade 
increases and other countries' competent authorities begin to meet more regularly they too will 
have such UK/US relationships, understand and appreciate the approaches of one another and the 
demands expected and this will contribute to the decreasing of time needed per case. A good 
rapport between competent authorities might result in more cases being solved, as they 
understand one another's points of view on matters, but that is not to say the conclusion reached 
will be one which the taxpayer desired. The latter could end up paying more tax in the 
jurisdiction that they did not originally want to.
In addition, the number of transfer pricing disputes on a bi- and multilateral scale is increasing 
and the competent authorities are demanding more and more resources to cope with the work 
created. Andrew Hickman commented that there are currently lots of adjustments being done 
and therefore plenty of work for the International Division to do in this area. Andrew Hickman 
and Daniel O'Marney, however, are the two UK people really responsible for the transfer pricing 
competent authority procedure and as a major trading nation does the UK really have enough 
resources to cope with the amount of work necessary to deal with the cases of double taxation?
Dykes (1998) agreed with Peterson (1994) about the slowness of the procedure and also added 
that it was considered and inflexible process. Peterson (1994) did say, however, that the
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streamlining of the operations of the US process by the ERS Assistant Commissioner in 1993/4 
has made significant improvements decreasing the previous average amount of time required to 
process a case by more than 50 percent. Currently the time needed will have decreased by even 
more than that.
With regards to the cost of the competent authority procedure there are in theory minimal 
additional costs for a taxpayer, since all the information that the competent authority would 
demand from a company should already have been created in keeping with the OECD and US 
transfer pricing rules adapted by at least most of the developed countries. The countries usually 
bear the costs of negotiation as opposed to the taxpayer paying for their services. In comparison 
there are a great deal more expenses for a taxpayer involved in obtaining an APA.
- Updating and Negotiation of Treaties
One bilateral treaty which warrants mentioning is the US/Portugal treaty, an agreement which 
amazingly took over 30 years to negotiate (loannou, 1995). Of course this is an exceptional case, 
most treaties take much quicker than that to reach agreement and are regularly updated to keep 
them relevant to the different countries participating. The OECD (1996) recommended that 
member countries: "Undertake promptly bilateral or multilateral consultations to address 
problems connected with tax treaty provisions, whether arising in their own country or raised by 
countries with which they have treaties
Two press releases issued by the Inland Revenue in October 1997 and December 1997 highlight 
the UK's constant updating and negotiation of new treaties. The former press release announced 
the achievement of concluding 100 treaties as of September 1997, the first country to reach this 
many agreements. In addition, the UK showed continuing commitment to treaties having held
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negotiations since April 1996 with 23 countries, some of which were exploratory, including those 
talks with Kazakhstan, Lithuania and Namibia. Dawn Primarolo MP (Inland Revenue, 1997b), 
Financial Secretary to the Treasury, echoed this opinion in a December press release saying, "I 
want to confirm the Government's commitment to maintaining and to extending the UK's lead in 
the area of Double Taxation Agreements."
- Changing Treaties
Treaties are updated and changed through a process of renegotiation and to enable this to be done 
regularly an end date for treaties is usually included in the agreement, a point whereby the 
treaties are no longer Valid'. It has already been said that competent authorities must tell other 
authorities of changes to their domestic laws, but it is also necessary that treaties be renegotiated 
if critical assumptions change from a result of statutory modification.
- UK Treaty Relief
The UK has the greatest network of double taxation treaties, holding agreements with more than 
100 countries. According to Simon's Tax Cases (1997), the US has treaties with nearly all 
Western European countries with most members of the Commonwealth and with countries such 
as Japan and Israel. Countries who do not participate include many of the Arab countries and tax 
havens, although some agreements exist with the latter countries these are limited to 
arrangements involving transport profits and employees.
- Exchange of Information
Bilateral treaties, as well as providing a mechanism through which the problem of double 
taxation is resolved, they help governments counter tax avoidance and evasion by providing for 
the exchange of information between treaty partners. This means that additional financial
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information, normally out of reach (over the border) from one authority, may be gathered and 
used for administering their domestic tax laws. In the US this is provided in Article 26 of the US 
Model Income Tax Treaty. Article 26 offers eight different ways in which information may by 
exchanged including, amongst others, a routine exchange programme and a simultaneous 
criminal investigation programme.
Arbitration Convention
Unresolved double taxation cases may have recourse to arbitration, although such procedures are 
new and not universally accepted by all OECD countries. In Europe the EU Arbitration 
Convention was signed by the 12 member states of the European Union on 23 July 1990 and 
came into force on 1 January 1995. The Convention was signed initially for a 5 year 
'experimental' period but has not been extended for a further five years. According to Simon 
(1997): "This should do something to assist the taxpayer who finds himself as a shuttlecock 
batted across from one country's competent authority to the other."
The first stage of the proceedings under the convention is the same as the above, with competent 
authorities attempting to reach a solution through mutual agreement. If an agreement is not 
arrived at within two years from the date on which the case was first presented by one of the 
competent authorities, then the taxpayer has the right to have his case decided by a specially set 
up Advisory Commission. In a sense, the convention provides a better alternative for taxpayers 
because, at the final stage, proceedings under the convention produce a ruling which is binding
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on the member states involved, unless the countries decide not to follow the recommendations 
and instead agree to eliminate the double taxation by some other means.
According to the Arbitration Convention, the advisory commission should consist of:
  Two representatives of each competent authority concerned;
  An even number of independent persons of standing;
  A Chairman - to be appointed by the independent persons of standing and must possess the 
qualifications required for appointment to the highest judicial offices in his country or be a 
jurisconsult of recognised competence.
The commission has the authority to demand any information, evidence or documents be 
provided by the enterprises and the competent authorities. This information is strictly 
confidential and if anyone from the commission divulges any information provided to him then 
he can expect to face prosecution.
The advisory commission must present its resolve, found by majority vote, within six months of 
the case being presented, a relatively short time scale which must be attractive to taxpayers. In 
addition, the cost is born by the jurisdictions involved and hence the taxpayer also benefits by not 
bearing any of the costs incurred.
Experience of implementing the provisions of the convention has been negligible. It is possible 
that, in future, there may be increased recourse to the convention following the changes in UK 
domestic law envisaged in the Modernisation of Transfer Pricing Legislation consultative 
document. With the requirement for taxpayers to give more information about inter-related 
transactions there is likely to be an increase in transfer pricing adjustments. It would seem
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sensible for affected taxpayers to consider whether to invoke the convention either instead of, or 
as well as, the mutual agreement procedure article of a double tax treaty if they need to take steps 
to avoid double taxation.
The US also offers an arbitration service which was also passed in 1990 and is contained in Rule 
124. According to Wrappe (1997), Rule 124 both encourages the use of arbitration and 
standardises the basic procedure for choosing arbitration. The most famous case is that of Apple 
Computer and was the only transfer pricing case to be brought to arbitration. The panel rules in 
favour of the IRS after much changing in the ERS position.
ConclusioD
The most popular way of approaching the problem of double taxation is through the 
establishment and maintenance of tax treaties. Opening these lines of communication for tax 
authorities in different jurisdictions facilitates the discussion of the issue of taxation on MNEs 
operating across their borders and broadens awareness of the global operations of companies, the 
Arbitration Convention is really a "last resort" mechanism through which MNEs and tax 
authorities can discuss the issue of taxation if the MNE is seriously unhappy with the outcomes 
and taxation decisions of tax authorities.
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CONCLUSION
MNE growth has resulted in a rapid increase in the total value of IIP transactions and tax 
authorities have realised the level of potential lost tax revenue. In 1992 in the US, Bucks and 
Mazerov (1993) reported that, President Clinton announced the federal government's annual 
loss of at least $10-12 billion in tax revenues.
ITP effects almost every aspect of multinational operations including research and design, 
marketing and distribution as well as the global tax burden (Ernst and Young, 1997a). 
Numerous studies were carried out to determine the primary objectives of MNEs towards 
valuing ITPs to determine which aspects of global operations were most influential.
Governments suspected the sole objective of MNEs was to minimise global taxation. Tax 
minimisation is a major factor in the ability to maximise global profits, but Leith and Barrett 
(1992) said: "It is only one of the many components that follow from ownership, location, and 
internationalisation advantages that arise from market imperfections."
Studies reported similar findings that MNEs aimed to maximise their overall, world-wide 
profit and to achieve this they attempt to minimise the effect of restricting factors. These 
constraints include: varying income taxes and legislation (Arpan, 1992; Borkowski, 1992; 
Ernst and Young, 1997a; Plasschaert, 1979; Tang, 1992; Wu and Sharp, 1979; Yunker, 1982),
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restrictions on profit and dividend repatriation (Arpan, 1992; Plasschaert, 1979; Tang, 1992; 
Yunker, 1982) and custom duties (Arpan, 1992; Plasschaert, 1979; Tang, 1992; Yunker, 
1982). In addition and with the more stringent legislation and guidance of 1994 onwards, 
'new' important considerations arose including documentation preparation for inspection and 
the effect of anti-trust legislation of foreign countries (Borkowski, 1997; Cravens and 
Shearon, 1997; Ernst and Young, 1997a; Tang 1992; Yunker, 1982).
MNEs should carry out analysis of any action they are considering in response to restrictions, 
in terms of the resultant effects on the ability to minimise other restrictions, the administrative 
burden and how this action might be perceived by authorities. The latter is particularly 
relevant to the largest, most 'public' MNEs (Al-Eryani et al, 1990; Benvignati, 1985; and 
Cravens and Shearon, 1997). Cravens and Shearon (1997) concluded that the latter size 
factor together with the legal variable have the only real significance on setting ITPs.
The increase in importance of ITP has warranted it a higher status in the decision-making 
framework of MNEs. Head Office-concentrated decision-making although conflicting with 
the popular adoption of decentralised management is describe by the Ernst and Young 1997 
Transfer Pricing Report that recorded 78% of MNE respondents expecting to face 
examination of their transfer pricing policy in the following two years.
Chapter 2 explored ALP and showed four criticisms highlighted by Bucks and Mazerov 
(1993) and Mazerov (1994) that summed up the failure of ALP as a global solution to transfer 
pricing control: "The arm's length pricing system:
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  costs the federal and state treasuries billions of dollars annually in unjustified and 
unnecessary revenue losses;
  diverts too many scarce resources to tax planning, complex accounting and auditing 
practices and lengthy litigation;
  creates inequities in tax payments and thereby tilts the competitive playing field by 
allowing global corporations to play transfer pricing games that entirely domestic firms are 
not even eligible to enter; and
  fails to guarantee any substantial degree of international uniformity in the division of 
income for tax purposes.
The 'fairness1 behind the theory of ALP is good, but inherently the theory is inapplicable in all 
but the simplest transactions, rendering the three traditional transactional methods extraneous. 
ALP was introduced by the US and supported by the OECD when transactions and the 
structure of MNEs were much simpler. The growing complexities of MNEs, by their growth, 
size, and their nature equates to monopolistic characteristics. Regardless of these problems 
ALP is vastly acknowledged, which has taken time to achieve, and supposedly produces 
generally acceptable levels of income.
Because ALP is so well known, it would be too difficult, almost impossible, to replace it with 
something which would be as expansively recognised. It may be argued, however, that ALP 
is out of date, that although the principle is fair, the complexity of interrelated transactions 
renders TPMs relevant to a limited number of transactions. MNEs are expending huge 
resources attempting to show that the TPMs are relevant to all their transactions because they
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do not want to face expensive investigation. It may also be argued, however, that ALP has 
evolved significantly in order to be relevant to the current global operations of MNEs, new 
methods and guidelines have been introduced, with the most specific changes relating to 
intangible property. This latter argument would appear to be the most popular, with countries 
continuing to use and adopt systems very similar to the US and OECD. One example 
investigated in this thesis was the UK (a well-developed, major trading nation) which has 
recently updated its regulations to echo the OECD application of ALP.
Adopting an alternative, although at present there is an absence of real options, would create 
whole new opportunities for double taxation and international dispute during the interim 
changing over period (which could take more than twenty years).
Chapter 2 looked at the problems introducing a new system based on global formulary 
apportionment (GFA) would bring and this would be the same for any alternative. GFA as 
the next 'best' alternative has not gained sufficient support to threaten the existence of ALP. 
Recommended by the US, particularly North Dakota and California where it has been 
adopted, GFA is argued to be a method using an accounting system most fitting to the reality 
of world trade conducted within a global enterprise. Audits would also be less time 
consuming. However, ALP is better equipped to cope with the changing exchange rates, 
differing accounting standards and use of multiple currencies (OECD, 1995). In addition, 
OECD (1995) argued that the cost savings of quicker audits are insignificant to the funds 
required to cover "intolerable compliance costs and data requirements" of GFA.
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Chapter three explored the success of supplementary 'profit-based' methods in capturing the 
huge proportion of inter-related transactions that rendered inappropriate the use of the three 
traditional transaction methods. Some people have interpreted this use of profit-based 
comparisons as further indication of the failure of ALP.
Profit-based methods, by not depending on the comparability of inter-related and independent 
transactions, offer more flexibility than traditional TPMs. As opposed to TPMs, profit-based 
methods could find arm's length prices for intangible property.
The profit-split method is the most notable profit-based method, but its use is limited by the 
necessity for all relevant revenue authorities to agree on the underlying basis for allocating 
profits (Stitt, 1995).
The rapid growth of intangible property has caused huge problems, particularly as there are no 
exact comparables and no necessary links between the value of an intangible and the cost of 
maintaining it. Cost-sharing provisions, accepted by the OECD and US, provided for the 
expected benefits of an intangible to each party to be in proportion to the risk-sharing and cost 
contribution. The "commensurate with income" was founded on this idea and, although a 
'fair' premise, problems have been experienced over documentation requirements to 
demonstrate profit distributions of intangible property in accordance to cost contributions.
CPM, as a TPM, demands the easiest and cheapest type of analysis is performed and although 
transfer prices are complicated to set they are the easiest to check. However, CPM is far from
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receiving global approval, there is still debate over the arguable, non-arm's length 
characteristics of CPM. The harmonisation process has given some positive support to CPM 
as a last resort TPM.
There can be no doubt that there has been some collusion between the OECD and the US over 
ITP because of the resultant similarities between the guidelines and regulations. They 
continue to support ALP and deny the future of unitary approaches in ITP.
The core of harmonisation focused on the adoption of similar best method approaches. Under 
the latter, the over-riding preference (blatant in previous guidelines and regulations) for the 
use of traditional transaction methods were relaxed, instead taxpayers have 'freedom1 to select 
and document use of any TPM, albeit the most appropriate one under the individual facts and 
circumstances.
The best method approach laid down the foundations for the introduction of TNMM in the 
OECD 1995 guidelines and the wider (although still minimal) acceptance of CPM. This is 
because the methods must be proved to be the most applicable TPM (in the US) and to adhere 
to the ALP (in the OECD) before tax authorities will accept them pricing inter-related 
transactions. The OECD accepted that the CPM could have some use in ITP, although it still 
has no plans to introduce CPM into future versions of the guidelines. Instead the OECD has 
provided a more acceptable orchestration of CPM in the form of the TNMM with some clear 
differences between the two.
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The OECD and US provide similar standards of comparability in their regulations/guidelines 
and agree with the need for: functional analysis; acceptable arm's length ranges; and the use of 
multiple year data. They admit to difficulties in carrying out the above when transactions 
involve valuable intangible property. The US regulations allow for periodic adjustments to 
royalty rates whilst the OECD is openly cautious about this approach.
The US regulations and OECD guidelines have not relieved the expansive documentation 
requirements. There is a greater burden on US-based MNEs and penalties maintain control 
over taxpayers in the US to ensure their compliance with the requisite information. The use of 
penalties to control taxpayers and maximise their tax revenue stream has appealed to 
numerous jurisdictions (including Japan and the UK) despite the prudent approach 
recommended by the OECD.
The real result of harmonisation is, according to Greenhill and Bee (1996), that "US taxpayers
who comply with Section 482 regulations should not be exposed to a significant risk of
double taxation in OECD member countries" and vice versa.
The future should, therefore, be about trying to make the ALP (in the guidelines and
regulations together) more relevant and up to date with global trading. In addition, taxpayers
need more help deciding and documenting the most appropriate TPMs, for example with the
provision of more case studies on the five approved methods. In addition to the latter, the
OECD (1997) are concerned with the following two areas:
application of the general principles of the guidelines in complex situations; and
improvement of the implementation of the guidelines and the design of administrative
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procedures.
The US should also be concerned with the above problems with reference to their own 
regulations.
The OECD guidelines and the US regulations have brought enormous world-wide attention to 
ITP. Particularly in the last fifteen years, countries have learnt about the potential tax 
manipulation ITP practices of MNEs, seen the potential increase in tax revenue from placing 
some controls, and introduced a system based on the ALP. Chapter 6 shows a 'knock-on1 
effect in the history of ITP policing. The US introduced ALP in an effort to minimise lost tax 
revenues from tax manipulation. The US then aimed to educate the world about the use of 
ALP and the OECD, being one of the first to recognise ALP, introduced ITP guidelines. Over 
the past fifteen years in particular, a majority of countries have learnt from the changing ITP 
regulations and guidelines and have issued measures themselves. These have mostly mirrored 
the OECD 1995 guidelines. Chapter 7 showed that the UK was a typical example.
The introduction of AP As offered companies the opportunity to approach tax administrations 
and present their business with what they perceived to be the most applicable (or least 
inapplicable) TPM for open discussion in advance of actually setting them. This "open 
forum" approach is certainly something that could aid support in the future for the ALP, 
although some critics have noted that the introduction of APAs is a statement of the failure of 
ALP.
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APAs offer chances for MNEs to show the profits of businesses carrying out similar 
transactions and present cases why they differ in make-up and would differ in their policies. 
Instead of being defensive about their TPMs they can present them positively.
APAs 'could' be a positive step in the transfer pricing debate; however, the number of 
drawbacks that exist currently prevents a very large demand for them. They are too 
prescriptive and structured, particularly when thinking of the US system (Canada, for 
example, offers a much more relaxed approach). APAs generally ask for too much from a 
taxpayer, for too much detail, too much time and too much sensitive data to be revealed.
The first case, Apple Computer, is an example of a company that suffered repeated transfer 
pricing enquiries and adjustments and had no other option but APAs. Certainly, they are 
increasing in popularity, but perhaps more as a result (as with Apple Computer) of the failure 
of companies to support their TPMs convincingly enough not to face continued and repetitive 
attention combined with transfer pricing adjustments.
Hopefully over time APA processes will be refined and companies will approach them not as 
a last resort but as the most beneficial and most appropriate ITP option available to them. A 
relaxation in the regulations would encourage a greater all round appreciation of pre-TPM 
setting negotiations and a willingness to settle transfer pricing problems in a less hostile 
environment.
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With the lack of alternatives to ALP, APAs, with an adequate number of trained tax officials, 
are the only way to stop the level of legislation world-wide spiralling out of control in the 
competition among governments to claim the most tax dollars.
In addition, the huge network of double tax treaties would keep governments aware of each 
other's position on MNE taxation and allow information exchange to increase their knowledge 
of the MNEs global operations. In the past governments have only been able to guess at an 
MNE's global operations from the data they received on the trade involving their country. 
This has resulted in an atmosphere of distrust of the objectives of MNEs. A government's 
appreciation of the tax demands of other governments on an MNE and an MNEs 
understanding that a government is educated in the MNE's global trading would create a more 
informed environment in which to communicate.
The future of ITP is uncertain. On the one hand legislation could become ever more 
prescriptive, restrictive on taxpayers and increasingly penalty-policed. With the growth of 
treaty networks and the global exchange of information on MNEs amongst governments, 
combined with most countries being aware of ITP and adopting systems mirroring the OECD 
and US, including increasing 'open-forum' APAs, there does not appear to be a need for more 
restrictive regulations. This would only lead to further bad feeling on the part of MNEs 
towards governments and further inhibit world trade (since ITP regulation is already a 
significant cost of world-trade).
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An alternative and more realistic future is that the treaty networks and inter-governmental 
communication networks could develop such that jurisdictions could decide together the 
proportion of an MNE's global profit taxable in each jurisdiction. This option, however, is the 
most government-biased one i.e. the authorities could decide, regardless of an MNE's 
contribution, where different proportions of the profits would be taxed. The benefit to MNE's 
with this is that the resource expenditure would be absorbed mostly by the tax 
administrations.
The final option is that ALP as a whole could be replaced and this is unlikely in the present 
absence of realistic alternatives. As ALP becomes more widely acknowledged as an 
inapplicable solution to ITP, especially with future advances in global trading, and with 
knowledge of an alternative course then the future of ALP will obviously need to be re- 
examined.
The realistic future, and indeed the direction of international transfer pricing appears to be 
going in, is a combination of a relaxing in the rules for obtaining APAs and a maximisation in 
the use of the treaty networks. These options offer the most success of making ALP usable 
for the longest period of time, perhaps because the emphasis is away from the actual TPM and 
towards open discussion and information exchange on the operations of MNEs.
APPENDICES
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APPENDIX 1
ESTIMATES OF THE VALUE OF TRANSFER PRICING TRANSACTIONS.
"The Ruding Committee (1992) estimated the value of transfer pricing transactions involving 
EC countries based on 1989 data. Although sizeable amounts, these estimates do not include 
payments for services, interest, royalties, licences, and know-how fees."
Transfer prices within the EC
Transfer prices EC : North/South America
Transfer prices EC : Asia/Pacific
Transfer prices EC : Rest of world
TOTAL
billions ECUs
307
108
90
226
731
Source: Elliott, J. 1995. Transfer Pricing. Intelligent Systems in Accounting and
Finance.
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APPENDIX 2
DIFFERENCE IN IMPORTANCE OF VARIABLES IN TRANSFER PRICING 
DETERMINATION
Income Tax
Customs Duties
Inflation
Changes in currency rates
Exchange controls
Improving financial appearance 
of subsidiary
Expropriation
Export subsidiaries and tax 
credits
Level of competition
PARENT NATIONALITY
USA
1
2
1
3
2
3
3
4
4
Canada
1
2
2
3
3
3
3
2
2
France
1
2
2
2
5
3
5
2
2
W Germany
3
3
2
2
5
4
5
4
3
Italy
1
3
2
3
5
4
5
2
2
Scandinavia
3
3
3
3
5
4
5
4
3
UK
3
3
2
2
5
1
5
2
3
Weighting Scale:
3
4
High importance 
Medium importance 
Low importance
Not mentioned
Mentioned only with respect to non-US operations
Source: Arpan, J.S. 1988. International Intercorporate Pricing
in Issues in Multinational Accounting eds. Nodes, C. and Parker, R.
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APPENDIX 3
PROFIT SPLIT METHOD DEFINITION FROM 1993 US TEMPORARY 
REGULATIONS
Three methods
1. "Residual allocation " profit split method. 
It has a two step approach:
Identify parties' routine functions and assigning a market return to those functions 
Dividing residual profit on the basis of relative value of each party's contribution of 
intangible property.
2. "Capital employed allocation " profit split method.
Allocates combined profit or loss based on the ratio of the relative capital employed by the 
controlled taxpayers.
3. "Comparable " profit split method.
Based on the relative profits of uncontrolled taxpayers engaged in transactions and 
functions similar to those of the controlled taxpayer.
Source: Ogum, G. and Kirn, K.A. 1995. New US International Transfer Pricing 
Regulations. Multinational Business Review. Spring.
221
APPENDIX 4
CPM DEFINITION TAKEN FROM 1993 US TEMPORARY REGULATIONS
Taxpayers should apply several steps when using the CPM:
First: Determine the "tested" party
This party is ordinarily the controlled taxpayer that performs the simplest and, 
therefore, most easily compared operations.
Second: Determine the appropriate "business segment"
To evaluate the tested party. Generally the CPM is applied separately to each 
industry.
Third: Select comparable companies for benchmarking purposes
The greater the similarity of the comparable, the more reliable it is as the 
measure of the arm's length price.
Fourth: Make adjustments
To improve consistency and to achieve greater similarity between comparable 
parties and the tested party.
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Fifth: Must determine appropriate profit-level indicators
For example, financial ratios, such as return on capital or return on operating 
assets, that measure the relationships between profits, costs incurred, and 
resources employed.
Sixth: Apply the single best price-level indicator
Apply against the company results to simulate a range of "constructed 
operating income" results.
In other words, if taxpayers take these steps and make all the necessary adjustments, their 
arm's length range would include all constructed operating profits derived from the 
comparables.
Source: Ogum, G. and Kirn, K.A. 1995. New US International Transfer Pricing 
Regulations. Multinational Business Review. Spring.
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APPENDIX 5
UK 1970 TAXES MANAGEMENT ACT - SECTION 30C
Determinants Requiring the Sanction of the Board
1. This section has effect where a determination requiring the Board's sanction is made for 
any of the following purposes, that is to say -
a) the giving of a notice under section 28A(5) or 28B(5) of this Act stating the conclusions 
of an officer of the Board in relation to any self assessment or partnership statement;
b) the making of an assessment under section 29 of this Act; or
c) the giving of a notice under section 30B(1) of this Act amending a partnership statement.
2. If the notice under section 28A(5), 28B(5) or 30B(1) of this Act or, as the case may be, the 
notice of the assessment under section 29 of this Act is given to any person without -
a) the determination, so far as it is taken into account in the notice, having been approved by 
the Board, or
b) a copy of the Board's approval having been served on that person at or before the time of 
the giving of the notice, the notice under section 28A(5), 28B(5) or 30B(1) or, as the case 
may be, the assessment under section 29 shall be deemed to have been given or made (and 
in the case of an assessment notified) in the terms (if any) in which it would have been 
given or made had that determination not been taken into account.
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3. For the purposes of this section the Board's approval of a determination requiring their 
sanction -
a) must be given specifically in relation to the case in question and must apply to the amount 
determined; but
b) subject to that, may be given by the Board (either before or after the making of the 
determination) in any such form or manner as they may determine.
4. In this section references to a determination requiring the Board's sanction are references 
(subject to subsection 5 below) to any determination of an amount falling to be brought 
into account for tax purposes in respect of any assumption made by virtue of paragraph 
1(2) of Schedule 28AA to the principal Act (provision not at arm's length).
5. For the purposes of this section a determination shall be taken, in relation to a notice under 
section 28A(5), 28B(5) or 30B(1) of this Act or an assessment under section 29 of this 
Act, not to be a determination requiring the Board's sanction if-
a) an agreement about the matters to which the determination relates has been made between 
an officer of the Board and the person in whose case it is made;
b) that agreement is in force at the time of the giving of the notice or, as the case may be, of 
any notice of the assessment; and
c) the matters to which the agreement relates include the amount determined.
6. For the purposes of subsection 5 above an agreement made between an officer of the 
Board and any person ("the taxpayer") in relation to any matter shall be taken to be in
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force at any time if, and only if -
a) the agreement is one which has been made or confirmed in writing; 
that time is after the end of the period of thirty days beginning - 
i) in the case of an agreement made in writing, with the day of the making of the
agreement, and 
ii) in any other case, with the day of the agreement's confirmation in writing.
Source: Inland Revenue. 1997. Modernisation of the Transfer Pricing Legislation. 
Consultative document.
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APPENDIX 6
UK TRANSFER PRICING DOCUMENTATION REQUIREMENT
Consultative Document
Appendix II: Documentation Requirement
This guidance note explains the Inland Revenue's approach to construing this record-keeping 
requirement for the purposes of the transfer pricing legislation. It sets out the sorts of 
documents which the Inland Revenue expects taxpayers to prepare and retain for tax purposes. 
It also gives details of those records which should be retained if (but only if) taxpayers 
prepare them for their own commercial reasons. And it gives an indication of the records 
which taxpayers are not expected to prepare or retain.
Documents which taxpayers are expected to prepare and retain
The Inland Revenue expects documentation in relation to a taxpayer's transfer pricing 
arrangements to be created or referred to and retained in accordance with the same prudent 
business management principles which would govern the process of evaluating a business 
decision of a similar level of complexity and importance. These records should show a 
taxpayer's efforts to comply with the arm's length principle and should include the information
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on which any transfer prices were based, a record of the factors taken into account and details 
of the method selected.
For each period, such records will normally be expected to include:
  a record of the taxpayer's relevant transactions and the extent of any other commercial or 
financial relations with associated enterprises within the scope of the legislation;
  a record of the nature and terms of any transactions with associated enterprises within the 
scope of the legislation, and where the terms of any transaction change during the period, a 
record of the re-negotiation of those terms and the circumstances giving rise to the change;
  all commercial agreements entered into by the taxpayer, whether with associated
enterprises within the scope of the legislation or with independent third parties, including:
distribution agreements
manufacture or supply agreements
service contracts
agreements relating to research and development
loan or other financial agreements
licence agreements
cost-sharing agreements, 
and any other documents relating to the negotiation of the terms of these agreements;
  all investment appraisals undertaken by the taxpayer in relation to an investment in or 
involving associated enterprises within the scope of the legislation;
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in relation to transactions or series of transactions involving associated enterprises
considered in evaluating its transfer pricing arrangements under the arm's length principle,
including a record of the factors taken into account and of the decision-making process;
in relation to transactions or series of transactions involving associated enterprises within
the scope of the legislation, a record of the transfer pricing method selected and why it was
considered it would produce arm's length pricing; where the application of the transfer
pricing method selected relies on comparability data (prices, margins etc.) any such data
used by the taxpayer in the application of the method should also be retained;
a record of any price negotiations with associated enterprises within the scope of the
legislation;
a record of any offsetting transactions taken into account in determining the pricing for any
transactions or series of transactions involving associated enterprises within the scope of
the legislation;
a record of the nature, terms and pricing relating to any uncontrolled transactions or series
of transactions in which the taxpayer was involved, and which are relevant for determining
the arm's length price for any comparable transactions or series of transactions involving
the taxpayer and an associated enterprise within the scope of the legislation;
a record of any business or management or pricing strategy adopted by the taxpayer and the
reasons for adopting it;
a record of any budgets or forecasts prepared; where budgets or forecasts are prepared by
reference not only to the taxpayer's business as a whole, but also to each separate business,
trade or division and/or to each product or product line, these should also be retained by the
taxpayer;
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a record of any financial including profit and loss information prepared; where financial 
information was prepared by reference not only to a taxpayer's business as a whole but also 
to each separate business, trade or division and/or to each product or product line, this 
should also be retained by the taxpayer.
The Inland Revenue considers that most of the records listed above would be prepared by 
most taxpayers in accordance with the principles of prudent business management without 
reference to tax considerations. It may, however, be necessary for taxpayers to prepare or 
refer to documents of the kind listed above which would not have been prepared or referred to 
in the absence of tax considerations. Taxpayers are only expected to prepare or retain such 
records if they are indispensable for a reasonable assessment of whether the taxpayer's transfer 
pricing arrangements reflected in its tax returns satisfy the arm's length principle and can be 
prepared or retained by the taxpayer without a disproportionately high cost being incurred.
Many of the records listed above will be prepared by a taxpayer every year. In some cases, 
however, taxpayers may not judge it necessary to prepare a new record every year - for 
example in relation to the transfer pricing method selected and the reasons for selecting it. 
Where there has been no material change in the relevant circumstances, the Inland Revenue 
accepts that records prepared in a previous accounting period, which are relevant to the 
transfer pricing arrangements adopted in the accounting period under review, may satisfy the 
record keeping requirement.
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Documents which taxpayers should retain if they prepare or obtain them
Some taxpayers undertake considerable in-depth analysis in developing and implementing an 
overall group-wide transfer pricing policy, perhaps for other commercial reasons. Where such 
analysis is undertaken, any documents, reports or other records produced or obtained should 
be retained by the taxpayer.
Such records might include the following:
  a formal written statement of the taxpayer's transfer pricing policy;
  a pricing appraisal or other report giving consideration to the basis on which a taxpayer's 
transfer prices should be set and the factors to be taken into account;
  a comparability analysis, whether by reference to individual transactions or series of 
transactions;
  a functional analysis.
The Inland Revenue does not expect a taxpayer routinely to prepare such documents, reports 
or other records solely for UK tax purposes. However, it may be necessary for taxpayers to 
undertake some analysis of this kind during the course of any transfer pricing enquiry.
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Documents which taxpayers are not expected to prepare or retain
The Inland Revenue will not expect taxpayers to:
  determine which, of a number of appropriate options, is the 'best' transfer pricing method;
  consider comparable data (prices, margins, etc.) from any uncontrolled transactions or 
series of transactions to which the taxpayer or an associated enterprise was not a party, 
unless such data is available to them.
The Inland Revenue will not expect taxpayers to prepare any documents in relation to such 
considerations.
Source: Inland Revenue. 1997. Modernisation of the Transfer Pricing Legislation. 
Consultative document.
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APPENDIX 7
QUESTIONS ON THE UK USE OF ADVANCE PRICING AGREEMENTS
Chapter 6: Administrative Issues 
Section I: Advance Pricing Agreements
6.41 General comments arising from this brief overview of APAs would be welcome. In 
addition the Government invites taxpayers' views relating to the following questions:
Is there support for the proposition that the Inland Revenue should make the APA process 
available to taxpayers? Is that support affected by the proposed legislative changes 
discussed in this document?
Is that support qualified by perceived disadvantages in the APA procedure as it is currently 
understood? What are those disadvantages and how might they be removed?
Does the Mutual Agreement Procedure afford a satisfactory means by which UK taxpayers 
may obtain an APA, or would formal domestic legislative provisions be preferable? If 
preferable, is this essentially in order to establish domestic legal authority or in order to 
alter the procedure?
233
Is there perceived to be a lack of understanding about the procedures by which APAs may 
be obtained, and would the issue of guidance notes be helpful?
Is there an interest in applying for APAs on a unilateral basis, that is an understanding with 
the UK tax administration alone, bearing in mind both that any such arrangements may not 
eliminate double taxation and that they are informal and non-binding?
Source: Inland Revenue. 199 7. Modernisation of the Transfer Pricing Legislation. 
Consultative document
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APPENDIX 8
ARTICLE 9 OF OECD MODEL TAX TREATY
1. Where
a) an enterprise of a Contracting State participates directly or indirectly in the
management, control or capital of an enterprise of the other Contracting State, 
or
b) the same person participates directly or indirectly in the management, control 
or capital or an enterprise of a Contracting State and an enterprise of the other 
Contracting State,
and in either case conditions are made or imposed between the two enterprises in their 
commercial or financial relations which differ from those which would be made between 
independent enterprises, then any profits which would, but for those conditions, have accrued 
to one of the enterprises, but by reason of those conditions, have not so accrued, may be 
included in the profits of that enterprise and taxed accordingly.
2. Where a Contracting State includes in the profits of an enterprise of that State - and taxes 
accordingly - profits on which an enterprise of the other Contracting State has been charged to 
tax in that other State and the profits so included are profits which would have accrued to the 
enterprise of the first-mentioned State if the conditions made between the two enterprises had 
been those which would have been made between independent enterprises, then that other
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State shall make an appropriate adjustment to the amount of tax charged therein on those 
profits. In determining such adjustment, due regard shall be had to the other provisions of this 
Convention and the competent authorities of the Contracting States shall if necessary consult 
each other.
Source: Inland Revenue. 1997. Modernisation of the Transfer Pricing Legislation. 
Consultative document.
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GLOSSARY
The following glossary is extracted from the 1995 OECD Guidelines for reference.
Advance Pricing Agreement (APA)
An arrangement that determines, in advance of controlled transactions, an appropriate set of 
criteria (e.g. method, comparables and appropriate adjustments thereto, critical assumptions as 
to future events) for the determination of the transfer pricing for those transactions over a 
fixed period of time. An advance pricing arrangement may be unilateral involving one tax 
administration and a taxpayer or multilateral involving the agreement of two or more tax 
administrations.
Arm's Length Principle
The international standard that OECD Member countries have agreed should be used for 
determining transfer prices for tax purposes. It is set forth in Article 9 of the OECD Model 
Tax Convention as follows: where "conditions are made or imposed between the two 
enterprises in their commercial or financial relations which differ from those which would be 
made between independent enterprises, then any profits which would, but for those
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conditions, have accrued to one of the enterprises, but, by reason of those conditions, have not 
so accrued, may be included in the profits of that enterprise and taxed accordingly".
Arm's Length Range
A range of figures that are acceptable for establishing whether the conditions of a controlled 
transaction are arm's length and that are derived either from applying the same transfer pricing 
method to multiple comparable data or from applying different transfer pricing methods.
Associated Enterprises
Two enterprises are associated enterprises with respect to each other if one of the enterprises 
meets the conditions of Article 9, sub-paragraphs la) or Ib) of the OECD Model Tax 
Convention with respect to the other enterprise.
Comparability Analysis
A comparison of a controlled transaction with an uncontrolled transaction or transactions. 
Controlled and uncontrolled transactions are comparable if none of the differences between 
the transactions could materially affect the factor being examined in the methodology (e.g.
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price or margin), or if reasonably accurate adjustments can be made to eliminate the material 
effects of any such differences.
Comparable Uncontrolled Price (CUP)
A transfer pricing method that compares the price for property or services transferred in a 
controlled transaction to the price charged for property or services transferred in a comparable 
uncontrolled transaction in comparable circumstances.
Compensating Adjustment
An adjustment in which the taxpayer reports a transfer price for tax purposes that is, in the 
taxpayer's opinion, an arm's length price for a controlled transaction, even though this price 
differs from the amount actually charged between the associated enterprises. This adjustment 
would be made before the tax return is filed.
Contribution Analysis
An analysis used in the profit split method under which the combined profits from controlled 
transactions are divided between the associated enterprises based upon the relative value of
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the functions performed (taking into account assets used and risks assumed) by each of the 
associated enterprises participating in those transactions, supplemented as much as possible 
by external market data that indicate how independent enterprises would have divided profits 
in similar circumstances.
Controlled Transactions
Transactions between two enterprises that are associated enterprises with respect to each 
other.
Corresponding Adjustment
An adjustment to the tax liability of the associated enterprise in a second tax jurisdiction made 
by the tax administration of that jurisdiction, corresponding to a primary adjustment made by 
the tax administration in a first tax jurisdiction, so that the allocation of profits by the two 
jurisdictions is consistent.
Cost Plus Mark Up
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A mark up that is measured by reference to margins computed after the direct and indirect 
costs incurred by a supplier of property or services in a transaction.
Cost Plus Method
A transfer pricing method using the costs incurred by the supplier of property (or services) in 
a controlled transaction. An appropriate cost plus mark up is added to this cost, to make an 
appropriate profit in light of the functions performed (taking into account assets used and risks 
assumed) and the market conditions. What is arrived at after adding the cost plus mark up to 
the above costs may be regarded as an arm's length price of the original controlled transaction.
Direct Costs
Costs that are incurred specifically for producing a product or rendering service, such as the 
cost of raw materials.
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Functional Analysis
An analysis of the functions performed (taking into account assets used and risks assumed) by 
associated enterprises in controlled transactions and by independent enterprises in comparable 
uncontrolled transactions.
Global Formulary Apportionment
A method to allocate the global profits of an MNE group on a consolidated basis among the 
associated enterprises in different countries on the basis of a predetermined formula.
Gross Profits
The gross profits from a business transaction are the amount computed by deducting from the 
gross receipts of the transaction the allocable purchases or production costs of sales, with due 
adjustment for increases or decreases in inventory or stock-in-trade, but without taking 
account of other expenses.
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Independent Enterprises
Two enterprises are independent enterprises with respect to each other if they are not 
associated enterprises with respect to each other.
Indirect Costs
Costs of producing a product or service, which, although closely related to the production 
process, may be common to several products or services (for example, the costs of a repair 
department that services equipment used to produce different products).
Multinational Enterprise Group (MNE group)
A group of associated companies with business establishments in two or more countries.
Multinational Enterprise
A company that is part of an MNE group.
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Mutual Agreement Procedure
A means through which tax administrations consult to resolve disputed regarding the 
application of double tax conventions. This procedure, described and authorised by Article 25 
of the OECD Model Tax Convention, can be used to eliminate double taxation that could arise 
from a transfer pricing adjustment.
Profit Split Method
A transactional profit split method that identifies the combined profit to be split for the 
associated enterprises from a controlled transaction (or controlled transactions that it is 
appropriate to aggregate under the principles of Chapter I) and then splits those profits 
between the associated enterprises based upon an economically valid basis that approximated 
the division of profits that would have been anticipated and reflected in an agreement made at 
arm's length.
Resale Price Margin
A margin representing the amount out of which a reseller would seek to cover its selling and 
other operating expenses and, in light of the functions performed (taking into account assets 
used and risks assumed), make an appropriate profit.
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Resale Price Method
A transfer pricing method based on the price at which a product that has been purchased from 
an associated enterprise is resold to an independent enterprise. The resale price is reduced by 
the resale price margin. What is left after subtracting the resale price margin can be regarded, 
after adjustment for other costs associated with the purchase of the product (e.g. custom 
duties), as an arm's length price of the original transfer of property between the associated 
enterprises.
Residual Analysis
An analysis used in the profit split method divides the combined profit from the controlled 
transactions under examination in two stages. In the first stage, each participant is allocated 
sufficient profit to provide it with a basic return appropriate for the type of transactions in 
which it is engaged. Ordinarily this basic return would generally not account for the return 
that would be generated by any unique and valuable assets possessed by the participants. In 
the second stage, any residual profit (or loss) remaining after the first stage division would be 
allocated among the parties based on an analysis of the facts and circumstances that might 
indicate how this residual would have been divided between independent enterprises.
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Secondary Adjustment
An adjustment that arises from imposing tax on a secondary transaction.
Secondary Transaction
A constructive transaction that some countries will assert under their domestic legislation after 
having proposed a primary adjustment in order to make the actual allocation of profits 
consistent with the primary adjustment. Secondary transactions may take the form of 
constructive dividends, constructive equity contributions, or constructive loans.
Simultaneous Tax Examinations
A simultaneous tax examination, as defined in Part A of the OECD Model Agreement for the 
Undertaking of Simultaneous Tax Examinations, means an "arrangement between two or 
more parties to examine simultaneously and independently, each on its own territory, the tax 
affairs of (a) taxpayer(s) in which they have a common or related interest with a view to 
exchanging any relevant information which they so obtain".
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Traditional Transaction Methods
The comparable uncontrolled price method, the resale price method, and the cost plus method.
Transactional Net Margin Method
A transactional profit method that examines the net profit margin relative to an appropriate 
base (e.g. costs, sales, assets) that a taxpayer realises from a controlled transaction (or 
transaction that it is appropriate to aggregate under the principles of Chapter I).
Transactional Profit Method
A transfer pricing method that examines the profits that arise from particular controlled 
transactions of one or more of the associated enterprises participating in those transactions.
Uncontrolled Transactions
Transactions between enterprises that are independent enterprises with respect to each other.
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